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This thesis contributes to the recent scholarly re-evaluation of  Karl Barth’s moral theology 
through an examination of  the theme of  human responsibility in his thought. The language 
of  responsibility recurs throughout Barth’s ethical writings, and its frequency and strategic 
significance in his articulation of  the nature of  the active human agent in Christian ethics 
means it is worthy of  scholarly consideration. To date, no extended study of  this topic in 
Barth’s thought exists, and, apart from critical summaries of  his use of  responsibility 
language in select parts of  the Church Dogmatics in corners of  the secondary literature, 
responsibility-ethicists have tended to ignore Barth’s work on this topic. My intention, 
through exegetical reading of  several key texts, is to provide explication, clarification, and 
analysis of  his understanding of  human responsibility. On the basis of  this exegetical work I 
shall argue that the idea of  responsibility is in fact a key component of  Barth’s theological 
ethics and significantly informs his presentation of  human agency. 
 Following the introductory chapter, the central chapters of  the thesis are exegetical 
readings of  human responsibility in three major texts from the Barth corpus: the Ethics 
lectures; the ethics of  CD II/2; and the special ethics of  CD III/4. The fifth and final 
chapter is a synopsis of  the development of  Barth’s understanding and his articulation of  
human responsibility across these texts. My constructive proposal as to how we may 
understand Barth’s overall account is based on the preceding exegetical work. I argue that 
the ethics of  the Church Dogmatics ought to be read together, and that in doing so we see that 
the mature Barth offers: 1) a theological description of  human responsibility, which I argue 
is a kind of  moral ontology in which the human agent is called to inhabit a particular space 
in relation to God; and 2) concrete indications of  the kind of  responsible actions that 
represent and enable the embedding of  that description in human life. He develops what I 
term “indicative practices” which give shape to human lives, enabling human agents to 
navigate the moral space into which they have been placed. These two elements taken 
together are, I suggest, the sum of  Barth’s account of  human responsibility. 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All abbreviated references to the Church Dogmatics and Kirchliche Dogmatik will be followed by 
the volume number, part-volume number, and page reference; for example CD II/2, 631. In 
each footnoted reference to primary texts the English edition will be followed by the 
German edition in parenthesis; for example CD II/2, 631 (KD II/2, 701). 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Human Responsibility in Barth’s Moral Theology 
1.1 Introduction and Rationale 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the ongoing scholarly re-appraisal of  the theological ethics 
of  Karl Barth by attending to the theme of  human responsibility in his moral theology. For 
most of  the twentieth century Barth’s approach to ethical reasoning in general, and to 
human agency in particular, was regarded with indifference or hostility due to his 
methodological decision to treat ethics in the genre of  dogmatic theology. This decision 
meant that many felt Barth emphasised theological priorities such as divine sovereignty and 
revelation at the expense of  anthropological considerations, and was therefore unable to 
speak about human being and action. His so-called ethics was therefore useless for thinking 
about human action because it was encumbered by the need to speak foremost about divine 
action. The recent challenge to this critical reading of  Barth has sought to understand his 
theological ethics ‘from within’ by investigating, describing and analysing the theological 
contours of  his approach, and taking seriously his ethical claims in the light of  the results. 
Such readings have been illuminating not least because they are more sympathetic to Barth’s 
concerns. Sympathy is not an indication of  a lack of  intellectual rigour or suggestive that the 
theologians engaged in this re-reading are all ‘Barthians’,  but rather speaks of  an openness 
to reading Barth as he wished to be read and in that way to making sense of  his claim to be 
engaged in Christian ethics. This re-appraisal is ongoing, but several strides forward have 
been made. Recent studies have explored issues relating to the structure of  Barth’s moral 
theology; the relationship between dogmatic claims on the one hand and concrete ethics on 
the other; and particular themes in Barth’s ethical thought. I shall discuss these further in 
section 1.2. One theme in Barth’s thought that has not yet been discussed in detail, and on 
which no monograph-length studies exist at all, is human responsibility. 
 The lack of  attention paid to Barth’s responsibility ethics is nothing short of  a lacuna 
in our understanding of  his moral theology which needs to be filled, for two reasons. The 
first is because the frequency of  instances of  responsibility language throughout the Barth 
corpus is high, and this indicates that human responsibility was an important recurring idea 
for him. From his earliest occasional writing and lecturing on ethics, through to the first 
systematic treatment in the Ethics lectures, and finally the ethical sections of  the Church 
Dogmatics, Barth consistently deployed the language of  responsibility to talk about human 
agents. It is an important element of  both his theological description of  the human agent 
and also the way he thinks the Christian life must actually be lived, and even a casual reading 
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of  his ethics would throw up several occasions in which the language of  responsibility is 
used in this way. By making Barth’s idea of  responsibility a focus of  detailed study I turn this 
observation about the frequency and potential importance of  responsibility-language into a 
more coherent argument about its conceptual significance. The second reason is that when 
Barth deploys the language of  responsibility, the idea is accorded great significance in terms 
of  human agency. Two short examples from the Dogmatics serve to demonstrate this, and 
begin to indicate the value of  a comprehensive study of  the topic. The first is from the 
ethics of  CD II/2. Here Barth argues that “the idea of  responsibility…gives us the most 
exact definition of  the human situation in the face of  the absolute transcendence of  divine 
judgement.” He concludes the same paragraph saying, “We live in responsibility…”  In this 1
example, Barth’s idea of  responsibility is definitive of  human existence; that is to say it is the 
ultimate and final description of  the human situation with regard to the sovereignty of  God 
which is experienced in the transcendence of  divine judgement . Responsibility is definitive 
of  human life, and also describes the context is which human beings conduct themselves. 
When Barth says human beings live in responsibility, therefore, he is at the least commenting 
on the ongoing nature of  this situation, and its absolute accuracy is defining human 
existence in this way. The second example is from CD III/2, where Barth states, “real 
man…is engaged in active responsibility to God”, and again summarily in the same 
paragraph that “being human consists in responsibility.”  Here the language names an 2
ontological aspect of  human existence; it describes for Barth the nature of  real or genuine 
human being, suggesting that this may only be understood and actualised from within 
relationship to God. Moreover, for Barth, this relationship is anthropologically axiomatic - 
the sine qua non of  true human agency is responsibility to God.  
 Taken together these quotations indicate the fundamental nature of  Barth’s 
understanding of  human responsibility, and are intended to indicate how significant the idea 
of  human responsibility is for Barth. They are not exhaustive, and there is much more that 
Barth has to say on the topic. The statements are an indication of  why a study of  human 
responsibility is important: I have chosen them because they are suggestive of  the ways that 
responsibility language is employed by Barth in different parts of  his dogmatic whole, and 
are helpful for my contention that the idea of  responsibility is close to the centre of  what 
Barth wants to say about human agency.  With very little explanation or contextualisation it 
is easy to see from these quotations that at the least responsibility-language plays an integral 
role in his articulation of  human being and doing. To be human, and to be so in the fullest 
 CD II/2, 641 (KD II/1, 713).1
 CD III/2, 175 (KD III/2, 209).2
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sense of  that, is to be responsible. It is also to know oneself  in relationship to God. By 
implication, those who do not know that they are responsible before God in some sense or 
other deny their true humanity because genuine humanity consists in this responsibility. 
Barth employs the language to name and define the human situation; responsibility plays a 
central role in his theological description of  human existence and therefore human action; it 
is his definition of  the modus in which we live and act as creatures. The significance of  
responsibility-language, therefore, cannot easily be underestimated. All ethical systems - 
whatever their theological or philosophical persuasion - proceed with some vision or 
overarching account of  human being in mind in order to guide and make sense of  what is 
said about human action. In Barth’s case, I shall argue, ‘responsibility’ is at the heart of  this 
vision. Therefore if  we wish to develop our understanding of  his account of  human being 
and doing, as the recent trend in interpreting Barth’s ethics invites us to do, the task of  
understanding Barth’s account of  human responsibility demands attention. 
 Given the importance that I am suggesting Barth accords to it, a clear and decisive 
account of  what responsibility means in the context of  his theological ethics is necessary: 
how and in what way are humans responsible before God? What is the ethical, especially 
ontic, implication of  this responsibility? What form does it take? A detailed study of  human 
responsibility in Barth’s thought is required to answer these questions, and to unearth its real 
value and meaning for his theology as a whole. Such a study will also clarify the kind of  
contribution Barth is able to make to the wider discussion about responsibility-ethics. 
 That being said, reading Barth on human responsibility is not at all straight forward. 
He does not proceed with some common definition of  responsibility in mind, nor does he 
borrow one from another discipline. On the contrary, Barth’s general approach to moral 
reasoning means that he qualifies and revises ethical concepts in relation to the dogmatic 
location he gives to them, and as such common moral ideas are frequently reworked and re-
orientated by him. They are thus also given particular and nuanced meanings. The idea of  
responsibility is no exception. Therefore, in order to interpret and understand the idea of  
human responsibility in Barth’s theological ethics, special care must be taken to attend to the 
way he uses the language. I may not presume to know what Barth means or intends by 
human responsibility by virtue of  some other account of  it. The conceptual and practical 
content of  responsibility-language is defined by the wider matrix of  his dogmatic ethics, and 
this must be given full attention if  the depth of  his claim regarding responsibility and the 
human situation is to be properly understood. 
 Recognising that Barth thinks theological claims ought to qualify ethical concepts, 
and indeed that he discusses ethical ideas in precisely this way, matters particularly for the 
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idea of  human responsibility. Barth writes, “the idea of  responsibility, rightly understood, is 
known only to Christian ethics.”  The adjective ‘Christian’ distinguishes the use of  3
responsibility language in that context from any wider discussion of  human responsibility. 
The Christian confession gives the idea of  responsibility a nuanced and particular meaning - 
which Barth regards as the “right” understanding - which is informed, presuambly, by the 
particularities of  the Christian conception of  the human agent. By implication, Barth 
suggests that Christian ethics as distinct from other kinds of  ethics finds its genesis not in the 
moral quandaries of  life, though those may cause us to question what the appropriate action 
is, but in God’s work for us in Jesus Christ. This is witnessed in Christian doctrine  - here 4
understood as the essential teaching of  the Church grounded in scripture and creed.  5
Christian doctrines describe reality as they bear witness to the truth of  the gospel of  Jesus 
Christ and the place of  the human being within it.  Because the gospel affects us, doctrines 6
as witnesses to the gospel also solicit behaviours from us: the quest to conform to the will 
of  the God whom we worship and confess as Lord. To borrow a phrase from Christopher 
Holmes, Christian doctrine “radically implicates.”  To say that responsibility may only be 7
“rightly understood” in relation to Christian faith is for Barth to state that the idea of  
responsibility names something that is true about human beings as those for whom God is 
God pro nobis and in the light of  which a Christian account of  human responsibility may be 
offered. As such, Barth’s particular understanding of  human responsibility is intrinsic to the 
dogmatic location he gives to the idea.  
 Therefore the basic question what does human responsibility mean for Barth? needs 
answering because for Barth it means something different than for other responsibility-
ethicists. As I shall argue in section 1.3, the concept has always had fluid meanings and 
flexible application within ethical systems of  the twentieth century, and scholars have always 
gone to lengths to clarify their own particular understanding of  it. Answering the question 
of  what it means for Barth is necessary to continue the task of  making overall sense of  his 
moral theology, and to contribute to our growing understanding of  its potency.  
 CD II/2, 642 (KD II/2, 714). Emphasis added.3
 Barth famously said that dogmatics is ethics. CD I/2, 793 (KD I/2, 888). On this see also Duane Stephen 4
Long’s essay, ‘Moral Theology’ in John Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and Iain Torrance, eds., The Oxford 
Handbook to Systematic Theology (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 456-465, especially 462-3. 
 A helpful summary of  Barth’s thought on this is Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline (London: SCM Press, 1949), 5
chapter 1. 
 On this point I have found Christopher J Holmes, Ethics in the Presence of  Christ (London: T&T Clark, 2012) 6
really helpful: “doctrines describe, albeit through a glass darkly, what is real and going on”, p.vii.  
 Holmes, Ethics in the Presence of  Christ, viii.7
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 My thesis proceeds with three goals in mind. The first is to substantiate my claim that 
human responsibility in Barth’s thought is a worthy topic for consideration by demonstrating 
that the idea plays a significant role in his moral theology. I shall do this by way of  exegetical 
reading of  three key texts in which the concept is theologically and ethically important. The 
second is to clarify and explicate Barth’s particular understanding of  human responsibility 
through a close exegetical-reading of  those texts, offering an overall account of  it in relation 
to his wider theological and ethical concerns, and attempting to understand what Barth is 
proposing. The third is, on the basis of  these two, to contribute to the scholarly re-appraisal 
of  Barth’s theological ethics by arguing: 1) for greater recognition of  the role responsibility 
language plays; and 2) that Barth has something particular to offer a Christian ethics of  
responsibility that the current critical rejection of  his work in this area ignores. Taking 
account of  this helps to give us a fuller picture of  what is possible when we treat ethics in 
the genre of  dogmatics.   
 In order to facilitate this I will use the rest of  this chapter to complete some 
preliminary work before moving onto exegesis and analysis in the following chapters. This 
work involves mapping out my particular approach to the topic within the Barth corpus, and 
where necessary defending my methodological decisions. It seems important to contextualise 
as much of  my work as possible by locating it in relation to several wider fields, notably 
Barth scholarship in general, other Christian responsibility-ethics, and the current state of  
interpretation of  Barth’s responsibility-ethics. I shall tackle each of  these in order. First, in 
section 1.2, I shall give an overview of  the contemporary discussion of  Barth’s moral 
theology and in particular the shift in scholarly opinion over the last twenty-five years, in 
order to show where my research might complement the growing trend to read Barth as a 
serious theological ethicist. I begin by outlining the received tradition, before giving an 
overview of  the key thinkers who have been influential since the early nineteen-nineties. 
Then I shall highlight the instances where a more robust account of  human responsibility 
would help fill out our current understanding of  Barth’s moral theology. Second, in section 
1.3, I will give an overview of  the development of  the concept of  responsibility in the 
twentieth century. I begin the section by plotting the development of  the concept in moral 
and political philosophy using Richard McKeon’s helpful essay on the subject. I then turn to 
the development of  Christian understandings of  responsibility throughout the twentieth 
century. These two spheres of  moral reasoning - broadly speaking the secular and the 
religious - have not always communicated well with one another, and a clear divergence 
becomes evident from the historical survey I offer: in each trajectory the idea of  human 
responsibility took different conceptual paths. This, I suspect, contributes to some of  the 
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hesitancy that exists among scholars regarding Barth on this topic, which itself  grows out of  
a general hesitancy in Christian responsibility-ethics connected to a lack of  clear conceptual 
definition. Attention to the divergence will make clear the parameters of  the broader 
conversation and allow me to comment on the way Barth’s ethics of  responsibility has been 
understood and received. In section 1.4 I will attend to the ways in which Barth has already 
been read on human responsibility, and in particular to the work of  three Christian scholars, 
all of  whom are concerned to develop a meaningful Christian understanding of  
responsibility: H. Richard Niebuhr; Albert Jonsen; and William Schweiker. I shall explore 
each of  their readings of  Barth and also their criticisms of  him in detail. In the closing 
chapter of  this thesis I shall return to Jonsen and Schweiker in particular and ask whether or 
not my re-reading of  Barth deals with their concerns. In section 1.4 I shall highlight the key 
internal problems that scholars face when reading Barth on this topic: in particular his lack 
of  a direct and clear definition of  the terminology. After that I move to suggesting a 
possible way forward by developing an idea from an essay by Edward Farley. Farley would 
not normally be considered a dialogue partner for Barth, but I draw on his work here not to 
interpret Barth directly but to give insight into how we might regard Barth’s approach to 
human responsibility in the light of  his lack of  conceptual clarity. In particular I draw on 
Farley’s distinction between ‘theological thinking’ and ‘theological methodology’. In a 
context where the meaning of  the language of  responsibility is notoriously fluid, Barth’s 
oversight of  a definition makes a huge difference, and explains the requirement for this 
thesis to take on an exegetical approach. Finally, in section 1.5, I shall draw together some of  
the key insights from preceding sections in order to give an overview of  the shape and flow 
of  the rest of  the thesis, and explain what will be discussed in each of  the following 
chapters. Here I give my rationale for the decision regarding which texts I have chosen to 
engage exegetically, and how these relate to one another as well as to Barth’s wider 
theological development.  
1.2 The Changing Landscape of  Secondary Literature  
Twenty years ago Nigel Biggar noted that “the English-speaking world has not been 
generous with the attention it has paid to the ethical thought of  Karl Barth.” In the same 
paragraph he went on to name the small number of  volumes that gave “sustained 
consideration” to Barth’s ethics and suggested that the cause of  such a dearth was his 
reputation as one whose “stress on divine judgement seems such as entirely to devalue 
human activity and ethical reflection.”  Five years later John Webster suggested that “close 8
 Biggar, The Hastening That Waits: Karl Barth’s Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 1.8
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study of  Barth’s ethical writing is still in its infancy” and that detailed study of  texts in his 
moral theology was “needed more than anything else.”  Both were recognising to some 9
extent that the Anglophone world had already digested Robert Willis’ critical call to “move 
beyond Barth” in ethical discourse.  Willis argued that “the credibility and effectiveness [of  10
Barth’s ethics] are vitiated by a series of  recurring problems” all of  which could be linked to 
the “exceedingly tight relationship” between dogmatic theology and ethics, i.e. which could 
be linked to Barth’s methodology.  Willis’ had been the dominant view for more than 11
twenty years at the point when Biggar made his comments. 
 While Willis had set out to overcome the “repetition of  accumulated caricatures and 
shibboleths about ‘abstractness’ or ‘remoteness’” in Barth’s ethics by attending to the 
“ethical thrust” of  Barth’s theology,  his conclusion was that Barth’s particular theological 12
method was in fact a hindrance to his ability to adequately fulfil the work of  an ethicist. The 
recurring problems to which Willis refers centre on what he regarded as Barth’s 
overemphasis on Christology. In brief, Barth’s Christocentric commitment, and its impact on 
his description of  the human creature, requires him to employ the idea of  analogia relationis 
thus providing an epistemological base for the moral agent. But Willis argues that this 
actually obscures rather than clarifies the position of  the human agent  because it avoids the 13
“pressing questions of  evidence and verification” that are normally required in ethical 
discourse.  He notes that these questions may have been answered if  Barth had not rejected 14
the analogia entis, because it would have provided an analogical basis on which to consider the 
material of  created order as ethically significant. Instead Willis argues the Christocentric 
analogia relationis leads to “the total elimination of  the world, including human action…so 
that the world and the human are somehow absorbed into the being of  God.”  There 15
ceases to be, on this reading of  Barth, an ontological distinction between Creator and 
creature and so there is no substance for moral discourse - everything is collapsed into 
Christology. Willis’ contention is that Barth’s favouring of  analogia relationis over analogia entis 
is inadequate for moral reasoning because faith is not an “ordinary epistemic mode.” Faith-
 JohnWebster, Barth’s Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth’s Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 9
1.
 Robert Willis, The Ethics of  Karl Barth (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 449.10
 Willis, The Ethics of  Karl Barth, 428.11
 Willis, The Ethics of  Karl Barth, 1.12
 Willis, The Ethics of  Karl Barth, 430.13
 Willis, The Ethics of  Karl Barth, 431.14
 Willis, The Ethics of  Karl Barth, 36.15
Page !14
based ethics results in a kind of  “transcendentalism…that…makes ambiguous the precise 
status of  the created order, history, and the knowledge derived from ordinary cognitive 
modes…”  Instead “all relevant insights about humanity are developed out of  16
Christology…[which] makes it difficult to take seriously the kinds of  data and insights that 
are provided by phenomenological description.”  Willis’ point is that Barth’s description of  17
human agency appears to be at some distance from what human beings know of  themselves. 
Barth, Willis charges, “fails to make effective transition out of  the context of  ‘divine ethics’ 
and into the empirical framework where the stuff  of  human decision and action must be 
wrestled with.”   18
 Willis’ critique was a substantial contribution to the discussion on Barth. It was also 
regarded by many as the final word on Barth’s moral theology: very few scholars who were 
engaged in reading his Dogmatics in 1970s and 1980s took time to treat his ethical material. 
Those ethicists who read Barth usually gave him as an example of  approaches that were 
inadequate for the task.  Since 1990 however, things have changed: there has begun “an 19
ongoing re-evaluation of  the importance and validity of  [Barth’s] theological ethics.”  20
Instead of  “moving beyond” Barth, as Willis desired, there has been a resurgence of  interest 
in him, which has resulted in the publication of  several monographs and articles that treat 
him as a significant voice in the general history of  Christian ethics.  These fresh readings 21
have not been uniform in their approach, and three particular ways of  engaging with Barth’s 
ethics are discernible: 1) scholars seeking to interpret Barth in the light of  some other ethical 
system, and enquire as to the compatibility of  it with his moral theology. Nigel Biggar and 
Matthew Rose are good examples of  this: the former reading Barth through the lens of  
casuistry, and the latter through the lens of  natural law theory; 2) those scholars engaging 
Barth for some insight into a moral problem or quandary or as part of  a wider discussion 
 Willis, The Ethics of  Karl Barth, 433.16
 Willis, The Ethics of  Karl Barth, 446.17
 Willis, The Ethics of  Karl Barth, 443.18
 For example, Robin Lovin’s critique of  the viability Barth’s ethics - “it is impossible for public ethics” - in 19
his Christian Faith and Public Choices: The Social Ethics of  Barth, Brunner, and Bonhoeffer (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1984), 42. 
 Paul Nimmo, Being in Action: The Theological Shape of  Karl Barth’s Ethical Vision (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 20
2007), 3.
 On this see David Clough and Michael Leyden, “Claiming Barth for Ethics: The Last Two Decades” 21
Ecclesiology 6 no. 2 (2010), 166-182. Since the publication of  this review article several more substantial 
monographs have appeared: David Haddorff, Christian Ethics as Witness: Barth’s Ethics for a World at Risk; 
Gerald McKenny, The Analogy of  Grace: Karl Barth’s Moral Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Matthew Rose, Ethics with Barth: God, Metaphysics, and Morals (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010). I may also include 
here the published papers of  the Princeton Theological Seminary Annual Karl Barth Conference, 2008: 
Daniel Migliore, ed., Commanding Grace: Studies in Karl Barth’s Ethics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010).
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about a particular topic. These tend to be more occasional pieces, or as part of  a larger 
constructive conversation. For example, scholars have sought dialogue with Barth on 
bioethics,  animal ethics,  criminal justice,  war,  politics,  family,  and economics,  as 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
well as more conceptual discussions about agency , anthropology,  and metaphysics.  It is 29 30 31
unusual now for publications dealing with Barth’s theology not to include at least one 
chapter on his ethics, and increasingly scholars are turning to it as a component of  his 
overall dogmatic thought without which it is difficult to make sense of  Barth’s theology. By 
no means are all these conversations ‘Barthian’ in nature, nor are the scholars that look to 
him for insight ‘Barthians’, but the increasing engagement with his thought shows that Barth 
is an ethicist of  whom notice must be, and is being, taken; 3) those describing the content of  
Barth’s moral theology, what might better be called “dogmatic ethics” , to develop our 32
understanding of  his ethics. This third approach to Barth has led to an attitudinal change 
amongst scholars: a willingness to read and understand Barth on his own terms, before 
 For example, Neil Messer, Respecting Life: Theology and Bioethics (London: SCM, 2011). 22
 David L. Clough, On Animals: Volume One: Systematic Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2012).23
 See essays by Timothy Gorringe and Katherine Sonderegger in Migliore, ed., Commanding Grace…24
 Rowan Williams, ‘Barth, War, and the State’ in Reckoning with Barth: Essays in Commemoration of  Karl Barth’s 25
Birth, edited by Nigel Biggar (Oxford: Mowbray, 1988) ch 9; David Clough, ‘Fighting at the Command of  
God: Reassessing the Borderline Case in Karl Barth’s Account of  War in the Church Dogmatics’ in Conversing 
with Barth edited by John McDowell and Mike Higton (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) ch 11.
 George Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of  Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000) pt. 26
1. See also essays by David Haddorff  and Todd Cioffi in Daniel Migliore, ed., Commanding Grace: Studies in Karl 
Barth’s Ethics…; Timothy Gorringe, Against Hegemony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Frank 
Jehle, Ever Against the Stream: The Politics of  Karl Barth 1906-1968 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).
 William Werpehowski, ‘Reading Karl Barth on Children’ in The Child in Christian Thought, edited by Marcia 27
Bunge (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001) ch 15; Joseph Mangina, ‘Bearing Fruit: Conception, Children, and 
the Family’ in The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics, edited by Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006) ch 35.
 See Kathryn Tanner, ‘Barth and the Economy of  Grace’ and also Christopher R J Holmes, ‘Karl Barth on 28
the Economy: In Dialogue with Kathryn Tanner’ in Daniel Migliore, ed., Commanding Grace…, ch.10 and ch.
11.
 Joseph Mangina, Karl Barth on the Christian Life: The Practical Knowledge of  God (New York: Peter Lang, 2001); 29
Archibald Spencer, Clearing a Space for Human Action: Ethical ontology in the Theology of  Karl Barth (New York: 
Peter Lang, 2003); Nimmo, Being in Action…
 For example, David Kelsey’s recent Eccentric Existence, 2 vols. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2009) 30
takes Barth as as significant interlocutor at several points in his own constructive argument.
 Matthew Rose, God, Metaphysics, and Morals…31
 Michael Banner, ‘Turning the World Upside Down - and Some Other Tasks for Dogmatic Christian Ethics’ 32
in his Christian Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Banner 
describes Barth’s ethics as the simultaneous assertion of  “the ethical significance of  the subject matter of  
dogmatics, and the essentially dogmatic character of  the presuppositions of  genuine ethics.” ‘Turning the 
World Upside Down…’, 3.
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rushing to fit him into extant conceptual frameworks, or rejecting his approach because of  
its perceived uselessness. Instead, more considered exegetical readings of  Barth have been 
able to lay bare the inner logic of  his moral theology, and explore the structure and content 
of  his ethical material. This trend has benefitted from the publication of  the Gesamtausgabe  33
and access to several previously unpublished texts such as the Münster/Bonn Ethics lectures. 
With a greater number of  original works available, scholars are now able to engage more 
fully with the depth and breadth of  Barth’s moral theology, and to appreciate both its 
peculiarity and its significance. 
 Briefly, I want to sketch some of  the issues raised by approaches 1) and 3). 
Highlighting the work of  Biggar and Rose I shall indicate how some readings of  Barth have 
been creative and have helped to explore aspects of  Barth's work otherwise understudied, 
whilst rejecting this approach for my own work because the fundamental premise challenges 
the basic contours of  Barth’s dogmatic ethics. I then turn to an overview of  contributions 
from Paul Matheny, John Webster, David Clough, and Paul Nimmo to show where my work 
relates to their common judgement that Barth’s moral theology is some kind of  ontology. 
Matheny and Webster attend to the formal Christological elements of  this, whilst Clough 
and Nimmo in different ways engage in some discussion of  the concrete requirements of  it 
in human action, Clough by attending to the ongoing significance of  dialectical thinking and 
Nimmo by examining the ontic element of  Barth’s presentation of  human agency. The 
interplay between ontology and action is a background feature of  my work on Barth’s 
responsibility-ethics, and so taking some time to note the key thinkers here is important. I 
will argue in my discussion of  the Ethics lectures in Chapter 2 and of  CD II/2 in Chapter 3 
that Barth describes the nature of  the “moral space” inhabited by human agents using 
responsibility-language. My contribution to this discussion is to suggest, on the basis of  
material drawn from CD III/4 in Chapter 4,  that Barth also describes indicative practices 
which enable the human agent to navigate this space, and these actions are themselves 
responsible-acts thus aiding the human agent to embed the insights gained in discussion of  
the ethics of  responsibility in CD II/2 in real lived-life. This addition, I shall argue, enables 
human agents to inhabit and fulfil their divine determination as responsible partners of  God 
in the Covenant.  
 Biggar thinks that a kind of  casuistry is discernible in the systematic structure of  
Barth’s moral theology. His theology is trinitarianly differentiated - Creation, Reconciliation, 
 Published, since its inception in 1971, by Theologischer Verlag Zürich in conjunction with the Karl Barth 33
Archive (Switzerland) - the Director of  which is also the Editor-in-Chief  of  the Gesamtausgabe. The Collection 
is published in five series: Predigten (Sermons); Academische Werke (Academic Works); Vorträge und 
kleinere Arbeiten (Lectures and Short Articles); Gespräche (Conversations); Briefe (Letters). 
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Redemption - and at the close of  each volume Barth intended discussion of  ethics. “In each 
of  these spheres, special ethics explicates the meaning of  the constant will of  God in terms 
of  a governing concept or principle.”  Biggar argues that Barth’s special ethics does not 34
“claim the power to identify conclusively what God is commanding in a given situation”  35
but can give indications of  the normal form of  the divine command - what he also calls “an 
aid to hearing” the command - without claiming to be the command itself. This is so 
because the command of  God in Biggar’s reading of  Barth is concretely recognised as 
calling. He writes, “what is actually commanded is finally determined, not by moral rules, but 
by personal vocation.”  The command of  God is ultimately personal - the divine address is 36
received by a hearing-subject as command and calling, and is enacted as the subject obeys. 
Biggar sees the casuistic element in the hearing-role of  the human agent: “this concept of  
hearing God’s command has the advantage of  being compatible with the casuistic exercise 
of  the full analytical powers of  moral reason.”  Biggar sees casuistry as a particular listening 37
“technique” governed by theological discernment.  The agent must position themselves to 38
hear the command, and also discern and assess what they think they have heard in the light 
of  what they know of  God in Christ. Reading Barth is this way places him at odds with 
others aspects of  his theology in at least two ways: the first is Barth’s outright rejection of  
the casuistic tradition, as he writes, “the way of  casuistry is basically unacceptable, however 
enticing it may seem, and however convenient it would be…”  The second is about the 39
nature of  the the encounter between God and human agents in the divine address. Barth 
suggests consistently that human beings know themselves to be “arrested” by the 
commanding-Word, such is its force and power. Biggar has not been without scholarly 
criticism about this. David Clough argues strongly that Biggar’s work ought to be viewed as a 
rather unhelpful “reinterpretation” of  Barth’s ethics, and judges that “squeezing Barth’s 
 Biggar, The Hastening That Waits, 31. 34
 Biggar, The Hastening That Waits, 32.35
 Biggar, The Hastening That Waits, 44. On several occasions Biggar comes close to presenting Barth’s ethics as 36
a kind of  Christian spirituality. For example, when he writes that “a major theological correlate of  this 
concept of  vocation is the intimate presence of  the living God to the individual human creature.” The 
Hastening That Waits, 164.
 Biggar, The Hastening That Waits, 44. 37
 Biggar, The Hastening That Waits, 41.38
 CD III/4, 8 (KD III/4, 7).39
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vigorous and provocative ethical thought into the confines of  natural law and casuistry 
deprives it of  its most compelling qualities.”  40
 In a similar vein to Biggar, though from a Roman Catholic perspective, Matthew Rose 
has sought to read Barth in-step with the natural law tradition, in particular the Thomist 
moral philosophy of  Hans Urs von Balthesar’s earlier work.  In essence Rose wants to argue 41
that Barth thinks moral rules are discernible for Christians, and that Barth displays “an 
unwavering conviction that certain moral truths flow straight from the gospel.”  Rose here 42
argues that for Barth one impact of  the gospel is that it gives human agents an insight into 
moral truth and that encounter with Christ gives Christians a perspective from which to 
interpret the world morally. Statements like this make Rose’s interpretation particularly 
interesting, since most Protestant readings of  Barth have articulated his rejection of  any kind 
of  natural law or casuistry. For Rose the gospel as the gracious act of  God liberates 
Christians to “conform to God's intentions for the created order” which are knowable “in 
rerum natura.”  We are enabled to perceive these divine intentions precisely because of  Jesus 43
Christ: “For Barth, Christ liberates us from the self  imprisonment of  false views and 
discloses the intelligible form through which all things were made…the revelation of  Christ 
is also the discovery of  nature.”  Christology is key to Rose’s assertion here, and in particular 44
the nuanced Christology of  CD III, which is his sole focus. Rose perceives in this 
permission to construct a Christocentric ontology which encompasses all of  creation - 
“Jesus Christ is the contingent truth and basis of  everything”  - and which therefore makes 45
moral truth open to human agents: reality takes on an imperatival characteristic. Rose’s 
account of  Barth has met with scholarly criticism, mostly for its idiosyncratic presentation 
of  his theological concerns, and for the skewed picture presented by focusing solely on the 
special ethics of  CD III/4. 
 Whilst Biggar and Rose offer interesting interpretations of  Barth, neither approach is 
particularly helpful in this study: I am concerned with explicating the meaning of  a particular 
 David Clough, Ethics in Crisis: Interpreting Barth’s Ethics (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 116. Biggar has since 40
acknowledged that his earlier work was a “reconstruction” indicative of  where he thought Barth “should have 
gone”. Biggar, ‘Karl Barth’s Ethics Revisited’ in Migliore, ed., Commanding Grace…, 26.
 Rose, God, Metaphysics, and Morals, 5. Hans Urs von Balthesar, The Theology of  Karl Barth. Translated by 41
Edward Oakes (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1992).
 Rose, God, Metaphysics, and Morals, 18.42
 Rose, God, Metaphysics, and Morals, 42.43
 Rose, God, Metaphysics, and Morals, 49.44
 Rose, God, Metaphysics, and Morals, 55.45
Page !19
theme within Barth’s dogmatic ethics. To do so requires a different method for engaging 
Barth, which other scholars may help with. 
 Turning to Matheny, Webster, Clough, and Nimmo the discussion moves towards a 
comprehensive understanding of  Barth based on close-reading of  key texts. In his Dogmatics 
and Ethics  Matheny argues that Barth’s ethics is best understood as a “theological realism” 46
centred on the divine-human covenant-relationship which is determined by God in Jesus 
Christ. As such, for Barth, from a centre in Jesus Christ dogmatics and ethics were not 
separate disciplines but a homogenous whole.  Matheny sees this as the proper way to think 47
about human agency and conduct in Barth’s ethics recognising that dogmatic description has 
ethical significance: “Dogmatics was to be understood as an explication and examination of  
the proclamation of  the Church in reference to the Gospel message in terms of  its 
appropriateness as instruction and regulation in living the Christian life.”  Matheny sees in 48
Barth a way of  understanding the relationship between Jesus Christ as the sum of  the gospel 
of  grace, and also the revelation of  true humanity in the divine command. The reality of  
human being - what Barth calls genuine or real humanity in CD III/2 - is grounded in the 
person of  Jesus Christ. Matheny saw in Barth’s Dogmatics a necessary turn to Christology in 
order to underpin the ontological status of  the human agent qua agent. The doctrine of  
election Barth develops in CD II means that there is, therefore, no place of  neutrality in 
relation to God. Matheny sees in Barth’s “Christological ontology” a resource from which he 
can develop “formal and material anthropological statements from corresponding 
Christological statements.”  Barth’s Christology gives Matheny formal resources for 49
thinking about human agency. 
 Similarly, John Webster denotes Barth’s approach to ethics as a “moral ontology” in 
which Barth is describing the space in which human agents act. The basis of  this is the 
covenant which God has established between himself  and human beings in Jesus Christ, and 
in which he invites human beings to be active participants. Participation presupposes and 
conditions human agency, such that all of  Barth’s Dogmatics (which takes as its theme the 
divine-human covenant) has agency and ethics within its vista, and therefore radically 
implicates human beings.  
 Paul Matheny, Dogmatics and Ethics: The Theological Realism and Ethics of  Barth’s Church Dogmatics. (New York: 46
Peter Lang, 1990).
 Matheny, Dogmatics and Ethics, 3.47
 Matheny, Dogmatics and Ethics, 7.48
 Matheny, Dogmatics and Ethics, 134.49
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 Barth’s dogmatics can be construed as an extended enquiry into the moral field – into 
 the space within which moral agents act and into the shape of  the action, a shape  
 given above all by the fact that their acts take place in the history of  the encounter  
 between God as prime agent and themselves as those called to act in correspondence 
 to the grace of  God.   50
Webster is not so much concerned with the concrete questions of  what exactly I ought to do 
in this situation, but sees in Barth a way of  delineating the space wherein such actions take 
place and therefore to inform the “shape” of  human lives. The spatial metaphor is helpful, 
because Webster argues that Barth’s moral vision for true human agency is understood 
through it.  This means that the theological realism which Matheny identifies in Barth is 51
explicated in terms of  human conduct: in as much as Christian confession purports to a 
particular understanding of  the world, so too it gives rise to a particular way of  being and 
acting within the world, with a particular orientation.  Webster’s reading of  Barth places 52
Barth against the background of  post-Enlightenment attempts to describe the active agent 
philosophically, opting instead for a robust theological ethics in which human action is 
invited and agency bestowed in Jesus Christ.  The human agent is describable on this basis, 53
and appropriate actions may then be inferred. 
 Clough and Nimmo attend to the more concrete and contextual elements of  the 
moral vision Matheny and Webster have discerned in Barth, but they do so in different ways. 
While Clough does not deal with Barth’s ethics using terms like ‘moral ontology’, his 
emphasis on the situated-ness of  human agents in relation to God in Barth’s thought, and 
his conviction that therein ‘crisis’ is an “inescapable feature of  God’s relationship with the 
world” lend themselves to being understood in this way.   The cause of  the crisis Clough 54
sees as continually operative in Barth’s thought is partly epistemological - “because we do 
not hold the will of  God in our hands…we must continually seek after it in new times and 
new places”  - and also the ongoing dialectical nature of  Barth’s theology. The dialectical 55
‘Yes-No’ of  God is grounded in Barth’s Christology, and so in some sense is the condition 
 John Webster, Barth’s Ethics of  Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 4.50
 Webster, Barth’s Ethics of  Reconciliation, 216. 51
 Webster, Barth’s Ethics of  Reconciliation, 223.52
 See, Archibald Spencer, Clearing a Space for Human Action: Ethical Ontology in the Theology of  Karl Barth (New 53
York: Peter Lang, 2003), 58-9.
 Clough, Ethics in Crisis…, xiii.54
 Clough, Ethics in Crisis…, xvii.55
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and divine determination of  human agency: “for Barth the dialectic between Christ’s divinity 
and humanity is one key reason why all theology must bear a dialectical shape.”  Since 56
Clough recognises that ethics is intrinsic to Barth’s theological work, so too must ethics bear 
a dialectical shape. The ‘crisis’ theology describes the nature of  the moral landscape, and in 
that sense provides some sort of  ontological description of  the space wherein the agent 
must act. For Clough, this means that Barth’s insistence that human existence is the series of  
actions each agent performs must reckon with the crisis-ontology constructively - providing 
some navigational tools that will enable agents to act within the tension of  not knowing 
directly the will of  God. Clough outlines three attitudes that he thinks are necessary for this: 
faithfulness; humility; and active-ness which he thinks enable the human being to act well. 
These three, he thinks, resist the temptation to be prescriptive about what human beings 
ought to do, an also the possibility for paralysis in the face of  not knowing, whist taking 
seriously the crisis-ontology he sees in Barth. 
 Like Clough, but in a slightly different way, Nimmo addresses the concrete 
requirements of  navigating the ontological space Barth describes for the human agent in his 
discussion of  Barth’s understanding of  conformity to Christ.  He cites three aspects of  57
human conformity to the divine determination which he finds in Barth: faith; obedience; and 
prayer. Each of  these is concrete and practical, since “for Barth…conformity of  the ethical 
agent to Jesus Christ means correspondence in action.”  There is no way that ethics remains 58
ethereal or descriptive only, but takes on a dynamism that is proper to genuine humanity. 
Each of  these attitudes has their ground in Jesus Christ. Faith is the decision and act of  the 
human agent to determine herself  in confirmation of  the divine determination of  her in 
Christ, and is characterised by gratitude and repentance.  Obedience is the enactment of  59
that self-determination to confirm the divine-determination in Christ through particular and 
concrete works, most especially the call to love as Christ loves.  In both these attitudes 60
Nimmo sees in Barth the requirement to take account of  the way the gospel of  Jesus Christ 
conditions the being and action of  the agent. The prayers of  human beings are enabled by 
Jesus Christ, who is himself  the “proper suppliant”, but are for the human agent true and 
genuine acts wherein she calls upon God from the concreteness of  her situation.  In doing 61
 Clough, Ethics in Crisis…, xviii.56
 Nimmo, Being in Action…, 136.57
 Nimmo, Being in Action…, 137. Emphasis added.58
 Nimmo, Being in Action…, 139.59
 Nimmo, Being in Action…, 145.60
 Nimmo, Being in Action…, 149.61
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so, she orders her life and confirms its proper orientation. This matters for any ethics, 
because all moral discourse has some direction. For Nimmo, Barth’s actualistic ontology 
gives ethics a shape and direction, as well as particular content and practice in the concrete 
circumstances of  human life.  
 In the work of  all of  these theologians our interpretation and understanding of  
Barth’s ethics has developed considerably. In my contribution of  explicating the idea of  
human responsibility in Barth’s thought, my work stands on the shoulders of  giants by 
touching upon the issues raised by Matheny, Webster, Clough, and Nimmo. In particular the 
delineation of  the ontological space inhabited by responsible human beings on the one 
hand, and the navigation of  that space through indicative responsible actions on the other. A 
substantial aspect of  my argument is that “responsibility” names, for Barth, the nature of  
the moral space which human agents are accorded, as well as indicating for them how they 
might navigate that space appropriately. The practices I highlight in CD III/4 are not in 
themselves exhaustive of  all responsible actions, but serve to orientate the responsible agent 
in a way that appropriately reflects the ontological reality in which she finds herself. In my 
discussion of  human responsibility in the ethics of  CD II/2 and CD III/4, I argue that the 
two aspects of  description and indicative action can be read in tandem with one another. 
1.3 Responsibility: The Development of  the Concept 
Generally speaking, the notion of  human responsibility has a relatively short history 
compared to some of  its other counterparts in moral discourse both within and outside 
theological ethics. The semantic history of  the term is tied up with the Latin respondere and 
the idea of  answering and being answerable to/for something/one.  Responsibility came 62
into use as an ethical term in western European philosophy only in the past three hundred 
years  - a mere toddler compared to, for example, the ancient ethical concepts of  praise and 63
blame, with which contemporary accounts of  responsibility have much to do. According to 
Richard McKeon, the arrival of  the term is to be considered “at best a new instrument for 
use in current and ancient controversies.” For this reason also - it having been marshalled 
 The same is true in German, where Verantwortung is cognate with Antworten, to answer. The Latin has its 62
roots in the term spendere, to promise. To respond is therefore to re-promise, or to revisit the oath/promise 
made and ask oneself  whether ones actions conform to it. Responsibility has some connection, semantically 
speaking, to integrity.
 It is widely agreed that the earliest general uses of  the term date back to the seventeenth century. See 63
Jonsen, Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics (Washington: Corpus, 1968), 3. According to Richard McKeon 
in his ‘The Development and Significance of  the Concept of  Responsibility’ in Freedom and History and Other 
Essays, edited by Zahava McKeon (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), 65, the first philosophical 
treatment of  the term comes much later in Alexander Bain’s The Emotions and the Will published in 1859.
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only in contentious issues - it became a much disputed notion.  At the heart of  the dispute 64
was the struggle to give responsibility a distinctive ethical meaning, since its cognitive range 
incorporated ideas already at play in “ancient controversies” - accountability, answerability, 
praise and blame, judgement, culpability, virtue, relationship, authority, and power. 
 McKeon argues that this dispute continued throughout the modern period, becoming 
a hallmark of  the difficulty of  introducing new concepts into ethical debates, and that it was 
only in the aftermath of  the Second World War that some effort was made to give 
responsibility a peculiar moral flavour. The driving factor in this was the need to concentrate 
the efforts of  European philosophers in conversation and understanding in order to help 
with the cultural reconstruction of  the continent at that time. He locates the particular shift 
from a lack of  coherence to a more comprehensive philosophical account in the papers 
presented at the International Institute of  Philosophy conference, 1956, at which the theme 
was responsibility.  Freed from the “official” interpretations of  human agency in totalitarian 65
regimes, and with a concern to give sound guidance to the newly emerging post-war 
humanity, philosophers from across Europe were able to come together and articulate 
something about the way acts and values interrelate, and about how assessment of  these is a 
vital part of  philosophical ethics. This was the basis for their account of  responsibility.  The 66
Second World War had played a significant role in altering the landscape of  moral discourse, 
and the notion of  responsibility – it was thought – could give people the language to 
organise and structure post-war political rebuilding, diplomacy, and the establishment of  
harmony. Because it had none of  the baggage of  the more ancient ethical language, 
“responsibility” could be moulded and shaped to fulfil this political task. With a vision of  
the new Europe in mind, responsibility-ethics could encourage certain kinds of  attitudes and 
behaviours that lead to the strengthening of  relationships, and mitigate against those which 
might lead to war. 
 In the subsequent development of  the concept over the latter part of  the twentieth 
century, further questions have been raised by philosophers, but these grow out of  this 
primary concern to let values and actions interrelate critically thus ensuring the integrity of  
human action. In particular, questions around the freedom of  the agent to act in accordance 
 McKeon, ‘The Development and Significance…’, 68.64
 The International Institute of  Philosophy was an arm of  the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 65
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).
 This is a much less forensic description of  human responsibility than is found in John Martin Fischer and 66
Mark Ravizza, eds., Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), but is closely 
linked to what Fischer elsewhere call “intuitive judgements” about human action. See John Martin Fischer, 
My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 64.
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with their values, whether he or she is predetermined for certain activities,  and what 67
conditions must be met in order for us to say that someone is truly responsible for their 
actions (or, indeed, lack of  action) – and therefore open to praise or blame – have been 
especially important.  As have very grounded concerns about the way in which our actions 68
and values relate to specific practical foci. The most famous of  these is probably Hans Jonas’ 
clarion call for humanity to review its attitude towards future generations, in his book The 
Imperative of  Responsibility.  In developing an account of  human responsibility for 69
technological development and its effects on the world presently, Jonas calls us to be guided 
by a sense of  obligation and duty of  care to those who come after us. Here is an interplay 
between the way in which we value technology for the support of  our lives, the 
acknowledged value of  our current resources upon which we are dependent, and the value 
we place on our descendants who have a future share in our resources (which is, of  course, 
closely related to the value we place on ourselves as human beings and links in the chain of  
human history). As these three tussle for ascendency, Jonas argues that our responsibility is 
properly toward the future and the generations that come after us. This assessment process 
is what responsibility is all about: we ask to whom we are answerable, and against what 
standard, and whether we are able to fulfil the requirements placed upon us in this 
deliberative process in the actions we choose to undertake. 
 In all of  these instances, what McKeon called “the intelligibility of  ideas and values” 
has played an important role in the way we assess the integrity of  human activity, and has 
become the foundational aspect of  philosophical responsibility. What has made it so potent 
is the extent to which it works both at the personal/individual level of  our thinking and 
acting, and also at the corporate/social levels. The original desire for a uniting concept has 
been carried on in the philosophical approach to human responsibility, influencing not only 
academic debate about agency and power, but also exercising influence in court rooms, as in 
John Martin Fischer’s work, and in social programmes, as in Hans Jonas’ work. That more 
ancient concepts such as imputability, accountability, answerability, and liability are frequently 
drawn alongside our modern understanding of  responsibility serves to fill-out its conceptual 
 These questions are not new, and find their genesis in Enlightenment concerns raised by key thinkers such 67
as Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Kant about the nature and foundation of  common morality. McKeon seems 
to suggest that the intensification of  focus on responsibility after World War Two takes this debate forward in 
a new way.
 Here again, see John Martin Fischer, ed., Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Fischer 68
and Ravizza, eds., Perspectives on Moral Responsibility; and Fischer, My Way… 
 Hans Jonas, The Imperative of  Responsibility: In Search of  Ethics for the Technological Age (Chicago: Chicago 69
University Press, 1984).
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range and extend its cognitive influence. As such the secular development of  responsibility-
ethics has been considerable. 
 By contrast, the notion of  human responsibility in Christian ethics has achieved very 
little conceptual coherence across the twentieth century. According to Jonsen the notion has 
suffered from a sense of  “confusion…about the precise meaning and use”,  and has, 70
according to Gerald McKenny, “gone out of  fashion” in twenty-first century Christian 
discourse. He goes on in the same paragraph, “the concept of  responsibility is too thin to 
compete…with the well elaborated conceptions of  moral and intellectual virtues that have 
appeared in recent decades.”  To have gotten to the point where virtue theory can 71
completely override responsibility-ethics seems like a strange development in the recent 
history of  Christian ethics given that in the mid-twentieth century - when philosophically 
responsibility-ethics was gaining a greater level of  coherence - the language of  moral 
responsibility was almost pervasive in the thought of  several significant theologians. Karl 
Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer,  Emil Brunner,  Joseph Fletcher,  Bernhard Haering,  72 73 74 75
Reinhold Niebuhr,  H. Richard Niebuhr,  and Helmut Thielicke  were all engaged in 76 77 78
thinking about Christian moral reasoning as some form of  responsibility-ethic, and all use 
the language of  responsibility at critical points in their discussions of  human agency as well 
as in their ethical work more broadly. Nearly all of  these scholars are synonymous with a 
Christian understanding of  human responsibility, such was their influence. Furthermore, in 
1948, the first World Council of  Churches (WCC) Assembly, held in Amsterdam, reported 
that the notion of  human beings as those “responsible before God” living in the 
“responsible society” would be helpful in the restructuring of  Europe.  The following WCC 79
Assembly, held in Evanston, gave a whole section of  the plenary meetings over to the theme 
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“Responsible Society in World Perspective.”  The quest here was for a universal notion of  80
responsibility - what does a truly responsible society look like? - that could form and shape 
the Church’s participation in post-war society, and which could permeate secular moral 
discourse for the benefit of  all. This mirrors almost exactly the secular developments 
articulated by McKeon in the years immediately following the Second World War. More 
recent articles by William Schweiker, Kathryn Tanner, Nigel Biggar, Bernd Wannenwetsch, 
and Wolfgang Hüber show that until about the last fifteen years theologians and Christian 
ethicists have been engaged with some kind of  notion of  responsibility as a way of  thinking 
about and articulating meaningful human activity for most of  the last hundred years. Why 
then the increased un-fashionability of  responsibility-ethics articulated by McKenny?  
 At this point, the contrast with the development of  the philosophical idea described 
by McKeon is helpful: unlike the secular school of  thought, at the peak of  its use in 
Christian ethics there was no single coherent understanding of  responsibility and its 
importance for the discipline of  Christian moral reasoning. It never developed a uniform 
conceptual meaning. William Schweiker puts it more sharply when he writes, “it is not at all 
clear that they [theologians] are speaking about the same thing despite the use of  common 
language.”  The U.S. sociologist Horace Kallen, wring in 1942, states bluntly that “it 81
[responsibility] is the subject of  a great deal of  mystification amongst theologians…”  and a 82
little later, in 1966, U.S. philosopher Herbert Fingarette argued that it was a confusing 
concept because there was no agreed way of  dealing with responsibility, but when it is 
brought into dialogue with the religious tradition “us poor mortals” get “caught in limbo 
between history and God.”   From the start, the discussion about human responsibility in 83
Christian ethics has been hindered by lack of  cogency - we are in limbo - and the result in 
recent years has been a wholesale move away from the idea in moral discourse. 
 Though Schweiker articulates the problem near the end of  the twentieth century, it is 
clear from Kallen and Fingarette, as well as Jonsen, that it was recognised as a problem for 
Christian/theological ethics thirty years earlier. But it was also a problem for those mid-
twentieth century theologians employing the language themselves. This is clear to us because 
one of  the disciplines of  those Christian ethicists engaged in this topic has been to explain 
and clarify over and over what is intended in their use of  the terminology. At each step these 
various forms of  Christian ethics have been required to explain and defend their 
 http://www.oikoumene.org/en/who-are-we/background/history/assemblies.html80
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understanding of  human responsibility from within the rationale of  their own 
methodologies. So, for example, Dietrich Bonhoeffer described human responsibility in 
terms of  social interactions rooted in the soteriological idea of  Stellvertretung - vicarious 
action: “responsibility is essentially a relation from one human being to another.”  Emil 84
Brunner, on the other hand, argued that responsibility is first and foremost a description of  
humanity as “created and claimed by God”  rooting the idea in the doctrines of  creation 85
and redemption. The Niebuhr brothers focused less on doctrinal issues and more on 
philosophical anthropology, but disagreed about the location of  the impetus for 
responsibility: whether it begins with the active agent at large in the world (Reinhold) or with 
some external force acting upon the agent and compelling a response (H. Richard). Though 
this might seem incidental, the disagreement is really about whether responsibility is 
proactive or reactive in nature, and therefore about what form responsible human agency 
actually takes.  86
 Noting the differences between all these thinkers supports the idea of  lack of  clarity 
that Schweiker notes, and highlights the problem raised by what Robin Lovin calls the 
“frequency and fluidity”  of  the concept in Christian ethics. In a helpful and elucidatory 87
essay, he argues that despite its prevalence in the mid-twentieth century, responsibility-ethics 
has actually suffered from a great deal of  neglect - a consistent lack of  analytical attention - 
which in turn has given rise to a lack of  conceptual clarity, and a failure to root responsibility 
language appropriately. He comments that responsibility language is “pervasive in modern 
life, but…curiously ungrounded.”  How we ground the concept in Christian ethics helps us 88
to gain clarity over its meaning and function, and the absence of  close attention to this fact 
leads to fluidity and ambiguity of  meaning. One impact of  this fluidity is simply the 
recognition that every instance of  responsibility language in Christian moral discourse needs 
glossing in order to be meaningful. Another is to recognise that without such careful 
clarification, the term is potentially meaningless. 
 “Grounding” contributes to the classificatory task as it gives us a theological context 
in which to read and against which to interpret the idea of  responsibility, which helps us to 
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navigate the interplay between wider theological concerns about human responsibility, and 
the practical nitty gritty of  instantiating responsible action - what Lovin calls “proximate 
responsibility.”  How can human beings be considered responsible in relation to divine 89
sovereignty? And how can Christians act responsibly in concreto? Unless it is clear what human 
responsibility means theologically and ethically the terminology will remain equivocal, and 
therefore profoundly unhelpful for moral discourse; hence McKenny’s valedictory note. 
Theology is a considerable part of  this problem, according to Lovin. He suggests that 
“ambiguity of  terminology mask[s] a deep division in theology”,  and so to understand the 90
meaning and use of  ethical language by a particular theologian, close attention must be paid 
to their theology. Only when the theological questions are asked and answered will the 
proximate/practical questions be answerable. This will be especially important in this thesis 
because of  Barth’s particular approach to the relationship between ethics and theology, 
discussed in section 1.2. It will be in paying close attention to the theological discourse 
wherein Barth discusses human responsibility that its meaning will become clearer. 
 Barth is usually thought to be concerned only with theological articulation of  moral 
concepts but not the practicalities of  ethics. This is, on my reading of  Barth’s responsibility-
ethics, a mistake which grows out of  a lack of  detailed attention to this theme- he has never 
been given the same kind of  hearing on the topic as Bonhoeffer or Haering, for example. 
One contention of  this thesis is that there is more material on human responsibility available 
in the Barth corpus than scholarship has thus far suggested, and that in attending to this 
material we see that he offers us a theological description of  human responsibility grounded 
in and attentive to Christian dogmatic theology but with practical and liveable implications. 
 In the following section I articulate the current status quo in the scholarship on Barth’s 
understanding of  human responsibility, before turning to highlight some other problems 
that the would-be reader of  Barth’s responsibility-ethics faces. I then suggest a way forward, 
borrowing some insights from Edward Farley’s work on context and interpretation. 
1.4 Reading Barth on Human Responsibility: The Status Quo 
Earlier I noted that human responsibility has not yet been treated as a significant theme in 
the recent scholarly re-evaluation of  Barth’s ethics.  Any proposed re-reading of  Barth on 91
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this topic in the light of  the scholarly re-evaluation must first take into account the status quo: 
first the problem of  existing critical scholarship; and second the internal problems that 
Barth’s work poses for the would-be reader. This section is concerned with describing these 
two issues, before offering a way forward that takes them seriously but is not encumbered by 
them. 
1.4.1 Three Key Critics: Niebuhr, Jonsen, and Schweiker 
On the whole, the rejection of  Barth’s ethics rests on the disbelief  that his theological 
premise has the capacity and ability to do the work traditionally associated with ethics: 
reasoned reflection that leads to practical action. Professional ethicists regard his way of  
thinking as simply not action guiding. Three scholars are particularly important in this with 
regard to Barth’s idea of  human responsibility: H. Richard Niebuhr in his posthumously 
published The Responsible Self;  Albert Jonsen in his Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics;  92 93
and William Schweiker in his Responsibility and Christian Ethics.  
 Niebuhr’s work on responsibility is subtitled “An Essay in Moral Philosophy” and this 
might give us a clue as to where it begins to diverge from Barth’s approach.  Niebuhr treats 94
Barth as the best example of  “Christians who have sought to make Jesus Christ not only 
their exclusive principle of  their understanding but also of  their action.”  He suggests, quite 95
directly, that this is largely a problem for those who wish to do ethics “confined to theology” 
and accuses Barth of  both Christo-centrism and “Christo-morphism.” By this he means that 
Jesus Christ is the only permitted analogy or metaphor for a Christian understanding of  
human conduct, and so is the true µορφε of  human being and action. But, over against 
Barth, Niebuhr reads Christ through the category of  “symbol” not ontology, and so his 
criticism of  Barth focuses on the ethical need to interpret the Christ-symbol for human 
agents. His contention is that Christian moral reasoning has always used symbolic speech in 
order to make sense of  its task and to give direction for human action. Borrowing insights 
from philosopher Ernst Cassirer, he argues that we ought to interpret ourselves “as symbolic 
more than as rational animals” which means that  
 H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy, Second Edition (Louisville: 92
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 we are far more image making and image-using creatures than we usually think  
 ourselves to be, and further that our processes of  perception and conception, of   
 organising and understanding the signs that come to us in our dialogue with the  
 circumambient world,  are guided and formed by images in our minds. Our languages, 
 we are reminded, are symbolic systems.  96
The depth of  our symbolic nature means that both our interpretation and therefore our 
interaction with the world around us is governed by imagery. From this view point he then 
re-interprets the person of  Jesus Christ: 
 …when we reflect on our existence as Christian with this hypothesis in mind we  
 become aware that in Christian life Jesus Christ is a symbolic form with the aid of   
 which men tell each other what life and death, God and man, are like…  97
In this way, Jesus Christ is for Christians the “symbolic form with which the self  
understands itself, and with the aid of  which the self  guides and forms itself  in its actions 
and its sufferings.”  The Christ-symbol is the source of  Christian self-identification and 98
self-understanding, and of  moral and ethical imagery by which the Christian decides and acts 
Christianly.  
 Niebuhr’s argument against Barth is simply that Jesus Christ alone is not enough for 
the Christian to live well. The meaning of  Jesus Christ needs to be made known, and this 
cannot be done “without the aid of  other metaphors and symbols such as Word of  God, 
Son of  God, Servant, Lord, covenant, humiliation, exaltation, reconciliation, salvation.” He 
finds all of  these interpretative elements in Barth’s theology, and so argues that his Christo-
centrism is in fact not Christ-centrism at all, but the introduction of  “non-Christian though 
not non-biblical symbols such as commandment, law, obedience, and permission.” The issue 
here then is about “the adequacy, the revelatory value, of  the symbols associated with Jesus 
Christ”  and more importantly the place of  responsibility in relation to those. 99
 Responsibility, for Niebuhr, was best understood as an emerging symbol through 
which the human agent could understand their actions, reactions, and interactions with other 
human agents. It is the primary symbol for understanding relationships, which are 
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foundational to human existence. The question then is “How can Christians relate the form 
of  Christ to the form of  responsibility? or how do we understand ourselves as both 
responsible in our Christianity and Christian in our responsibility.?” What this question 
highlights for us is the way in which Niebuhr understood responsibility-ethics to originate 
independently of  Christian moral reasoning, and then in some sense to be annexed by it. 
The key question he asks is about the form that that annexation should take, and in what 
ways we may “associate Jesus Christ with the responsible life…”  since Christ is the 100
controlling symbol for all Christian ethics (hence his jibe at Barth’s non-Christian if  not non-
Biblical moral language). 
 Niebuhr’s rejection of  Barth is therefore methodological: he preferred to have a 
commonly held philosophically structured notion of  responsibility which he brought into 
dialogue with the central Christian symbol of  Jesus Christ to assess the formal connections 
between them. This makes Christian ethics applicable beyond the boundaries of  the 
theological/confessional fraternity for the good of  the whole society. Christ “exemplified” 
the ethics of  responsibility, but is not the sole definition of  it. In freeing responsibility-ethics 
from the confines of  theology, Niebuhr is able to develop “an ethics of  universal 
responsibility” which appeals to a universal society.  101
 Barth’s methodology was also a problem, for similar reasons, for Albert Jonsen who 
was the first to offer a comprehensive overview of  responsibility-ethics in twentieth century 
Christian thought. In his book he engaged with several key thinkers, both Roman Catholic 
and Protestant, offering a critical reading and interpretation of  their various approaches to 
the topic. He suggested that Barth should be included in such an overview “less for the 
purpose of  analysis than for the purpose of  illustrating the problems and peculiarities of  
religious use of  the concept…”  In a short, and very focused, analysis of  CD II/2,  102 103
Jonsen argues that Barth’s theological method commits him to the idea that “all our 
understanding about man’s works must be derived from our knowledge of  God’s works”, 
and this ultimately is problematic because it forces us to do the unnatural thing of  turning 
away from the subject-matter in order to develop our understanding of  it.  His critique 104
centres on Barth’s commitment to theological thinking per se, in such a way that is “not done 
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with the intention of  translating propositions of  faith into philosophical propositions.” This 
kind of  method gives rise to ethical statements that resist public applicability and scrutiny.  105
Jonsen here foreshadows some of  the concerns of  scholars such as Gerald McKenny and 
Robin Lovin, who worry about the way responsibility language can be generally understood 
if  there is no common conceptual grounding.  
 Jonsen articulates the concerns of  many Christian ethicists engaged in public 
discourse when he says that the appropriation of  the concept of  responsibility by 
theologians from moral philosophy is not straightforward; the conceptual content gets 
skewed. He writes, “when the theologian employes such a term in his own context, it does 
not go unchanged. By adoption into theological discourse its boundaries are stretched. Its 
connotation shifts…which has led to some uncertainty and loss of  clarity in use.”  This 106
statement is very telling: Jonsen clearly thinks that the controlling centre of  ethical discourse 
must be philosophy, or else the language of  responsibility loses its meaning and purpose, it 
becomes unclear. Accordingly, a Christian understanding of  responsibility must reject 
theological concerns and follow a more philosophical trajectory, or translate the 
particularities of  theology into more acceptable philosophical themes, if  it is to become 
generally comprehensible. Barth simply will not do this, but maintains that theology is the 
appropriate modus in which to consider human activity Christianly. Jonsen labels the 
approach “theological affirmation” because he argues the primary end is in “thoughtful 
consideration in faith upon the revealed word of  God in the light of  reflective human 
experience”  rather than in garnering an audience persuaded of  the correctness of  the 107
approach who are subsequently enabled to live by it. If  theologians want to enter 
meaningfully into public ethical discourse, or at least speak to other Christians who are 
engaged in this discourse, more is required if  they are to be more than merely problematic 
examples: 
 we are requesting our theologians to clarify the fundamental relationship that exists  
 between God and man…and the place which the perception of  human values and  
 human norms has in relation to the divine will for man.  108
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Jonsen’s fear about Barth’s approach to responsibility is that in its theological affirmation of  
the concept the discussion becomes exclusive of  common human experience and perception 
- “human values and human norms” - and so limits the extent to which Christian ethics can 
speak to concrete human beings, and which they in turn can speak to their culture and learn 
from it. It fails to lead to definite human activity. For Jonsen, Barth has little to say about the 
nature of  responsibility beyond the confines of  the Church,  - i.e. the place wherein the 109
basic assumptions about God and humanity are agreed - and less to say about the 
practicalities of  responsibility even to those in the Church. Hence his portrayal of  Barth 
only as a problem: the latter makes no space for “human values and human norms” as 
ethically valuable in distinction from the divine will, and struggles to instantiate his 
theological understanding in human activity. 
 William Schweiker rejects Barth’s approach, making similar points to Jonsen, but 
takes a different critical route. In his book he offers a classification of  various kinds of  
responsibility ethics according to the kind of  power dynamic involved. Barth is presented as 
having a “weak” approach because of  the dialogical structure of  human responsibility - 
prioritising obedient response to God as the key to the concept.  So, along with other 110
responsibility-ethics of  this type, Barth “reduces the central moral datum to interpersonal 
relations” thus avoiding important issues such as agency, self-assertion, and power.  As 111
such Barth has little to offer a robust account of  responsibility that emphasises practical 
questions about these issues in a contemporary culture in which they are highly prized. 
Again, focusing on CD II/2, Schweiker argues that in making God the primary “other” 
whom we are called to encounter as Commander, Barth reduces human power for self-
determination: the human being does not act in and of  herself, but always in response to the 
sovereign power of  Another - even though this “other” is thought to be benevolent. Aside 
from the potential abuses that can and have been associated with this kind of  religious ethic, 
of  which he is clearly not unaware,  Schweiker makes the point that this use of  112
responsibility language is only meaningful for those within the Christian community, and 
those who in choosing to act in obedience are willing to put aside their own moral instincts: 
 For Barth divine command ethics asserts the sovereignty of  God in terms of  the  
 good and also in determination of  what we all ought to do. What we think is good  
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 cannot be definitive of  the good; what we decide to do is only right if  it is in   
 obedience to the divine command.  113
This means a fundamental shift away from the usual modes of  moral reasoning that are 
common to public discourse in a post-Enlightenment tolerant society, toward dependence 
upon encounter with the Christian God - hence Barth’s reputation for command based 
ethics: “revelation not responsibility is morally basic” because the agent is morally 
contingent. What is missing, as far as Schweiker can see, is a description of  how this 
encounter happens and therefore how it can possibly be morally normative for Christians, let 
alone other human beings. As such he rejects Barth’s approach because, as with Niebuhr and 
Jonsen, it is difficult to instantiate this kind of  responsibility-ethic. It makes theological sense 
but is of  little practical value. Schweiker instead offers his own working hypothesis for 
human responsibility: the integrity of  relationship between what an individual values, and the 
choices she makes - and the power she has to enact her values: what he calls “moral 
integrity”.  This makes sense to Schweiker as a method for Christian ethics as well as non-114
Christian ethics because values are permitted to vary from person to person: what matters is 
the relationship between what we value and how we live. Like Niebuhr, this has a much 
more universal application than the narrowly theological focus of  Barth’s ethics. 
For all three critics, the language of  responsibility is a theological cypher that helps 
Barth say something about God in the context of  moral theology, but very little about the 
active human agent engaged in concreto and needing to think towards action. Either Barth 
offers a concept that is too oblique, and in the end fails to fulfil the task of  guiding human 
agents towards concrete activity because of  its dogmatic (theological) nature; or it excludes 
Christians from meaningful contribution to contemporary public discourse on ethics and 
values because its foundational theology is alien to wider society, and therefore to her own 
normative way of  thinking about action; or he violates the sovereignty of  the responsible 
self  and promotes an unhelpful subservience to a divine will - which we may or may not 
encounter - by emphasising the descriptive nature of  dogmatic theology and therefore 
refusing to provide something practically normative. Their criticisms of  Barth are wholly 
consistent with the received view held until recently that Barth’s ethics suffers from his 
commitment to thinking about action from the perspective of  dogmatic theology.
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1.4.2 Highlighting Internal Problems 
The response to this kind of  critical reading of  Barth is not simply a straightforward reading 
of, for example, the Church Dogmatics highlighting the particular sections of  special ethics 
wherein he discusses human responsibility. This is important, but it is the beginning rather 
than the end of  the task. Understanding and articulating human responsibility in Barth’s 
thought is made difficult by two related internal factors. By ‘internal’ I mean problems of  
Barth’s own making, and which themselves prove to be obstacles to a coherent account of  
his understanding. These must be named in order to be dealt with. 
  First, Barth offers no overarching account or conceptual definition of  the idea of  
human responsibility in his thought. Even theologically rich and potent statements like those 
discussed at the beginning of  this chapter are not readily accessible in terms of  their ethical 
meaning. Barth marshals the language of  responsibility early on in his theological career - in 
the 1922 lecture, The Problem of  Ethics Today - without any introduction or gloss, and from 
then on, though there are moments of  intense usage - such as those in the Special Ethics of  
CD II/2, which have given rise to critical comment from Niebuhr, Jonsen and Schweiker - 
there remains no working definition to help us understand what it means for him to say 
human beings are responsible before God. So in this thesis I join scholars such as Gerald 
McKenny in seeking further clarity about the nature and meaning of  the idea in Barth’s 
thought.  115
 Second, Barth uses responsibility and its cognates regularly in shorter ethical writings 
and also through each volume of  the Church Dogmatics to say something about human agency.  
His comments about responsibility are not confined to the special ethics, though it is in the 
sections of  special ethics that their moral meaning is most readily discernible. Given that the 
Barth-corpus is so large, dealing with texts in isolation will only paint part of  the picture and 
fill-in part of  our understanding. Hence my critique of  Niebuhr, Jonsen and Schweiker for 
their narrow focus on the Christology of  CD II/2. Human responsibility is a significant part 
of  Barth’s mature writing but it is not always clear what it means as an overall theme running 
through his theology. Therefore, the different sections of  theological ethics from across his 
dogmatic edifice must be brought together in dialogue to give us a fuller picture. Barth’s 
 In a forthcoming chapter discussing broad themes in Barth’s responsibility ethics, McKenny highlights the 115
problematic relationship between divine and human responsibility, and in particular the fact that, “the 
responsibility God assumes for us, as Barth describes it, thus appears to absolve human beings of  
responsibility altogether.” Given that this is one possible reading of  Barth, work needs to be done to make 
sense of  his use of  the terminology. Gerald McKenny, ‘Karl Barth’s Concept of  Responsibility’ in Jürgen 
Boomgaarden und Martin Leiner, eds., Kein Mensch, der der Verantwortung entgehen könnte: Verantwortungsethik in 
theologischer, philosophischer und religionswissenschaftlicher Perspektive (Freiburg: Herder, forthcoming). I am grateful 
to Professor McKenny for sending me a copy of  his essay prior to publication. 
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unusual approach to human responsibility requires both theological and ethical analysis, and 
some attempt at bringing these two aspects together into a coherent account. 
1.5 A Way Forward: My Approach to Reading Barth on Human Responsibility 
So far along the way there have been two audiences involved in this discussion. The first is 
the fraternity of  Barth-scholars who are concerned to develop our understanding of  the 
logic and content of  his theology, of  which ethics is a constitutive part. Thus far I have 
argued that our understanding of  human responsibility as a key theme within his ethics has 
suffered from neglect, and that this is a substantial gap in our knowledge because it is a 
significant and recurring idea. It is also of  critical import to Barth’s theological anthropology. 
The second audience is the fraternity of  Christian responsibility-ethicists who have largely 
been critical of  Barth’s work on the basis of  his method and in relation to the practicality of  
his thought. What Barth does with the idea of  responsibility is, for some, unrecognisable as 
ethics even in relation to the general lack of  conceptual cogency about it within the broader 
Christian tradition. Alongside these two audiences, each with their own concerns and 
requirements, has been the problem which Barth himself  causes for us by not attending to 
the key task of  defining the notion as he understood it. He therefore swims against the 
stream of  theological ethicists of  the twentieth century who took time to clarify the 
technical language they employed. Therefore, in short, a thesis that proposes to understand 
Barth on human responsibility must attend to the theology, practicality, and interpretation of  
the topic. 
 In terms of  the way forward addressing these issues, it seems necessary to me to 
attend in detail to key texts in Barth’s oeuvre to illumine our understanding, and in particular 
to pay attention to how he thinks the responsible human being conducts themselves. I am 
taking seriously Lovin’s comment, discussed earlier, that contemporary Christian 
understandings of  responsibility have suffered from a lack of  clear conceptual “grounding” 
and therefore I wish to allow Barth’s theological grounding to become clear. In doing so, 
initially I shall hold back from rushing to any judgement about its moral usefulness, in 
particular its practicality. I am proposing to think with Barth about human responsibility 
throughout this thesis, and to clarify what he is saying about responsibility, offer a more 
coherent definition of  the idea from this perspective, and so deal with the central critique of  
Christian-ethicists that his approach has no practical impact. This latter issue, I argue, is one 
that Barth actually considered but not until later sections of  the special ethics of  the Church 
Dogmatics - sections which have not, until now, been part of  the wider discussion about 
responsibility-ethics. 
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 Edward Farley’s distinction between theological thinking and theological method has 
been very helpful for informing my approach to the difficulties I have discussed. Ordinarily 
these two theologians would be very far apart in terms of  method and theological priorities, 
and certainly no inference that they might be close to one another in these ways should be 
drawn from my use of  Farley at this point.  In an essay entitled Ecclesial Contextual Thinking  116
Farley outlines two approaches to theological method that shed some light on the issue of  
Barth’s reluctance to define responsibility. Farley distinguishes between the more formal 
“methodological approach” and the more intuitive “thinking” theology. Methodology 
connotes something scientific, ordered, and demonstrable. It involves the “precise 
delineation of  the field, subject matter, procedures of  enquiry, and modes of  verification”  117
in order to make discussion accessible and understandable. It also enables scrutiny, and 
comparison with other approaches to the same topic. The essential paradigm of  
“methodology” is scientific. This seems to me to sum up what Christian ethicists such as 
Niebuhr, Jonsen, and Schweiker have wanted from Barth on responsibility thus far, and 
which they have found more readily in other theological ethicists of  the twentieth century. In 
the light of  my account of  the haphazard development of  the idea in Christian ethical 
discourse, this expectation is necessary if  we are to understand the technical language used. 
By contrast, Farley argues that theology is not always scientific per se. We know this, he 
argues, because experience tell us it is not only for the expert trained in the appropriate 
method: “lay people, believers, even non-believers” are capable of  thinking and reflecting 
about truth in a given context. It is not a privileged activity, but a general human one. 
Moreover, the context in which it happens affects the content and way of  thinking: “context 
enters thinking by way of  the aims and agendas of  thinking…and is given thematic and 
criteriological weight.”  In a university lecture theatre theological thinking will look very 118
different from the kind on offer in a church service. Thus “theological thinking” is more 
intuitive, almost more organic, than theological method because it relies upon a deep 
connectedness to the context in which the activity of  thinking occurs, and grows out of  that. 
This is true not just for the physical context - a lecture theatre or a church building - but also 
the intellectual context in which a particular topic is considered. Theological intellectual-
contexts will inform our thinking in a different way from historical or philosophical ones.  
 Edward Farley, ‘Ecclesial Contextual Thinking’ in Darren C. Marks, ed., Shaping a Theological Mind: 116
Theological Context and Methodology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 15-30. 
 Farley, ‘Ecclesial Contextual Thinking’, 16.117
 Farley, ‘Ecclesial Contextual Thinking’, 16-17.118
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 In relation to Barth, whilst these two scholars could not be thought of  as from the 
same ‘school’ of  thought, Farley may offer an insight and a way forward in the difficulty of  
reading Barth’s seeming reluctance to be “methodological”. Barth’s approach to human 
responsibility is much more akin to “theological thinking.” The presence of  responsibility-
language and its critical use in his ethics demonstrates that he is reflecting on the topic and 
drawing attention to it, and doing so in the context of  dogmatic theology; thus, from Farley, 
the theological context affects the content of  the concept. In order to think about human 
responsibility with Barth, and to understand what that language means for him, it is necessary 
to consider the immediate dogmatic location of  his discussion - the theological grounding 
of  the topic, in Lovin’s terms. This is best done by way of  exegesis - critical explanation, 
explication, and interpretation - of  key passages in which Barth’s idea of  human 
responsibility plays an important part. The three core chapters of  this thesis, therefore, are 
centred around exegesis of  key texts in his theological ethics.  
 The texts I have chosen are deliberate works of  theological ethics rather than more 
general works of  dogmatic theology, because I am keen to see how the idea of  responsibility 
is developed within Barth’s ethical material. The texts are: the 1922 lecture, The Problem of  
Ethics Today; the 1928-32 Ethics lectures; the 1929 lecture, The Holy Spirit and Christian Life; the 
ethics of  Church Dogmatics II/2 originally published in 1942; and the special ethics of  Church 
Dogmatics III/4 originally published in 1952. There are several reasons for choosing these 
particular points of  engagement with Barth’s theological ethics.  
 The first is that such a wide variety of  texts, both published works of  scholarly 
dogmatic ethics and occasional lectures addressing clergy and students, allows me to 
consider the topic in greater depth than has been done before. As I suggested in the 
previous section, critics of  Barth have tended to focus only on short passages from Church 
Dogmatics II. The more thoroughgoing engagement that I suggest is necessary requires the 
consideration of  a greater number of  texts, and therefore a greater number of  dogmatic 
contexts in which to consider ethics. This is an important methodological point regarding 
best practice when reading Barth: it is too easy and commonplace to focus on short passages 
- even long paragraphs - and miss the bigger picture that is carried across the whole corpus. 
In the case of  the Church Dogmatics this seems particularly important: the Trinitarian 
structure  of  the whole means that reading sections, paragraphs, and volumes in isolation 119
 On this see Biggar, The Hastening That Waits, 46-96; also Biggar, ‘Barth’s Trinitarian Ethic’ in The Cambridge 119
Companion to Karl Barth, edited by John Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) ch 13.
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from the rest may not give the fullest possible picture of  Barth’s thinking on a particular 
topic.  120
 Second, and related to the first, is that these particular works of  theological ethics 
punctuate Barth’s life at roughly ten year intervals. This enables me to be aware of  the 
development of  the idea of  responsibility in Barth’s thought, and in particular to highlight 
the significance and impact of  the Christocentric refocusing of  his thinking which happened 
between the Ethics lectures and the publication of  CD II/2. Though his theological 
development is not the primary topic here, it is necessary to plot some aspects of  it precisely 
because Barth’s ethics is so fundamental to his theological project. We ought to expect that 
developments in his theological method would affect his theological ethics. Indeed, what I 
think becomes clear is that the Christological turn actually provides Barth with a theological 
basis for talking about human responsibility in a way that was not possible before it. 
 Third, the choice of  particular texts is important. In The Problem of  Ethics Today Barth 
offers his own summary critique of  contemporary Christian ethics, and its development 
from the nineteenth century “bourgeois” Christianity influenced by post-Enlightenment 
anthropocentrism. He critiques the historical connection between ethics and human 
flourishing aside from God, and subsequently offers his own constructive suggestions. What 
is notable about this is the way the language of  responsibility is marshalled as part of  his 
constructive work, quite without explanation or definition, to say something about human 
agency. This seems like a helpful point of  departure in my thesis, making us aware that 
responsibility-language was a part of  Barth’s re-envisioning of  the project of  Christian ethics 
from an early point, and giving us some insight into what it meant at this stage. It sets the 
scene also for my engagement with the later Ethics lectures. Only in recent years have these 
lectures been recognised for their significance in Barth’s overall development. They are 
particularly important in a thesis considering his ethics both because of  their subject matter, 
and also because they comprise the only complete account he offers. The special ethics of  
CD IV was never finally completed, and CD V remained entirely unwritten. Therefore, 
attending to the way responsibility language is deployed here, amongst his more thorough 
presentation of  the project of  theological ethics, should render insights that prepare us for 
reading the special ethics of  the Dogmatics. Alongside these lectures in chapter 2 I also give 
some attention to The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life lecture. It demonstrates the importance 
of  both the trinitarian approach to moral reasoning which Barth employs in the Ethics, and 
also the dogmatic underpinning of  his understanding of  Christian life at this stage. 
 Biggar talks about the requirement that we “gain some sense of  the dynamic whole.” Biggar, The Hastening 120
That Waits, 47.
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Responsibility language is marshalled here also, though very briefly. These three texts taken 
together give an oversight of  his early thinking about human responsibility. 
 For Barth’s more mature approach, I turn attention to two sections from the Church 
Dogmatics. The first is the most commonly read section amongst responsibility-ethicists, CD 
II/2, and particularly §§36-39 which comprise the ethics section. The fact that this section 
of  the Dogmatics has had so much attention indicates that Barth’s discussion of  human 
responsibility here is quite significant: he locates the human agent in relation to the divine 
covenant and election actualised in Jesus Christ, and uses the language of  responsibility at 
length to describe the modus of  human being and acting as divine covenant partners. What is 
most interesting here, and frequently overlooked by commentators, is that Barth deploys 
responsibility-language in a way that reflects his two-natures Christology, thereby arguing 
that human responsibility is enabled by divine responsibility, and that both are epitomised in 
Jesus Christ. The description Barth offers here is foundational for his understanding of  
human responsibility, but it is not exhaustive. So, while I wish to attend to it in depth, it 
forms only one half  of  my discussion of  human responsibility in the Church Dogmatics. The 
other half  is in the special ethics of  CD III/4, in particular §§52-56, where Barth discusses 
the ethics of  the doctrine of  creation. This is a different dogmatic-context, and sees Barth 
engage much more in the concrete and lived experience of  the human creature as one 
necessarily caught up in responsibility before God and required to enact that. Barth takes 
seriously these issues and discusses more freely the ontic aspects of  human responsibility. 
Reading this, in the light of  his dogmatic concerns, gives us a different angle on the idea of  
human responsibility, and allows us to consider both the theological description - and 
therefore the logic of  his ethics - and also the practicality of  human responsibility for the 
lived experience of  human creatures. Again, I have chosen to engage with the topic of  
responsibility here in the midst of  the special ethics, and not to engage in detail the earlier 
discussion of  responsibility in CD III/2, because my primary interest is in human 
responsibility as a theme in Barth’s theological ethics. For the purposes of  clarity and 
appropriate focus I have chosen to make the special ethics my primary exegetical target.  
 In addressing these two sections of  the Dogmatics I am deliberately allowing them to 
be in dialogue with one another. This is slightly unusual, since the ethics of  CD III/4 is 
often read in the light of  CD III/2 and the dogmatic discussion of  covenant theology there. 
This matters, and will inform my account of  the special ethics of  CD III/4, but I wish to 
attend to the integrity of  the breadth of  his theological ethics also and argue in the closing 
chapter that reading the special ethics of  CD II/2 and CD III/4 together gives us a much 
more substantial understanding of  human responsibility in Barth’s moral theology than we 
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currently have. I am aware that my argument here does not attend in the same level of  detail 
to the fragments of  the ethics of  CD IV/4, published as The Christian Life but more 
appropriately the “Command of  God the Reconciler.” This decision was taken early in my 
work to keep the focus on the completed sections of  ethics and bring these into dialogue 
with one another. If  I had given sustained attention to the fragmentary ethics of  CD IV/4 I 
would first need to engage in the (distracting) task of  critical reconstruction before moving 
on to exegesis and analysis. There are common themes and there is a coherence to the 
special ethics which grows out of  the earlier insights from the Ethics lectures which I think is 
helpful for understanding a difficult topic like responsibility in Barth’s thought; so 
approaching the topic in this way we are more likely to come to a coherent account of  it. 
Where the fragments contribute directly to our understanding and illumine some earlier 
passage in the special ethics, I have referenced them appropriately. Not attending to these in 
the same way as earlier special ethics reflects the conviction that what I will say about human 
responsibility on the basis of  my research is not challenged by the material in CD IV/4 but 
strengthened by it. A detailed exegetical discussion of  this text was therefore not necessary 
to fulfil the goal of  explicating Barth’s understanding of  human responsibility and its ethical 
significance.  
 Approaching the topic at hand by way of  an exegetical reading, I am able to engage 
both Barth’s early theological ethics and his more mature dogmatic ethics and see how his 
thinking developed as well as see how the different sections of  ethics can be brought into 
fruitful dialogue. This allows me to think with Barth in depth about human responsibility. In 
doing so I answer the question posed by the fraternity of  Barth scholars that we make sense 
of  the logic and structure of  human responsibility within the wider framework of  dogmatic 
theology, and thus contribute to an area of  knowledge hitherto neglected. In addressing the 
theological anthropology and concrete ethics of  the doctrine of  creation, I am also able to 
attend to the question of  its practicality posed by the fraternity of  Responsibility-ethicists, 
namely how does a responsible human creature conduct themselves? The final question for 
me is how these two relate to one another, and what an overall account of  human 
responsibility in Barth’s thought might be. 
1.6 Thesis Overview 
I begin in the following chapter with a close reading and examination of  the cycle of  
lectures Barth delivered at Münster (1928-9) and the updated version at Bonn (1931-2) on 
the topic of  Christian ethics. Here I will trace the way the language of  responsibility is used 
at key points in Barth’s thinking at the time, and what he means by it in the context of  those 
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lectures. I shall set this material in a wider theological context by examining the earlier 
lecture The Problem of  Ethics Today and the contemporary lectures on The Holy Spirit and the 
Christian Life. 
 In chapter 3 I will tackle the material in CD II/2 and explore the account of  
responsibility Barth offers there, but in the wider context of  Barth’s theological 
development, and the particular emphases of  that whole volume. The result is to see the 
heavily theological material in a new light - not as deliberately overly-conceptual and 
contrived so as to reduce the import of  practical ethics, but as an act of  theological ground-
clearing in which space is created for responsible human activity. 
 I turn in chapter 4 to the special ethics of  CD III/4, and explore how Barth uses the 
language of  responsibility in that context. What becomes clear is that his notion is quite 
different in presentation from the earlier special ethics, and is much more concrete - naming 
particular instances and ways in which human beings might practice responsibility. The 
material in this special ethics has the feel of  a regular ethics manual, giving concrete 
examples and instructions about the practicalities of  responsibility. 
 The final chapter is a discursive chapter in which I bring together my observations 
about Barth on human responsibility in the two preceding chapters by offering a single 
account that makes sense of  the relationship between the theological work of  CD II and the 
more concrete description of  responsibility in CD III. I characterise my exegesis as two-
parts of  one single account: a theological description of  human responsibility that must 
subsequently be embedded in human life. This embedding takes the form of  concrete and 
particular practices, which I suggest are indicative practices that punctuate our lives but 
which give them form and structure. This then is how the theological description is 
actualised, and how we are able to inhabit the reality it describes. I then return to some of  
the earlier criticisms of  his responsibility ethics which I highlighted in chapter 1, and suggest 




Human Responsibility in the Münster/Bonn Ethics lectures 
In this chapter I argue that Barth’s understanding of  responsibility belongs very specifically 
to the human side of  the event in which the divine address is encountered as commanding-
Word. The Word of  God elicits human responsibility, and in so doing binds the human 
agent to God primarily and to fellow creatures secondarily. Responsibility describes the 
nature of  the actions undertaken by agents caught up in this event. At this stage, Barth’s 
account of  the theology of  human agency and therefore his theological location of  
responsibility is severely underdeveloped - he offers no account - but the material here is 
indicative of  what will be developed in the ethics of  the Church Dogmatics. 
2.1 Introduction 
The Ethics lectures consist of  two cycles of  the same lecture series, delivered first at the 
University of  Münster in 1928/29, and then again with revisions at the University of  Bonn 
in 1930/1,  to which Barth had moved to take up the Chair in Systematic Theology in 121
1930. Until that point Barth had never offered a systematic account of  ethics, preferring 
instead to address ethics through various occasional lectures, addresses, and speeches, or as 
part of  larger works. These lectures represent a deliberate and focused treatment of  ethics as 
a discipline, and a re-assertion of  its intrinsic relationship to dogmatics. According to 
Eberhard Busch, Barth’s assistant and biographer, the Ethics lectures ought to be understood 
as a response to the spread of  anthropocentrism within Christian ethics in the early 
twentieth century. Busch notes Barth’s particular “fear that his colleagues Bultmann and 
Gogarten were completely dissolving dogmatics into ethics (because the term ‘decision’ had 
such a central place in their views).”  Barth’s ‘fear’ is that in collapsing dogmatics into 122
ethics theology becomes anthropology in disguise because we cease to talk about God. This 
is a particularly acute anxiety for Barth in relation to Rudolf  Bultmann and Friedrich 
Gogarten, who had shared much in common with him during 1920s, and whose theological 
 By the time of  the second cycle at Bonn, Barth’s unusual approach to Christian ethics had proved a novel 121
draw for students in the University, and as many as 250 students were recorded in attendance. See Eberhard 
Busch, Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts (London: SCM Press, 1976), 204. 
 Busch, Karl Barth…, 181. Barth, Friedrich Gogarten, Emil Brunner, Eduard Thurneysen, along with 122
Rudolf  Bultmann, were considered co-founders of  the dialectical school of  thought in early twentieth-
century Protestantism. Together these were responsible for publicising the theological journal, Zwischen den 
Zeiten, and for a general turn towards God as divine subject in theological method. The group grew apart in 
the late 1920s into 1930s, and Barth ceased to be involved with the journal in 1933. Christophe Chalamet 
charts the early development of  this group in his Dialectical Theologians: Wilhelm Hermann, Karl Barth, and Rudolf  
Bultmann (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 2005). He describes the rise of  the journal in particular on pages 
152-160. 
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friendship he had enjoyed. But their developing trajectory was one from which he was keen 
to distance himself, especially in the latter part of  the 1920s. Barth spoke against Gogarten 
in particular, whom he named alongside Emanuel Hirsch as examples of  those 
compromising the integrity of  a truly Christian ethics by misleading attention.  In particular 123
Barth was worried about Gogarten’s recasting of  Christian faith as essentially an ethics of  
relationship - “from which he correlated statements about God and human being, thus 
emphasising anthropology”  -  which he had learned from Martin Büber, and which is 124
most clearly demonstrated in the introduction to his collected essays Glaube und Wirklichkeit 
(1928) where Gogarten offers heartfelt thanks to Büber.  Barth did not approve of  Büber’s 125
influence here, and in his Ethics  lectures critiqued both Gogarten and Bultmann by citing 
another Lutheran theologian, the nineteenth century theologian Richard Rothe (1799-1867) 
and in particular his multi-volume theological ethics  as exemplary of  the pitfall into which 126
their theology was heading because of  the tendency to turn to anthropology too quickly and 
from the wrong direction. In that text, Rothe developed the argument that ethics is a human 
task concerning human agency which is finally about the moral/spiritual development of  
human beings (i.e. anthropology) and that religion - and its theological or dogmatic content - 
supplies the data for this human development, albeit the best possible data. Herein the moral 
life and the religious life coincide, but in such a way that the religious life is reduced in scope 
and content to a supporting role, and in which God is not necessary, or at least not 
necessarily talked about.  Barth likens this to another idea of  Rothe’s - the “disappearance 127
of  the Church in the State”, such that the Church becomes merely an agent of  the State, or 
is given insignificant tasks to exercise on behalf  of  the State but is never really a thing in 
itself  with its own sphere of  reference. The Church disappears. As Barth applies it to the 
 In a short commentary on the life of  the Barth-Gogarten-Bultmann group, Timothy Gorringe suggests 123
that the underlying tensions in this circle reflected the tensions of  the Refromation: “Much of  the problem 
with Gogarten was a sense that there were things simply not shared with Lutherans. ‘The controversies 
between Lutheran and Reformed were never resolved’, Barth wrote to Bultmann.” See Timothy Gorringe, 
Karl Barth: Against Hegemony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 79. 
 Jack Forstman, Christian Faith in Dark Times: Theological Conflicts in the Shadow of  Hitler (Louisville: 124
Westminster John Knox, 1992), 161.
 See Nahum Glatzer and Paul Mendes-Flohr (eds), The Letters of  Martin Büber: A Life Dialogue (Syracuse: 125
Syracuse University Press, 1996), 37.
 Ethics, 8 (Ethik I, 9). Richard Rothe, Theologische Ethik I-III (Wittenberg: Koelling, 1869). 126
 This was a major concern for Barth: at the end of  an overview of  the various approaches to Christian 127
ethics other than his own, he writes: “We regard all these attempts at a methodological distinction between 
dogmatics and ethics as ethically suspect because with great regularity there takes place in all of  them a 
suspicious change of  direction, a suspicious exchange of  subjects, namely, of  God and man…” Ethics, 12 
(Ethik I, 17).
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situation of  ethics, dogmatics serves the flourishing of  anthropology by giving up its 
primary sphere of  reference and as such dogmatics disappears. 
 The Ethics lectures represent, in this context, a “fresh grounding” of  ethics - Barth’s 
attempt to seriously locate ethics within the spectrum of  dogmatic theology.  He does this 128
by re-stating the basic problem of  all ethics: the goodness of  human conduct. Barth is 
careful to remind his hearers that human conduct is not the concern of  Christian ethics 
alone, but of  any and every ethical system because the function of  ethics as a discipline is to 
explore and elicit human action and the thinking that leads toward action. But more than 
that, the discipline of  ethics is not simply concerned that human beings act but that they act 
well - that their actions are good, that their conduct is moral. The question then becomes, 
how do we assess the goodness of  human conduct? Every account of  ethics has its own 
approach to this question. But any human self-referencing answer leads Christian thinkers 
into the trap which Barth wants to avoid: anthropocentrism. To understand the goodness of  
human action by reflecting upon human being alone is impossible for Christian ethics, 
whose inner logic is formed and informed by Christian theology, which is, in turn, governed 
by divine revelation. As such, Christian ethics can only ever be theological ethics.  
 Theology, rooted in revelation, is always about divine disclosure; what Barth calls “the 
Word of  God directed to man.” The directional language is important. The divine Word 
moves towards human beings, and because it is Word-in-motion it must be address - God’s 
address to humanity; it is a human-ward action on the part of  God in which God remains 
Subject, i.e. speaker. As such, “man to whom God’s Word is directed can never become the 
theme or subject of  theology”  since that would be to replace the divine address to 129
humanity with the human address to God. Such a move is impossible because the impetus is 
always of  God in his address. The subject of  Christian theology is therefore always the 
divine Word. As such, if  Christian ethics is properly speaking theological ethics, it is 
impossible for ethical discourse to proceed in any way other than by way of  the same divine 
Word or address. This does not preclude talking about human beings, as some have 
suggested, but rather it means that anthropology is not a substantive or separate theme 
alongside God: it must be discussed as a reality dependent upon God, “as predicate relates to 
subject.”  This places humanity within the sphere of  the divine Word as those to whom 130
divine address is made. As addressed creatures human beings are caught up in the dynamic of  
 Ethics, vii (Ethik I, 8).128
 Ethics, 13 (Ethik I, 19).129
 Ethics, 14 (Ethik I, 20).130
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Christian theology - “the Word of  God…is spoken for you and to you”  - and so there is a 131
place for considering humanity appropriately from within the proper focus on revelation. 
 In dogmatic terms, the locus of  theology wherein this appropriate consideration may 
be made, and therefore wherein ethics is to be located, is the doctrine of  sanctification; we 
might think of  this as the effect of  the divine address as it is received. The answer to the 
question of  the goodness of  human conduct is found in the statement, “good means 
sanctified by God.” The question of  human goodness therefore has a divine orientation: we 
are forced to turn towards the will and Word of  God in order to do the work of  ethics in 
assessing the goodness of  human conduct, because we are lacking sanctification aside from 
God. This has the effect of  relativising all other modes of  ethical assessment: we must 
enquire about the validity of  all possible methods of  approaching the problem of  ethics 
from within the sphere of  theology. For the Christian, actions may only be attributed as 
‘good’ if  they are sanctified, i.e. if  they are predicated on the divine Word.   
 But Barth thinks sanctification means more than simply acting well. Though 
contemporary ethics concerned itself  with actions - asking the question what should we do? 
- Barth sees the task in more existential terms. It concerns the whole person, the entirety of  
our human existence which includes our actions: “man does not exist and also act. He exists 
as he acts.”  Barth calls this our Lebensakt. Human life is the enactment in particular habits 132
and practices of  human existence; human existence is not static, but enacted. Thinking about 
ethics in this way mitigates against generalisations about human existence, since existence is 
enacted, and enactment means concrete specific activity. There is no place for the merely 
theoretical: Christian ethics cannot proceed “without the fact of  my being this specific 
person having any significance.”  Barth’s re-conception of  ethics is about my concrete 133
hesitance here and now; we not only weigh the merits of  our conduct, but in so doing 
comment on its relation to the origin and determination of  our existence. What is good human 
conduct? is in essence the same question as, what is true human existence? There is an interplay 
between the universal and the particular that refuses to allow ethics to become either overly 
generalised or exclusively particular. The answer to the questions can never be a purely 
human self-reflection, because human beings are not self  originating. We exist by virtue of  
the divine act of  creation. This takes us further into dogmatic theology.  
 What this means for Christian ethics as Barth developed it is an expansive vision of  
action and agency, in which we are no longer concerned with specific activities or actions 
 Ethics, 16 (Ethik I, 24).131
 Ethics, 16 (Ethik I, 24).132
 Ethics, 63 (Ethik I, 104).133
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alone, or for that matter responses to particular moral ‘issues’, but with the whole life of  the 
whole person: our actions have meaning in relation to what we think about our life and 
existence. Grounded in the doctrine of  sanctification, we perceive our lives to be originated, 
ordered, and claimed by God. Or as Barth puts it, the Word of  God is spoken to an 
individual and “lays claim to his life.”  This claiming-Word is understood and received by 134
human creatures as divine command - the imperative of  the good that must be enacted, or 
against which our conduct and decision are measured, and which therefore is the truth of  
our human existence. Sanctification, therefore, is nothing more than the claiming of  a 
human life by God in the divine command and the fulfilment of  that command in obedient 
response. 
 The God who speaks this life-claiming commanding-Word to human beings is the 
Triune God. This is of  central importance to a genuinely Christian ethic, since it is the 
encounter - in the speaking and receiving of  the life-claiming commanding Word - between 
human beings and God, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, which is its true condition. This 
encounter, Barth articulates as an event:  
 In ethics no less than in dogmatics God’s Word is not general truth which can be  
 generally perceived from the safe harbour of  theoretical contemplation…God’s Word 
 gives itself  to be known, and in so doing is heard, man is made responsible and his  
 acts take place in that confrontation.   135
There is no space for generalities: God’s life-claiming Word is spoken and received 
concretely at particular moments and informs our actual conduct. Its content is revelation, 
the witness of  God to God’s own self  - the Word of  the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit 
- and so the confrontation of  human beings with their false perceptions of  themselves and 
the world they inhabit. So Barth comments that “…revelation is God himself. But God 
himself  is our Lord from and by and to whom we are what we are.”  In hearing God’s 136
Word, we know him as Lord and ourselves as subjects of  divine lordship. The Word is God’s 
Word and speaks of  God, and so the Word is also triune: the command of  God the Creator, 
Reconciler, and Redeemer.  
 Ethics, 17 (Ethik I, 26).134
 Ethics, 50 (Ethik I, 83).135
 Ethics, 34-5 (Ethik I, 56).136
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 What then does God’s Word say? It is the Word of  the divine creation, the divine  
 reconciliation, and the divine redemption…it speaks to us about our determination for  
 God, about the event of  our relation to God, and about the goal of  our fulfilment in  
 God….[These] are the great orientation points of  the whole course of  Christian  
 dogmatics.  137
The Ethics lectures, as in his later Dogmatics, are structured according to the being and 
purpose of  God and its impact upon the moral life of  human beings.  Barth considers the 138
life-claiming Word from each of  these dogmatic locations, and as he does so each takes on a 
particular nuance: creation is about life; reconciliation about law; and redemption about 
promise.  This is not a separation of  Christian ethics into three types: it is about recognising 
that Christian theocentrism, by nature of  the triune theos at its heart, forces a threefold 
approach to the life-claiming Word. Again, this is about much more than the actions we 
perform, but the whole scope and orientation of  human life and existence. By introducing 
these theological foci Barth emphasises the role of  what we might call ‘vision’ in ethics. What 
is the bigger picture wherein my particular Lebensakt takes place? This almost metaphysical 
consideration underpins Barth’s wholesale rejection of  anthropocentric approaches to 
Christian ethics: we cannot know of  ourselves the origin and determination of  our existence.  
 It should be clear from the preceding overview that Barth’s aversion to 
anthropocentrism is not an aversion to talking about the human being and the validity of  her 
conduct. Rather it is about locating that conversation with theological integrity, and therefore 
speaking the truth about the goodness of  human conduct. This is his concern about 
Gogarten and Bultmann, amongst others, whom he perceives to have sold-out the 
theological integrity by focussing on human experience. In so doing he rejects even action 
focused ethics, expanding the task to include the wider question of  existence and 
determination. This systematic refocusing is what makes these lectures so important for any 
account of  his moral theology, or any account of  the development of  Barth’s thought. 
Strangely, as I argued in the opening chapter, not much attention has been given to these 
lectures in the field of  Barth scholarship, even since the English translation of  the 
Gesamtausgabe edition in 1980. A small number of  essay length treatments of  the lectures 
 Ethics, 52 (Ethik I, 86).137
 On this see Nigel Biggar’s helpful essay ‘Barth’s Trinitarian Ethic’ in John Webster (ed), The Cambridge 138
Companion to Karl Barth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 212-227. His extensive comparison of  
the Trinitarian structure of  the Ethics and that of  the Church Dogmatics is also very important. See his, The 
Hastening That Waits, 46-96.
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exist,  but there remains a space for a monograph length study of  them and their 139
important contribution to the development of  Barth’s theological method as well as the 
journey towards the special ethics of  the Church Dogmatics. 
 In the case of  this thesis, it is important in the context of  this theological re-
positioning of  ethics to see how Barth deploys responsibility language, and to understand 
what he means by it. Before I turn to the way that is done in the Ethics lectures, I wish to 
attend to two other texts from 1920s to help shed light on his appropriation and 
understanding of  responsibility-language. 
2.2. Responsibility Language before the Ethics Lectures 
Though I have suggested thus far that the Ethics lectures are some of  the most important 
texts in the Barth-corpus, I am also aware that Barth’s peculiar approach to moral reasoning 
did not simply appear form nowhere in 1928 - though the final trigger may have been his 
growing divergence from Gogarten and others at about this time. Barth had been very 
interested in the co-inherence of  dogmatic theology and Christian ethics for a number of  
years and several occasional lectures and papers bear witness to the fact that some idea of  
responsibility or other was present in much of  his moral theology in 1920s. I want to briefly 
attend to two of  these works in particular to fill out the developmental aspect of  Barth’s 
thought and its relation to the wider intellectual backdrop: a lecture delivered to church 
ministers in 1922 entitled, The Problem of  Ethics Today, and a lecture delivered to pastors, 
students, and other interested parties in 1929, entitled The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life. 
Both texts indicate the way Barth’s theology was developing throughout the 1920s, and most 
especially help us to see how his search for a coherent account of  human responsibility took 
shape. 
2.2.1 The Problem of  Ethics Today 
In the first lecture, Barth provides analysis of  the development of  Christian ethics in the 
early twentieth century and adopts a highly provocative stance against what he considers to 
be its major theological, and therefore ethical, pitfalls. The lecture was delivered in 
September 1922, and carries with it much of  the critical force that Barth-scholarship 
ordinarily associates with the (contemporary) Romans commentary: a total rejection of  the 
 Nigel Biggar, ‘The Trinitarian Dimensions of  Ethics’…; Paul Nimmo, ‘The Orders of  Creation in the 139
Ethics of  Karl Barth’ in Scottish Journal of  Theology 60, no. 1 (2007), 24-35; John Webster, ‘’The Great 
Disruption’: Word of  God and Moral Consciousness in Barth’s Münster Ethics’ in his Barth’s Moral Theology, 
41-64. My own (unpublished) Master’s thesis was an exegetical commentary on the theme of  divine 
judgement, The Form and Function of  Divine Judgement in Karl Barth’s Münster/Bonn Ethics 1928-31. (M.St. Thesis, 
Oxford University, 2008).
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unaided human endeavour towards God, and the recognition that Christian theology stands 
under the judgement of  God in as much as it is a human discipline which speaks human 
words in response to divine action. There is a resounding ‘No!’ to human beings in this 
lecture that is indicative of  this period in Barth’s life. The lecture was delivered four times in 
the period September - October 1922. The audience for each delivery were various groups 
of  church ministers and pastors, the ranks of  which Barth himself  had only recently left to 
join the faculty of  Göttingen.  Through a series of  scathing critiques, Barth attacked the 140
ease and laxity with which contemporary Christian faith had descended into the ethics of  the  
“ascending German middle class.”  His central concern here was the way in which the 141
intelligentsia of  nineteenth century Europe seemed to exercise an influence over Christian 
moral reasoning in a way that encouraged, in Barth’s mind at least, the avoidance of  the 
complexities of  the search for the good by conflating cultural development with morality. 
Towering figures such as Kant, Schleiermacher, and Troeltsch are highlighted as examples of  
those whose thinking about faith and morality underpinned the cultural status quo. This got 
epitomised, for Barth, in the way Christian ethics saw fit to “reduce the Gospel to a few 
religious-ethical categories like trust in God and love for one’s neighbour.”  Downplaying 142
the religious content to a few palatable values centred on trust, love, and common humanity 
overcame some of  the complexities of  thinking faith-fully about human action in a context 
in which textual and historical criticism had undermined the traditional sources of  Christian 
ethics, viz. the Church’s teaching and its biblical underpinning. But such avoidance of  
complexity was anathema to Barth who saw it only as the desire not to be confronted by the 
living God, and as such to set ethics on the - much more unreliable - ground of  human 
history in its most optimistic form. He wrote, 
 He delivered the lecture at a Pastors Conference in Weisbaden, on 26th September; a continuing education 140
seminar, on 28th September; a pastors co-operative group, on 11th October; a clergy meeting in Lower 
Saxony, on 13th October; and a Provincial Pastors meeting in the Ruhr Valley, on 24th October.
 The Problem of  Ethics…, 141 (Das Problem der Ethik…, 110). The earlier English translation of  this lecture 141
uses the more provocative phrase, “the ethics of  the bourgeoisie…” See Karl Barth, ’The Problem of  Ethics 
Today’ in The Word fo God and The Word of  Man, translated by Douglas Horton (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1935), 145.
 The Problem of  Ethics…, 143 (Das Problem Ethik…, 112). This is clearly a reference to Barth’s esteemed 142
teacher Adolf  von Harnack, and his well known lectures The Essence of  Christianity which finish with exactly 
this summary of  Christian faith. It is unusual in this text that Barth does not name him as an enemy of  
rightly-ordered Christian ethics, since much of  this text involves very direct naming of  particular theologians 
and the mistakes they have made - amongst them the Ritschlian School, another tradition with which Barth 
had earlier association. One reason for not naming Harnack is that it may not have been wholly necessary to 
do so, since Barth and he were engaged in a simmering dispute at the time of  this lecture, which was to 
become very public within a few months. See Martin Rumscheidt, Revelation and Theology: An Analysis of  the 
Barth-Harnack Correspondence of  1923 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
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 At its most basic, however, it was not really about asking what was to be done, as if   
 one did not know what to do. Rather, it was a matter of  asking about whether the  
 more philosophical or theological way, the Kantian or Schleiermacherian way, would 
 provide the enlightening formula for doing the Good which was to be done, that  
 which was quite evidently to be done in the certain, infinite need for improvement in 
 culture as a whole. This was a culture which was quite evidently infinitely capable of  
 improvement…   143
That which is “quite evidently” necessary is not the most logical or well argued point, but 
about that which comes most naturally to a given society, i.e. that which is already 
happening, and the ongoing development of  the society - its improvability. This, he argued, 
was felt by the elite to be an inherent and infinite quality of  high culture. Barth saw the 
influence of  the post-Enlightenment intellectual tradition as a fundamental turn to the 
human subject in the most positive way. Douglas Horton’s English translation loses some of  
the force of  Barth’s language when it translates, “annähernd genau passte” as the “almost 
perfectly obvious answer.” Amy Marga’s more recent translation captures more of  the force 
of  Barth’s point when she renders it “that which fits almost exactly the answer to all 
preceding questions”.  The connotation is much the same, but its rhetorical force indicates 144
more clearly the extent to which Barth saw his contemporary culture as being affirmed 
nearly entirely by Christian ethics: an almost exact match of  priorities and practice. This 
betrays the proper vocation of  Christian ethics to attend to the will of  God, reckoning that 
that lies outside of  society (though, at this stage, Barth may well have affirmed that it was 
discernible therein because of  the ‘orders of  creation’) and causes Christian ethics to lose its 
spiritual identity and rationale. Its reason d’être had become the affirmatory “yes” to what was 
already happening and was already believed to be right - answers to questions already 
decided upon. But as Barth already pointed out in the Romans commentary, the “yes” of  
God is always accompanied by a resounding “no!” 
 In place of  this kind of  limp Christian ethics, Barth forcefully shifts the focus from 
cultural affirmation to the contemplation of  a key ethical question: “what ought we to do?” 
It is an evocative question, which places action and compulsion at the heart of  Christian 
ethics: something is to be done, there is an imperative attached to it which comes from God, 
and we are called to discern what that is in order that we are able to do it. The status quo 
simply will not do. But lest we think this is a question we pose to ourselves - like bored 
 The Problem of  Ethics…, 141 (Das Problem der Ethik…, 110).143
 The Problem of  Ethics…, 142 (Das Problem der Ethic…, 111).144
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children on a rainy afternoon - Barth is quick to claim that this is a question asked of us not 
by us. Pursuit of  the “ought” means an external reference, a redirecting of  our attention 
away from ourselves to a reality other than our own in which the answer to the rightness of  
our conduct resides. The result therefore is that the question of  the goodness of  our 
conduct is posed to us not by us. We are questioned as human beings caught up in the crisis 
of  relationship with God in the whole of  our existence, and asked what ought we to do in 
light of  this relationship. It is an existential crisis, since both our being and doing are 
interrelated. Barth writes, 
 …at its most basic, the only sense it makes is in its emphatic reminder to us that this 
 problem cannot simply deal with a perspective on life and the world or other  
 harmless things. Rather, it deals with our very existence, our most personal and most 
 real situation in this moment; it deals with our plight, the actuality of  which we  
 cannot even for a moment abstract from…  145
This existential problem is a crisis for us because it catches us in the weakness of  not 
knowing the will of  God, of  not being able to live it, and yet still living from moment to 
moment and feeling the need to live well - “life means doing, even when it is by chance a not 
doing…[and] all action stands unavoidably under the question of  meaning, order, and 
truth.”  And so our whole lives are brought into question not from within but by the truth 146
of  God which lies beyond us, and questions us as to our being and doing. It is a question 
bound up with the justification of  the sinner - those who is Jesus Christ are taken up by God 
and established as righteous. All human beings, simul justus et peccator, are questioned as to the 
way they will live in the light of  Christ-centred proximity to God.   147
 Barth introduces the language of  responsibility only twice in this discussion  so 148
there is no extensive definition of  the concept, but its use here indicates that it was a part of  
his new vision for Christian ethics. In both instances Barth deploys the language in order to 
say something about the nature of  the human being and her conduct in the midst of  the 
 The Problem of  Ethics…, 138 (Das problem der Ethik…, 106).145
 The Problem of  Ethics…, 138 (Das Problem der Ethik…, 106).146
 The whole essay finishes with a very forceful series of  statements about Jesus Christ, which are both 147
critical of  the bourgeois Christianity of  nineteenth and twentieth century Europe, and which affirm what 
Barth takes to be Pauline emphases on the identity of  Christ (crucified, risen, and ascended) which ultimately 
will solve the ethical problem that faces all human beings. See The Problem of  Ethics…, 168 (Das Problem der 
Ethik…, 143). 
 In the German text, though the English translator introduces responsibility-language at other places in the 148
lecture which serves to elucidate part of  Barth’s argument further.
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crisis-relationship I have just described. In the opening paragraph of  the lecture, Barth 
argues that 
 The problem of  ethics is a critical question under which is placed all human action,  
 that is, one’s entire temporal existence. This question asks about the meaning and law 
 of  individual actions as well as the extent of  the truth in one’s existence. it makes the 
 individual responsible [verantwortlich] for the presence of  truth in his existence.  149
The meaning of  this becomes clearer as Barth developes the idea through the first part of  
the lecture: essentially each human agent is required to examine the underlying meaning of  
their actions - what informs and shapes their conduct, and that in turn relates to what is true 
and real about human existence. As such, our actions convey much more than simply our 
desires, but also our understanding of  what is true and real about human existence. Already 
we have seen that this remained an important idea for Barth in the Ethics lectures. At the 
heart of  practical Christian ethics is the need to examine one’s behaviour and conduct in the 
light of  the true reality of  the inescapable relationship with God in which all humanity is 
caught up. This is properly the subject of  Christian moral reasoning, and is for each human 
agent to own for themselves: 
 The human as human is placed into the situation in an irredeemable way, where his 
 “being” is understood as those activities he is responsible for [verantwortliches  
 handeln]; where his desires are questionable; where that-which-does-not-yet-exist  
 wants to engross that which should be, as the truth of  the trueness of  his actions.  150
The “truth of  the trueness” to which Barth refers is the question of  the truthfulness of  our 
assumptions and assertions about the human situation, which Barth characterises as the 
question of  goodness - “what is True - even if  it were the truest - must submit itself  to the 
critical question of  whether it is also good.”  God is the arbiter of  truthfulness and 151
goodness. 
 As Barth re-envisaged ethics in contradistinction to the inherited optimistic 
subjectivism of  nineteenth century middle-class, bourgeois Christianity, the language of  
responsibility offered a way to navigate the unavoidable crisis-relationship with God. On the 
 The Problem of  Ethics…, 135 (Das Problem der Ethik…, 102).149
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one hand is the fact that human beings exist, and to do so is to act; on the other is the 
interrogative discipline of  self-examination, in which the truth and goodness of  our actions 
- and therefore our existence - is called into question in the light of  our knowledge of  God. 
This is the basic function of  the language of  responsibility in this lecture, holding together 
these two and creating space for the human agent to act within. 
  
2.2.2 The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life 
The second text was delivered in October 1929 at a German conference organised with the 
purpose of  introducing pastors and students to the latest trends in theological thinking and 
research, and to expose them to the scholars and scholarship in the service of  the Church’s 
ministry. The approaches were wide ranging, and Barth’s brother, the philosopher Heinrich 
Barth, was also presenting a critical paper on ideas of  the spirit in German idealism.  As 152
one of  those scholars who had been formed theologically as a pastor, Karl Barth’s own 
offering was a personally important lecture because it gave him chance to acknowledge, and 
defend himself  against, some recent criticisms: notably that he had no place for the Holy 
Spirit in his theology.  But The Holy Spirit lecture is more than simply Barth’s response; it is 153
his own constructive pneumatology which is grounded in his developing Trinitarianism. His 
concern was to reject the prevalent neo-Kantian approach to the doctrine of  the Holy Spirit, 
developed even amongst other members of  the Dialectical “school”, which treated the 
human spirit as a significant part of  the discussion about God’s Spirit. As Bruce McCormack 
writes, “Barth’s central conviction is that the Holy Spirit, if  indeed it is truly the Holy Spirit 
of  which we wish to speak, is not human spirit. No synthesis of  the two may be 
imagined.”  In this he is also rejecting German idealism’s claim that focus on the human 154
spirit might open a way into speaking about the Absolute Spirit, or God, by point of  
comparison between divine and human consciousness. While Barth is keen to develop a 
structure for thinking clearly about human being in general and the Christian life in 
particular, with its theological impetus in God - i.e. in the work of  the Holy Spirit, he thinks 
 Opinion is divided as to what extent their approaches conflicted: Robin Lovin’s introductory essay to the 152
recent English edition of  the lecture, from which all my English references are taken, argues strongly that 
“the brothers Barth took positions in their lectures that were almost as opposed to each other as to the 
themes of  German idealism.” The Holy Spirit…, xiii. This view is implicitly supported by Busch who suggests 
that “from now on [i.e. after this lecture] tensions arose in Karl’s relationship with Heinrich…” Busch, Karl 
Barth…, 189. Bruce McCormack cautions against reading too much into the different approaches taken by 
the brothers, suggesting Lovin’s assessment is “one-sidedly negative” and that “there was enough agreement 
in the essentials to warrant sending them into the public arena under the shared title ‘On the Doctrine of  the 
Holy Spirit.’” Bruce McCormack, ‘Review of  Karl Barth’s The Holy Spirit and The Christian Life’ in his Orthodox 
and Modern: Studies in the Theology of  Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008) 311. 
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 McCormack, ‘Review of  Karl Barth’s The Holy Spirit… 311.154
Page !55
the conversation must begin with God and not with the Christian. This mirrors the move he 
was already making in the Ethics lectures, and is a basic methodological point: the Spirit 
about which Barth wishes to speak is the Spirit of  God, the Holy Spirit, and so revelation is 
the only appropriate way of  proceeding accurately. The fundamental distinction between 
God and creatures for which Bath argued in the Romans commentary remains. It should 
therefore be no surprise that Barth orientates his discussion of  the Spirit in a way very 
similar to his discussion of  the Word - the claiming-address of  the Triune God - in the 
Ethics. The Spirit is God’s Spirit, and as such is involved in the fulness of  the work of  God. 
The three foci of  his lecture are: The Holy Spirit as Creator; The Holy Spirit as Reconciler; 
and The Holy Spirit ad Redeemer. In each of  these Barth demonstrates how a theological 
account of  the Holy Spirit will emphasise the subjectivity of  the Spirit as the Spirit of  God, 
as the one who remains sovereign in all interactions with human beings. As such, the Spirit is 
the condition of  human beings’ knowledge of  God; human beings’ true life in God; and 
human beings’ hope in God. Barth does wish to speak about Christian life because that 
sphere is the particular work of  the Holy Spirit in sanctification; but the discussion must 
begin with the Spirit. 
 The tone of  the text is much less critical and aggressive than the The Problem of  Ethics 
lecture, and a notable difference between them is the move away from the idea of  crisis and 
the existential question posed by it. What we have instead, in terms of  the ethical content of  
the lecture, is a theological and dogmatic rationale for Christian ethics. What is noteworthy is 
that it takes place directly within the doctrine of  God. In true Reformed style, Barth thinks 
any consideration of  human agency must reckon with the work of  the Holy Spirit. And 
ethics is the Spirit’s work: there is no separate sphere of  anthropology which is “human 
ethics” and which does not therefore involve the work of  God. The Christian life is 
commanded, and so Christian ethics is about turning attention towards God who speaks his 
commanding-Word. But Barth cautions that it “should not in any way try to say directly what 
God’s command is…An ethics that thinks it can know and set forth the command of  God 
plants itself  upon the throne of  God.”  Emphasising the divine orientation of  Christian 155
ethics, most particularly in the doctrine of  sanctification as the work of  the Holy Spirit, 
necessarily requires some idea of  divine sovereignty, implying God’s freedom to speak his 
commanding Word. This may not be second guessed: what is in view is a discussion about 
the way in which we receive the Word of  God, and therefore the way in which the 
sanctificatory work of  the Spirit is received by human creatures. The language of  human 
 The Holy Spirit…, 9 (‘Der heilige Geist…’, ).155
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responsibility, whilst used in passing, is helpful here because it begins to illumine Barth’s 
understanding of  the active human agent in relation to the Holy Spirit. 
 The Holy Spirit lecture is more sparing in its treatment of  the idea of  human 
responsibility than the earlier lecture, but nonetheless it features in a noteworthy way. Its 
single occurrence is in the context of  Barth’s discussion of  reconciliation, and in particular 
the shape that Christian life takes from the viewpoint of  the Holy Spirit as Reconciler. The 
particular issue Barth has in mind is the problem of  sanctification, i.e. the way in which the 
work of  the Holy Spirit as reconciler is appropriated in the lives of  human beings. Here we 
meet the soon-to-be very familiar notion of  faith as miraculous work of  God in the heart of  
each Christian. It is miraculous because its content is judgement and justification, but it is our 
faith as it claims us, and therefore as we are unable to escape who God is for us as justifying 
judge, and who we are in the light of  that. The Holy Spirit works the reconciliation in such a 
way that some response or other is required of  us: Barth argues that the best possible 
response is obedience.  
 The requirement for obedience comes at a cross-roads, where, in Barth’s terms, the 
grace of  God which is God’s judgement and justification “cuts” into our lives as a vertical 
axis cuts a horizontal one.  This is the moment of  hearing God’s Word in faith, in the 156
concrete moment of  our lives in which this “cutting in” of  God happens. In that, we are 
bound to God and also bound to our fellow-human beings who share in creaturely reality, 
and are therefore part of  the creaturely existence from which we may not escape: “we 
become forfeit to God and bound in duty to our neighbour through sanctification.”  In 157
this context, Barth labels human’s as “responsible beings.” What he means by this is 
particularly interesting, and will help to shed some light on the use of  responsibility language 
in the Ethics lectures, and later on. He writes, 
 …this means that our sanctification is actual in the fact that we are challenged as  
 responsible beings [verantwortlich aufgerufen] by a summons that is never suspended 
 but that is to the effect that we are appointed to establish the orders of  creation that 
 apply to our existence as such – for example, marriage, race, and so forth – in the  
 church and in the state, as in the spiritual and secular order of  life implied in the  
 kingdom of  grace, that is of  our existence as simul peccatores et justi.  158
 The Holy Spirit…, 34 (‘Der heilige Geist…’, ).156
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The focus on the Schöpfungsordnungen is surprising especially given Barth’s reputation for 
rejecting this approach in his later work,  but as he employs it here it is not to be 159
misconstrued with the doctrine as exemplified by Erich Pryzwara from the Roman Catholic 
perspective, or later by Emil Brunner from the Protestant perspective.  The orders are not 160
themselves a means of  knowing and understanding who God is, but the perception of  them 
is the direct result of  this knowing in revelation and sanctification. They are the work of  
human beings who are called, aufgerufen, to be responsible, verantwortlich, in and through 
creation, i.e. in the concrete instance of  their own existence. The false-tension Barth 
highlights wherein this responsible life is to be lived is the conflict between the Church and 
the state - the former as the place of  the spiritual order of  life, and the latter the place of  the 
secular. This divide is wholly overcome in the work of  the Holy Spirit because the whole of  
life is in view, and the whole of  creation, as God’s creation, is ordered to the fulfilment of  
that. The summons is to confirm, Bestätigung, as valid for our human existence those orders 
as the proper spheres wherein human being can grow in grace as both condemned and 
justified sinner. Whatever that means exactly, and this will become clearer when we return to 
the Ethics, at the least it means life lived in the concrete circumstances of  creation - marriage, 
work, family etc.. Responsibility is therefore about the dual aspect of  divine encounter - 
those who know themselves to be sanctified because of  the moment in which the Holy 
Spirit “cuts into” their lives with the divine address - and of  the summons to live that 
sanctified life in the concrete reality of  creation. Barth is much more directive here than 
before about the way human beings ought to act as sanctified creatures, and responsibility 
names his approach to that particular problem. It is not a developed account but is a useful 
way into several themes that emerge in the contemporary Ethics lectures, to which I now 
turn. 
2.3 Responsibility in the Ethics Lectures 
Having explored the broad contours of  his Ethics in the introductory section, the purpose of  
this section is to give a detailed overview of  Barth’s use of  responsibility language in those 
lectures.  
 Barth clarifies the answer to the question of  the goodness of  human conduct as the 
outcome of  a single event comprising a conflated set of  happenings: divine address to 
 Dietrich Braun’s preface to the Ethics lectures suggests that “the ethical lectures of  1928 were not printed 159
during the lifetime of  Karl Barth because the author…appears in them an advocate of  the doctrine of  the 
orders of  creation which he later passionately rejected.” Ethics, vii (Ethik I, 7). See also CD III/4, 36-39 for 
Barth’s detailed rejection of  Schöpfungsordnungen.
 Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative (London: Lutterworth Press, 1937).160
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human beings in life-claiming Word; human hearing of  that Word as command; and 
obedient human response in concrete activities. Or in Barth’s shorthand, “man does good 
acts when he acts as hearer of  God’s Word, and in obedience to the good.”  Though 161
human action appears to be the zenith of  the progression, its quality of  goodness lies in the 
will of  God which is made known in the Word. As such, obedience is not the important 
point - i.e. Barth is not advocating an ethics of  human works where the good is simply to do 
as we are commanded as automatons. This would be to defy Barth’s methodological 
preference for speaking of  God. Therefore, the will of  God - which is the good, including 
the good for us as creatures - takes centre stage. But not simply the knowing of  God’s will, 
for to know what God wills is not itself  the fulfilment of  it. The fulfilment of  God’s will is 
in its enactment. The good is enacted when human beings respond to God in conformity, 
fulfilling his determination of  them in their Lebensakt. Barth deploys the language of  
responsibility to explore this point further, and to explain the space created for the human 
agent. He writes, 
 Man does good acts as he is led by God to responsibility [Verantwortung]. To act in  
 responsibility to God [Verantwortlichkeit] is to act in a committed way. In this  
 commitment  the good is done. Thus the good arises out of  responsibility   
 [Verantwortlichkeit] and therefore out of  divine speaking to which man responds  
 [verantwortet] with his acts.   162
God leads human creatures to responsibility by way of  his life-claiming, commanding-Word. 
It means that responsibility cannot be replicated, anticipated, or created aside from the 
activity of  God: human agency cannot properly be conceived aside from God. We become 
responsible by the act of  God: “man is made responsible.”  We become cognisant of  our 163
responsibility in the moment of  encounter with the life-claiming Word. The human agent is 
gifted a space in relation to God - something into which they are led - the essential character 
of  which is relational, and within which they must act. But it is not action alone: in Barth’s 
language responsibility is the human side of  divine-human “commitment”, Bindung. The 
bond that exists between human beings and God is the work of  God, and is the ontological 
basis of  a human being’s agency.  This relationship signifies the possibility and fundamental 
Godward orientation of  human responsibility, and thus their acceptance or rejection of  him, 
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and of  their own true humanity.  We have already encountered this language in The Holy 164
Spirit lecture, discussed above. To be responsible is to be committed or bound to God, and 
vice versa, and to live responsibly is to live out of  this commitment. It is the continual life-
situation of  human beings encountered and claimed by God. 
 This ‘bond’ is the ontological truth of  human life, in distinction from what Barth 
calls “conditioned truth.” Conditioned truths are those intellectual disciplines such as history, 
mathematics, and science which primarily reference the particular aspect of  creation with 
which they are concerned. These truths are objective, factual and theoretical: they relate to 
specific areas of  knowledge and are best asserted and tested without the active participation 
of  the observer in order for them to be what they are. They are not in themselves the truth, 
but have a share in the truthfulness of  the truth. Beyond them, Barth contends, there is a 
single truth which relates concretely to the reality of  all existence, and which is the sine qua 
non of  conditioned truth: i.e. “the condition on which my assertions are assertions of  
truth.”  This truth cannot be viewed objectively in a way that distinguishes it from the life 165
of  the viewer because her life is part of  it. Rather it is experienced as the critical question of  
“the truth of  my life and conduct…the truth of  my life and existence…the truth of  the 
good.” This ontological truth is about the truthfulness of  our lives in relation to their being 
and determination by God. In relation to ethics, it asks us to consider how accurately we 
enact our genuine humanity.  
 This question may only be answered in the concreteness of  my Lebensakt. These 
concrete lived responses to the question of  truthfulness are also a form of  responsibility as 
Barth understood it: 
  
 We must only answer with our life itself, to which our whole active life and each of   
 our individual acts, whatever it may be, must be viewed as the answer, in relation to  
 which our whole existence takes on the character of  answerability [Verantwortung]  166
In this case responsibility is about the ability to contribute to the truthfulness of  our own 
lives by fulfilling the divine determination. Our actions matter because by them we either 
confirm or deny our true selves. This must be distinguished from more common accounts 
of  answerability which are really about accountability. In accountability, the agent must 
 As Barth writes later in these lectures, “The decision in which we live every moment is a decision for or 164
against God. Responsibility to him is its point.” Ethics, 87 (Ethik I, 141).
 Ethics, 64 (Ethik I, 105).165
 Ethics, 66 ( Ethik I, 107-8).166
Page !60
retrospectively explain the thinking behind her actions, the actions themselves, and the 
consequences of  them to a person to whom she is answerable. Neither the thinking nor the 
actions themselves are the same as the account she gives of  them. For Barth, the 
characteristic of  Verantwortung is not the explanation of  the actions one undertakes, or the 
thinking towards action, but the quality that those actions have, in se, in relation to God. This 
is a permanent arrangement: there is no point at which my actions cease to be caught up in 
this, and I can be free from this bond. 
 We must not…stop considering the answerability [Verantwortlichkeit] of  our life- 
 situation, if  we are to know how far God’s command is real, how far…it is revealed  
 to us. It is revealed to us in the event of  our responsibility [Verantwortung]   
 understood as conduct.  167
Barth’s approach to human responsibility here introduces a new weight of  significance to 
conduct that removes from it any sense of  arbitrariness, both as it contextualises the whole 
scope of  our activity and as it frames our understanding of  the meaning of  concrete actions: 
“we are making a response with our act.”  The result is that human agents must consider 168
their conduct carefully since their actions have meaning and value as concrete enactments of, 
and answers to, their standing before God and as such means we are “concerned with the 
symmetry and harmony of  our decision with his own will.”  Such consideration is the 169
point of  ethical reflection: “not to try and find the truth of  the good but to give an account 
of  what it means that we have been found by it, and to give an account of  the character of  
responsibility [Verantwortung] that our conduct will always have in the face of  it.”   170
 Accounting for what it means that “we have been found by” the truth of  the good 
means taking seriously the Church’s dogmatic theology, since these relate to the truth of  
human existence precisely as they describe the truth of  God. Methodologically speaking, by 
keeping dogmatic theology central to this - governed as it is by revelation - we are forced to 
maintain focus on God and avoid the anthropocentrism Barth feared so much. It also 
prevents us falling prey to the “irresponsible possibilities” [unverantwortlichen 
Möglichkeiten] of  our lives - i.e. the false actions that deny our true determination and 
therefore deny us genuine humanity. There may be many opportunities, and various options, 
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but the only way Christian ethics may proceed, and therefore the only way the responsible 
agent may act, is in accordance with the divine Word. In saying this, Barth reminds his 
hearers that it is possible to go the wrong way, to make the wrong choices, and to live badly. 
We must therefore “resolve on responsible action” [verantwortliches Handeln]  - i.e. action 171
rooted in our awareness of, and commitment to, the divine-human ‘bond’. This is the 
decision I must make as moral agent.  In doing so we endorse responsibility-before-God as 172
our particular way of  life:  
 “as we come to reflect on the fact that we are weighed and that our acts in some way 
 mean responsibility [Verantwortung], we recognise that we will be weighed and  
 therefore will be responsible [verantwortlich] the very next moment…”   173
Though I must decide what kind of  actions will form my response to the life-claiming Word, 
I am not alone in this precisely because the dogmatic theology at its heart is the theology of  
proclamation, and therefore belongs to the community of  proclamation: the Church. As a 
‘moral fellowship’, the Church is the company of  men and women who have heard and 
received the divine command, and therefore have been made responsible before God. The 
fact that this fellowship exists bears witness to the “absolute, personal, living will distinct 
from ours” which has caused it to be.  Our fellowship with other Christians is the result of  174
the Lordship of  Christ, who confronts us and calls us to be part of  it. We are bound to him 
as head of  the Church (Colossians 1:18), and therefore bound to one another as members 
of  the body. The Church is therefore the fellowship of  responsibility. But the church is not 
the only fellowship of  which human beings are part. Barth was keen to emphasise the fact 
that we live “with and alongside” other human beings, and this also involves some idea of  
responsibility. This point was made very clearly in his discussion of  the dual aspect of  
responsibility - to God and to other human beings - in The Holy Spirit lecture. Barth writes, 
“the life of  others must be handled with awe and responsibility…because our attitude to this 
other life…can mean its life or death.”  Such is the concrete reality of  our responsibility 175
for one another that my action or inaction can have ultimate meaning for the flourishing or 
not of  another. The language is stark but communicates the seriousness of  the point that 
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human actions have concrete and specific meaning, and that responsibility as the particular 
characteristic of  it is real and enacted. Barth is not saying that responsibility automatically 
involves the preservation of  human life: it is not that human life is itself  the goal of  
responsible action. But he is saying that responsibility will be enacted in relation to another’s 
life as well as my own personal standing before God. Because of  this, he goes on to say that 
my enacted responsibility may “represent God’s own action” - remembering that 
responsibility is my obedient answer to the life-claiming Word received as command. This is 
a particularly difficult concept, and needs some explaining - which Barth attempts by 
discussing concrete examples of  responsibility. The most notable of  these is warfare. 
 War, according to Barth, is “the execution which a people organised as a state, on 
account of  its will to live, performs on another people which threatens it will to live.”  The 176
ethical problem is not about the right one has to execute another, but the possibility of  it in 
the light of  responsibility. The argument has several points. First, that the individual member 
of  the state is “not the responsible subject in war but rather that a third party acts for him in 
what proceeds, claims for him these military acts, and thus assumes responsibility in his 
place.” This is the outworking of  the bond between human beings established in the bond 
between God and humanity. So I may not be the responsible subject in war, but I am part of  
the state and share in the life of  the nation, which means that I am responsible for its life 
and activities - i.e. the actions undertaken on my behalf, are in some sense a reflection of  my 
own actions towards others. I am therefore invited to ask, responsibly, whether these actions 
conform to the divine Word. This discussion cannot meaningfully happen in abstraction, but 
only ever in the concrete circumstances of  life: Barth refuses “the vacuum of  an idea” and 
suggests that what is at stake is the reality that human agents must “accept responsibility for 
the fact that what I am now doing…is taking aim and shooting at Englishmen and 
Frenchmen.”  The ‘I’ need not be the actual soldier holding the actual rifle; it may refer to 177
the citizen at home, on whose behalf  the rifle is used - “to accept the responsibility which 
one’s people is about to take upon itself ” and not to think that a person’s pacifism, for 
example, “means that he does not share the responsibility of  his country because he does 
not bear arms”  - such is the depth of  the bond between human beings. My personal 178
convictions about the actions of  another do not abstract me from them, and cannot separate 
the bond established by God. So, he goes on, “if  I want the state to do something, I must 
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venture to be responsible for it as for my own personal will.”  I must decide and choose 179
my own course of  action as response to the divine determination that I be bound to others 
as I am bound to God. My actions are a response to this binding, but genuinely human 
actions embrace the bind and seek to fulfil it in the truthfulness of  their actions. 
Responsibility understood like this is about living from the prior bind to God that commits 
or binds us to fellow human beings in the concrete circumstances in which we find 
ourselves; it is about hearing the Word as command, and enacting that command in our 
particular Lebensakt. 
  
2.4 Conclusion and Summary 
Barth once retrospectively described the 1920s as an ongoing apprenticeship - beyond the 
completion of  his formal student years, but not quite at the point of  announcing his own 
dogmatic proposals.  His early ethical work, of  whichThe Problem of  Ethics is a good 180
example, was largely critical response to the false moves he detected in other approaches to 
Christian moral reasoning. As the decade progressed, Barth was much more willing to be 
dogmatically constructive in public, and was beginning to announce his own distinctive 
propositions first in the Göttingen Dogmatics (1924) and then with more force in the “false 
start” of  the Christian Dogmatics (1927) . The Ethics lectures should be understood as his first 
complete proposal regarding the proper way forward for Christian ethics, a constructive 
vision for ethics as the radical implication of  dogmatic theology. By way of  conclusion and 
summary to this chapter in which I have been attending to his thought on human 
responsibility in this period, several observations can be made. 
 The first is that even at this stage Barth is really concerned that there is a proper place 
for the human agent. His theological work is not meant as an attempt to sideline the moral 
self, but to allow it to act truthfully by exploring the depths of  its theological constitution. 
This is important because it grounds his understanding of  human agency in God’s treatment 
of  humanity, and particularly the divine determination of  human beings. In doing this he 
overcomes any distinction between human being and human-acting - preferring instead the 
idea of  Lebensakt,  that our existence is a series of  actions and vice versa and that these actions 
are meaningful. The language of  responsibility is used to give as clear an account of  human 
agency as possible in the light of  dogmatic concerns: it is about more than mere 
responsiveness: it involves ethical reflection and genuine decision making. The moral agent is 
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permitted to ignore the life-claiming address, but in so doing they open themselves up for 
destruction. 
 Second, Barth was a realist in as much as he thought dogmatic theology actually 
refers. This means that the Word-theology he developed to explain the way human beings 
are constituted as responsible creatures, and the command motif  which helps explain how 
human beings receive the Word of  God, are descriptive of  reality. They tell us something 
about the nature and status of  human beings vis a vis God. His understanding of  the 
Godward orientation of  human beings is an ontological statement. Barth’s ethics of  
responsibility is therefore about conformity to the reality of  our human existence, something 
which is not known to us but which we receive as we encounter God. His realist 
understanding of  the will of  God as something distinct from us but which encounters and 
commands us is key to understanding responsibility. 
 Third, one implication of  this is that Barth’s Ethics is predominantly a Christian 
ethics, that is, it only makes sense and has significance for Christian people. Hence his point 
that the moment of  encounter - what he calls the point at which the Word “cuts into” our 
lives - is so determinative for the responsible human being. Without this, a human agent 
cannot know themselves to be responsible before God, or bound to others in responsibility. 
Barth does not seem too disturbed by this: his focus is on the proper dogmatic location of  
ethics, and so is with the Christian content of  ethics. 
 Finally, the idea of  responsibility that Barth developed in 1920s was the human side 
of  the encounter with the life-claiming Word. It is the corollary of  talking about God’s Word 
in the dynamic terms of  address and sanctification that lead to using responsibility language 
as a way of  locating the human agent, and giving content to that agency. But it must be 
conceded also that the theological grounds for thinking about human agency in this way are 
thin. Barth is true to his initial fear about anthropocentrism, and refuses to talk about 
humanity except by talking about God, but his limited focus on God as divine commander 
means that he has no adequate space wherein to locate the human agent and her 
responsibility. How can talking about God mean one actually meaningfully talks about true 
humanity? What is needed is an account of  human being that is more theologically robust. 
This does not come until the Christological turn of  mid-1930s, and its influence on CD II/
2, to which I now turn. 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Chapter 3 
Responsibility in the Ethics of  Church Dogmatics II/2 
The general ethics of  CD II/2 is Barth’s first sustained treatment of  ethics within the Church 
Dogmatics, and therefore his first instalment since the Ethics lectures. Assessing the role and 
meaning of  the language of  human responsibility here makes a good point of  retrospective 
comparison with the Ethics, and enables me to assess the impact of  Barth’s Christological 
turn on his understanding of  human responsibility. He deploys the responsibility language 
extensively in these paragraphs, in relation to both divine and human agency (a nuance that 
is rarely picked up in the secondary literature). In a thesis that considers the ethical meaning 
of  human responsibility, it seems appropriate then to engage with Barth’s ethics of  
responsibility in this context. Doing so will allow me a point of  prospective comparison with 
the special ethics of  CD III/4 to which I turn in the next chapter. Furthermore, as I 
suggested in section 1.4, much of  the critical literature on Barth’s approach to human 
responsibility has focused on his Christology and its impact on the status of  the human 
agent. Most notably the idea that Christology overwhelms human responsibility. This issue 
needs to be tackled if  Barth is to be rehabilitated on this topic. 
3.1 Introduction 
In his autobiographical article, How I Changed My Mind, published in the USA in September 
1939, Barth described the previous decade - especially the period after the Ethics lectures - as 
one of  significant development. He referred to a “deepening” and “moving forward” in 
relation to advances already made, particularly in the area of  theological method.  Looking 181
back, he said that his concern had been to shed the last vestiges of  anthropocentric or 
naturalistic foundations of  Christian doctrine - which we have seen he had begun to do in 
the 1920s - and to develop a new approach centred exclusively on the person of  Jesus Christ. 
Barth saw this as a necessity for Christian doctrine and not an option, since the very 
existence of  the Church wherein theological thinking and speaking is to be done is the result 
of  the gracious work of  God in Christ: “to be in the Church…is to be called with others by 
Jesus Christ.”  The turn to Christology as foundational is therefore a natural corollary of  182
the divine address, which is actualised in Jesus Christ, and ensures that theology is always fit 
 The article was first published in the Chicago based magazine The Christian Century on 20th September 181
1939 and re-issued in the same magazine in July 1984. It has also been published in a single volume in the 
United States by John Knox Press (1966), and in the United Kingdom by St Andrews Press (1969).
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for its task of  speaking about God. If  the 1920s was Barth’s so-called theological 
“apprenticeship”, unlearning and re-learning dogmatic theology, the 1930s was the final 
beginning of  his major constructive work in doctrinal theology and ethics with the 
publication of  the first three part-volumes of  the Church Dogmatics.   
 Barth saw the Christocentric focus during this period as the affirmation, extension, 
and fulfilment of  insights gained during the preparation of  his Anselm study.  Published in 183
1931, he suggested in How I Changed My Mind that it was his most important work to date. It 
stood as a watershed in his theological development, a moment of  continuity with his recent 
theological past and also the beginning of  something new which can be seen in the general 
approach of  the Church Dogmatics. It was also a work of  interpretative ingenuity, giving a 
vision of  Anselm that was totally contrary to the image often painted by philosophers keen 
to use the “proofs” as a basis for natural theology.  The conviction of  the Anselm study 184
was that theology cannot be founded upon the logic of  apologetic argument (what is 
commonly called the ontological argument) or anthropological concerns but upon faith in 
God alone - grounded in God’s self-revelation - which is its proper raison d’être. Theology, as 
Barth learned it from Anselm, is the intellectus fidei - the attempt that humans make at 
understanding and deepening their faith in God.  Anselm sought theological understanding  185
precisely because he believed and not in order to believe: it was his ‘faith seeking 
understanding.’ As Timothy Gorringe - developing Sabine Plonz’ reading of  Barth - has put 
it, “the question then is not - How can God be known?, but - To what extent do we know 
God?”  Theological study is contingent upon faith and therefore presupposes an already 186
existing commitment within which the human being knows herself  to be caught up, and 
which she seeks to contemplate, develop, and know more fully. Theology is therefore 
dynamic, and relates to the lived-lives of  Christian people in faith-relationship with God. 
Their faith as knowledge of  God who is objectively given to be known, has an ethical impact 
in as much as it orders their way of  living. Theology must presuppose the confession of  
faith, the Credo, including Scripture, as the articulation of  truth both about God and also 
about who we are in relation to God. Deepened understanding comes only “by reflection on 
 The impetus for the book came from a seminar series Barth hosted in Bonn in 1930 on Anselm’s Cur Deus 183
homo and in the same year a lecture by Heinrich Scholz on Anselm’s Proslogion. Barth had hosted an earlier 
seminar series on Anselm in 1926 at Münster.
 Which Barth would later argue against strongly in his reply to Emil Brunner, “No!” in 1934. See Emil 184
Brunner and Karl Barth, Natural Theology. Translated by Peter Fraenkel (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946). 
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the credo…”,  or as Gorringe comments it “involves thinking through what has already 187
been given us in revelation.”  This means that the content of  Christian faith is not subject 188
to apologetic scrutiny in order to be considered viable by theologians, rather it is the “self-
evident basis of  the discussion”  because the discussion is taking place. Without the 189
articles of  faith and the scriptural witness which inform faith there would be no Christian 
theology.  
 Anselm’s insights here were interpreted by Barth as permission to construct a 
theological method that was less speculative than contemporary Protestant theology had 
become and more faithful to the credo by “start[ing] out from the knowledge of  God 
himself…”  This knowledge is given in Jesus Christ, and faith in him as the a priori of  190
theology must therefore, from Barth’s point of  view, govern our approach to it in the same 
way that any subject matter determines the mode of  study if  the study is to be genuinely 
scientific.  These insights underpinned his sense that all Christian thinking must take its cue 191
from Jesus Christ because “in Jesus Christ the living Word of  God [is] spoken to us men.”   192
 In turning to Christ as the point of  departure for theological reflection Barth also 
remained faithful to earlier ideas about revelation and divine sovereignty, but here grounded 
them much more dogmatically and more concretely than before. So the period immediately 
after the Anselm study, when all this methodological refocusing took place, he referred to as 
his “Christological concentration.”  It was a very important period in Barth’s development 193
because it set the trajectory for his theology for the rest of  his life, and its influence is 
 Anselm…, 27 (FQI…, 26).187
 Gorringe, Karl Barth…, 125.188
 Anselm…, 60 (FQI…, 60).189
 Anselm…, 166 (FQI…, 169).190
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extensive,  something which Barth himself  acknowledged in the opening pages of  CD II/194
1, published in 1939, when he implored the reader to keep Anselm’s Proslogion in mind and to 
refer to his own study of  that Benedictine scholar.  195
 The doctrine of  Jesus Christ became for Barth the hermeneutical key by which the 
Christian faith, and moreover the Christian life, was properly understood. In practice, as 
John Thompson notes, this meant that Jesus Christ was to be accorded “priority, centrality, 
and normativity…” and that “all aspects of  theology and dogmatics must be dynamically 
related to this living and concrete centre, and determined throughout by it.”  It was not an 196
attempt to rid theology of  all of  its particular and varied foci, or to collapse all theology into 
Christology, but to argue in the light of  the fact that theology must speak of  God that the 
common centre of  these various theological foci, and therefore the perspective from which 
each is to be viewed and understood, is governed by divine self-disclosure which enables us 
to speak truthfully. Christology therefore became, what McCormack has called, “a 
methodological rule”  against which the veracity of  theology was to be measured.  197
 McCormack highlights the key corollary of  Barth’s decision to proceed in this way, 
which is important for this chapter of  my thesis, namely that doctrines could no longer be 
considered independent of  one another because they are commonly linked in Christology.  198
The doctrine of  Jesus Christ was now to exercise a normative and determinative influence in 
all matters of  theology and doctrine, ethics, and biblical interpretation. This latter point is 
particularly important because Barth had already established himself  as a Biblical 
 Bruce McCormack argues that while the Anselm study is certainly a key factor in this development, its role 194
is more in setting the trajectory of  Barth’s thought and that more emphasis should be placed on the 1936 
Calvin Conference held in Geneva. Once again Barth found himself  in dialogue with his brother Peter, this 
time on the subject of  predestination. It was hearing Peter’s paper, and contrasting it with that by Pierre 
Maury - whose central theme was that the concrete reality of  election and predestination which is made 
known in Jesus Christ cannot be separated from the doctrine of  election - that really emphasised the need for 
a pervasive Christology. Maury’s paper made for “a truly Christological grounding of  predestination” in 
contrast to a more anthropocentric view, common amongst Reformed thinkers. See Bruce McCormack, Karl 
Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 455-458. 
Barth wrote up his account of  this conference and its significance for his own development in CD II/2, 
188-194 (KD II/2, 207-214). In terms of  this thesis, whether one takes Barth’s own assessment of  his 
development in relation to Anselm or McCormack’s consideration for the Geneva Conference, the important 
point is that by the time CD II was written, particularly the ethics in 1942, Barth was convinced of  the 
importance of  Christology for the whole scheme of  theology and this is discernible.
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theologian  and it was in the realm of  biblical exegesis and hermeneutics that his 199
Christocentric approach could be most readily perceived by the end of  the decade. In a 
series of  observations about scripture in CD I/2, Barth argued quite directly that “the 
content of  the Bible, and the object of  its witness, is Jesus Christ as the name of  the God 
who deals graciously with man the sinner.”  By “Bible” Barth meant both the Old and 200
New Testaments, as he continued: “the name of  Jesus Christ [was] concealed under the 
name of  Israel in the Old Testament and revealed under His own name in the New 
Testament, which therefore can be understood only as it has understood itself, as a 
commentary on the Old Testament.”  The figure of  Christ was for him the controlling 201
centre from which to read the whole bible, informing Barth’s understanding of  the whole 
canon as well as the whole project of  dogmatics which flows from that.  202
 The influence of  this Christological concentration is decisive for our understanding 
of  Barth’s moral theology. In particular, its influence can be detected in the ethics of  CD II/
2, published in 1942. The ethical question - what ought I to do? - appealing as it does to the 
will of  God had ordered his moral thinking from the Ethics lectures onwards and would now, 
in the context of  the Church Dogmatics, be given a fresh answer: “the will of  God…must be 
sought and found only in the work of  God, i.e. in the core and purpose of  that work, the 
name and person of  Jesus Christ.”  In one sense it is not new: the Ethics lectures, as we 203
have seen, appeal to the doctrine of  the divine Word as the communicative act wherein the 
will of  God is made known as human beings are addressed by that Word. But it is fresh in 
the sense that the divine Word receives greater theological attention, being grounded 
Christologically. It is more fully integrated into the heart of  dogmatics, and underpins 
Barth’s controversial statement that “dogmatics is itself  ethics, and ethics is also dogmatics” 
- that the heretofore separate disciplines of  dogmatics or doctrinal theology on the one hand 
and ethics on the other are not only closely intertwined, as Paul Althaus suggested, but 
 Alongside his dogmatic works, and necessary for them, was constant attention to books of  the bible in 199
lectures and publications. By 1930s several lectures series on biblical texts had been delivered and 
commentaries written: Romans I (1919); Romans II (1921); Philippians (1928); and John 1 (1933, though 
published much later). See Christina Baxter, ‘Barth - A Truly Biblical Theologian’ in Tyndale Bulletin 38, no. 1 
(1987), 3-27.
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to Romans, Philippians, and The Church Dogmatics. Unpublished PhD Thesis. University of  Durham, 1982.
 CD II/2, 191 (KD II/2, 211).203
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rather they are rightly understood as indivisible.  The ethical concern to live well is 204
answered only in attending to the divine will, which is made known only as God makes all 
things known in and through Jesus Christ. And vice versa, as we understand who Jesus Christ 
is so we understand who we are and who we are called to be. Barth was concerned for an 
anthropology that was honest, and that spoke of  true humanity, and he found it in relation 
to the doctrine of  Jesus Christ who was fully divine and fully human.  In short to 205
understand what a good and genuine human life looks like one needs Christology, in 
particular a form of  Chalcedonian Christology. Conversely, Christology is not an abstract 
theoretical reflection but describes concrete and genuine human existence.  
 These insights are very helpful for understanding Barth’s account of  human 
responsibility as it was employed in the special ethics of  CD II/2. Here he discusses the 
possibility and reality of  responsible human action only in relation to divine responsibility 
actualised in Christ, and therefore makes human responsibility analogous to Christ’s. My 
intention in this chapter is to explore his Christological account and, following the pattern 
already established in this thesis, to examine the passages wherein the language of  human 
responsibility is deployed and discern its meaning by reading them contextually. In order to 
make sense of  his use of  responsibility language I begin by attending to the particularities of  
Christology developed in CD II, before turning to responsibility-language in the special 
ethics. In particular I explore in section 3.2 the typically Reformed themes of  covenant and 
election which play an important part in his doctrine of  God, and examine how Barth’s new 
focus forms and shapes his understanding here. This is important because, as we shall see, 
he relates these themes directly to ethical topics such as the divine command, which in turn 
impacts our understanding of  human responsibility. The relationship between covenant, 
election, and command makes for a complex theological discussion, and one that - I suggest 
- has been the cause of  much of  the scholarly rejection of  Barth on the topic of  human 
responsibility. By describing the contours of  his thought on these topics, I am creating space 
for further discussion in section 3.3 about human responsibility in the midst of  the doctrine 
of  God. What emerges is a more interesting account than has so far been articulated in the 
secondary literature, in which both the divine and human agents are spoken of  as being 
‘responsible.’ The genius of  this move is that it locates the responsible human being vis a vis 
 The infamous statement is offered as critique of  Althaus’ 1931 work on the foundation of  ethics, CD I/2 204
793 (KD I/2, 888), but it appears amidst a more sustained argument for the treatment of  dogmatics as ethics: 
CD I/2, 782-796 (KD I/2, 875-90). This section argues that the Word of  God addressed to human beings in 
Jesus Christ is the key reason for treating ethics in this way because it is by “the Word of  God that human 
existence acquires theological relevance.” CD I/2, 793 (KD I/2, 887).
 Wolf  Krötke, ‘Karl Barth’s Anthropology’ in John Webster (ed) The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth 205
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 162.
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God, but with a much more theologically satisfactory understanding of  the impetus and 
nature of  human responsibility. What emerges is a sense of  human responsibility as gift, 
understood analogously to divine responsibility. It is clearly an act of  theological description, 
but with significant implications for later special ethics.  
3.2 Covenant, Election, and Divine Command 
Reformed theology has always had some kind of  federal or covenant theology as the 
organising principle of  its account of  Christian faith.  Although covenant theology 206
predates the sixteenth century Reformation,  the Reformed tradition after John Calvin 207
made the idea of  ‘covenant’ central to its understanding. It remained a critical element of  the 
tradition well beyond the time of  Calvin and beyond the Swiss borders, with key synodal 
gatherings and official church documents affirming its theological significance, for example 
The Heidelberg Catechism in 1563 and the Dutch Reformed Synod at Dordrecht in 
1618-19. Over time, various theological nuances have informed particular approaches to 
federal theology, and ideas such as covenant grace, covenant works, and covenant 
redemption came to express different points of  emphasis within the tradition. The basic 
features have not changed much, however, and Reformed theology is still characterised by its 
emphasis on federal theology. 
In keeping with the Reformed tradition,  Barth offered an account of  divine-human 208
covenant in the context of  his Doctrine of God. As I have already indicated, the impact of  the 
Christological concentration can be easily detected in CD II, and the central focus of  his 
covenant theology is the person of  Jesus Christ. In itself  this is not too unusual. Calvin, for 
whom God’s covenant grace was the central theme of  his Institutes of  Christian Religion, in his 
comparison of  the Old and New Testament covenants argued that Christ was the common 
thread across the canon - the overall mediator, prophetically witnessed in the Old Testament 
and apostolically heralded in the New.  Calvin could not conceive an account of  covenant 209
theology without recourse to the doctrine of  Jesus Christ, and Barth was much the same. 
 On this point see: D.A. Weir, The Origins of  Federal Theology in the Sixteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford 206
University Press, 1990); and Holmes Rolston, “Responsible Man in Reformed theology: Calvin Versus the 
Westminster Confession,” in Scottish Journal of  Theology,  23 (1970), 129-156.
 St Augustine is one example, and is heavily referenced by Reformed scholars. See John Leith, The Reformed 207
Tradition (Edinburgh: St Andrew’s Press, 1978), Ch. 1. 
 A very helpful book which in part explores aspects of  Barth’s relationship with the Reformed tradition, 208
especially his understanding of  the Christological emphasis of  its confession, is Eberhard Busch, Drawn to 
Freedom: Christian Faith Today in Conversation with the Heidelberg Catechism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010).
 John Calvin, Institutes of  the Christian Religion, 2 vols. Edited by John T. McNeill and translated by Ford 209
Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960) Vol. I, 428-64.
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But there are significant differences and divergences, in particular the way the doctrine of  
Jesus Christ is understood to relate to and inform covenant theology.  The content of  the 210
Christ-mediated covenant in Calvin’s theology is the fellowship of  God and his chosen 
people, founded upon the life and work of  Christ as the one who causes and enables it by 
his death and resurrection.  Here the relationship between Jesus Christ and the covenant is 211
dictated by the doctrine of  election - the prior sovereign decision of  God regarding 
humanity in which the human race is divided into two groups, those elected for salvation and 
those elected for damnation - so that the covenant in Christ exists only between those whom 
God has chosen for salvation on the one hand, known in biblical theology as Israel and the 
Church, and God himself  on the other. The identity of  individuals elect for salvation is 
governed by and known only to God according to his sovereign will. Moreover it is rightly 
understood as part of  the divine act of  creation, though in a postlapsarian context:  “for all 212
are not created in equal condition: rather, eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal 
damnation for others.”   213
 In the context of  the sixteenth century Reformation, emphasis on election 
and predestination had the double benefit of  being discernible (after a fashion) in scripture 
and of  mitigating against what Calvin regarded as the Roman Catholic notion that good 
works could lead to salvation. On the contrary, he asserted that election is an act of  God and 
is therefore never dependent upon a human being, even upon their faith – those whom God 
has predestined and elected for salvation are guaranteed to be subject to his grace by virtue 
of  that act of  God in deciding for them and for no other reason.  Others, because of  their 214
sinfulness, are deservedly subject to God’s wrath and damnation. The will of  God is the final 
arbiter, and because God is judge it is beyond contestation.  
Barth’s account works with and reworks the Calvinistic material, but, as with 
everything else after the Anselm study, he re-appraises the inherited Reformed understanding 
from the new Christocentric vantage point. Agreeing with Calvin, Barth places the idea of  
 In How I Changed My Mind, Barth noted how his new method had caused him to enter into critical dialogue 210
with the Reformed tradition whilst remaining within it. 
 Calvin, Institutes, Vol. I, 450. 211
 Calvin, Institutes, Vol. II, 976.212
 Calvin, Institutes, Vol. II, 926.213
 Calvin, Institutes, Vol. II, 932.214
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covenant very close to the centre of  his theology  but argues that Jesus Christ is not only 215
the mechanism by which the covenant may be enacted but is himself  the definition of  the 
covenant between God and human beings:  
everything which comes from God takes places ‘in Jesus Christ’, i.e. in the  
 establishment of  the covenant which, in the union of  His Son with Jesus of   
 Nazareth, God has instituted and maintains and directs between Himself  and His 
 people…   216
Covenant does not only take place ‘in Jesus Christ’, the hypostatic union of  the Son with the 
man Jesus is itself  the institution, maintenance, and direction of  the covenant. The covenant 
is not something ontologically separate from Jesus Christ. This is a considerable step beyond 
Calvin, whose willingness to see the damned condemned because they stand outside the 
covenant suggests to Barth there is an aspect of  human existence in which the grace of  God 
in Jesus Christ is not sovereign. This is a denial of  the Biblical witness and runs against the 
grain of  his theological method. Barth’s interpretation is informed here not only by his 
Christological concentration, but also by a thoroughgoing Chalcedonianism emphasising the 
union of  the Son with Jesus of  Nazareth and thus locating the actualisation of  the covenant 
in the incarnation. This means that not only in Jesus Christ, the God-man and the definition 
of covenant, do we meet God – “God can only be known through God”  - but we also 217
know ourselves to be covenant partners with him as we do so. Barth states, “God is not 
known completely – and therefore not at all – if  He is not known as the Maker and Lord of  
this covenant between Himself  and man.”  Thus human beings come to know the divine 218
determination of  them for covenant relationship as they come to know God as Lord of  the 
covenant. Because the covenant between God and human beings is actualised in Jesus Christ 
God is continually caught-up with human beings, and because Jesus’ humanity is universal 
God must be in covenant relationship with all people - including the reprobate and damned.  
 McGowan suggests that for Barth, “grace is the basis of  covenant, election is the outworking of  covenant, 215
creation prepares the ground for covenant, and reconciliation is the fulfilment of  covenant.” A.T.B. 
McGowan, ‘Karl Barth and Covenant Theology’, in Engaging with Barth: Contemporary Evangelical Critiques, eds. 
David Gibson and Daniel Strange (Nottingham: Apollos, 2008) p.115. This overview of  the ubiquity of  
covenant in Barth’s thought is challenged somewhat when McGowan critiques Barth’s account of  covenant 
for its failure to be properly Reformed, with reference to §57 only, thus missing the foundational sections of  
the Dogmatics which give rise to the content of  that paragraph.
 CD II/2, 8 (KD II/2, 7).216
 CD II/1, 79 (KD II/1, 86).217
 CD II/2, 509 (KD II/2, 565). 218
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 This view of  covenant as a divine decision to be in relationship with human beings is 
also upheld in Barth’s doctrine of  election, which he calls the sum of  the gospel, and at 
heart is indissoluble fellowship: “God in His love elects another for fellowship with 
Himself…He draws it upwards to Himself, so as never again to be without it, but to be who 
He is in covenant with it.”  In this covenant both God and the human creature cannot be 219
without one another. Therefore, election and covenant is the existential context (the pre-
condition) in which human beings come to know God, who is known as covenant-maker, 
established in eternity and enacted in history in Christ.   220
Human knowledge of  God is, therfore, a posteriori and in concreto.  In Kantian terms, 221
God “enters into relationship of  object to man the subject”  in the concrete reality of  the 222
divine-human person Jesus Christ, “for God is not known and not knowable except in Jesus 
Christ”.  Such knowledge consists only in the benevolent self-giving act of  God.  There 223 224
is no ontological change operative in this: God who reveals himself  in Jesus Christ shows 
himself  to be Lord of  the covenant and so to be God pro nobis from all eternity. The 
covenant is the eternal decision of  God which anticipates its enactment, what Barth called 
“temporal event”, in Jesus Christ  remembering that “what took place in Jesus Christ…was 225
not merely a temporal event, but the eternal will of  God temporally actualized and revealed 
in that event.”  In Christ we encounter both the eternal and the temporal will of  God.  226 227
Scholars have understood the significance of  this in different ways: Bruce McCormack 
argues that the best way to read Barth here is to say that God determined that covenant-
election should be constitutive of  divine ontology, i.e. that the decision for covenant gave 
rise to Trinity; others like Paul Molnar and George Hunsinger maintain that the Trinity is the 
 CD II/2, 10 (KD II/2, 9).219
 CD II/2, 509 (KD II/2, 565)220
 The definiteness of  the divine self-mediation is important later when Barth considers that the divine 221
command is given with ‘definite and concrete content’, CD II/2, 661 (KD II/2, 737).
 CD II/1, 9 (KD II/1, 8).222
 CD II/2, 509 (KD II/2, 565).223
 “Where God in His benevolentia gives Himself  to be known by man, and where man stands before Him as 224
one who knows this benevolentia as such and is therefore determined by it and obedient to it, there and there 
alone is there a fulfilment of  the real knowledge of  God”  CD II/1, 29 (KD II/2, 30).  
 CD II/2, 150 (KD II/2, 162).225
 CD II/2, 179 (KD II/2, 197).226
 CD II/2, 547 (KD II/2, 607).227
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presupposition and ground of  covenant-election, without which the doctrine of  election 
makes no theological sense.  228
The Chalcedonian definition,  which directly informs this account, gives Barth the 229
cue for thinking that our relationship with God is much more concrete than covenant 
governed by an abstract account of  election and predestination, as with Calvin. From the 
perspective of  Barth’s particular understanding of  the two natures in Jesus Christ, 
emphasising “our being with God and God’s being with us,” we encounter the unity of  
humanity and divinity and as such the goal of  the covenant.  This account of  Jesus’ 230
humanity questions the implicit limitations that Calvin’s doctrine of  election entails when it 
suggests that only some (the elect) are members with Christ. Instead, Barth sees the whole of  
humanity encompassed in Chalcedonian Christology: both the elect and the reprobate. Barth 
states that, in as much as the elect are “obviously to be found in the sphere of  divine 
election of  grace...[the reprobate] are also to be found there...the former in obedience, the 
latter in disobedience.”  Though the latter are disobedient, they are still present in Christ. 231
The corollary is to open up the circle of  the covenant beyond the limitations of  the elect so 
that it becomes the foundation of  all God’s dealings with all humanity.  A focus on 232
Chalcedonian Christology means that in Barth’s covenant theology all human creatures, 
reprobate and elect, are known and received by God in Christ. In Calvin’s predestinarian 
 Bruce McCormack, ‘Grace and Being: The Role of  God’s Gracious Election in Karl Barth’s Theological 228
Ontology’ in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
92-110; George Hunsinger, “Election and the Trinity: Twenty-Five Theses on the Theology of  Karl Barth,” 
Modern Theology, 24:2 (2008), 179-198; Paul Molnar, “Can the Electing God be God without us? Some 
Implications of  Bruce McCormack's Understanding of  Barth's Doctrine of  Election for the Doctrine of  the 
Trinity,” Neue Zeitschrift fur Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, 49 (2007), 199-222. There are two issues 
here: the first is the question of  how best to understand Barth, while the second is the bigger question of  the 
truth of  each theological position in relation to divine revelation. I am not particularly concerned with the 
second of  these in this thesis. As to the first, with Molnar and Hunsinger I understand the divine 
determination for covenant to indicate the Trinity as ontologically prior to the act of  election for Barth. Key 
texts support Hunsinger’s argument, for example the following from Barth’s account of  the being of  God: 
“As and before God seeks and creates fellowship with us, he wills and completes his fellowship with 
himself…He is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit and therefore alive in his unique being with and for and in 
another….He does not exist in solitude but in fellowship.” CD II/1, 275 (KD II/1, 308). Hunsinger, Election 
and Trinity…, 181.
 Chalcedonian Christology - used here to argue that Barth is committed to the two-natures hypothesis of  229
the Chalcedonian Formula of  451 - makes sense of  Barth’s ethics later on. Charles Waldrop, who has argued 
for an Alexandrian reading of  Barth’s Christology, has suggested that the ‘overemphasis’ on the divinity of  
Christ mitigates human actions and agency, thus rendering Barth’s account of  ethical agency senseless; 
Charles Waldrop, Karl Barth’s Christology: its basic Alexandrian character (New York: Mouton, 1984), 176. For a 
critical response which argues for a Chalcedonian account see George Hunsinger’s ‘Karl Barth’s Christology: 
its Basic Chalcedonian Character’, in Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 131-47. 
 CD II/1, 74 (KD II/1, 80).230
 CD II/2, 346-7 (KD II/2, 382).231
 The circle-metaphor is Barth’s own, referring initially to Jesus Christ, but extended in §35.3 in order to 232
facilitate discussion of  the apokatastasis charge. CD II/2, 417-19 (KD II/2, 461-464).
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covenant, even the possibility of  the knowledge of  God as anything other than prosecutor is 
impossible for the reprobate. For Barth, Jesus’ universal humanity is the divine good 
pleasure; it is grace.   233
In the gracious union of  the divine and human, Christ embodies the whole of  the 
covenant-partnership. Ethics as a human enterprise is treated in the doctrine of  God as all 
humanity is treated in Christ: ‘humanity in itself  has no place in the doctrine of  God. But 
Jesus Christ has a place…and a God without Jesus Christ…would be another, a strange 
God.’  Human beings own the highest knowledge of  themselves as human,  claimed and 234 235
commanded by God, and determined as covenant partners, on this basis: the corollary, as we 
shall see, is that ethics is not determinative of  human ontology, or human future – Jesus 
Christ is. Our response to the commanding claim, I shall argue, is the content of  responsible 
human agency since the covenant-decision is also an act of  judgement, wherein God the 
Judge orders our steps as his covenant partners: 
When God becomes Man’s partner, as the Lord of  the covenant who determines its 
meaning, content, and fulfilment, He necessarily becomes the Judge of  Man, the law 
of  his existence.   236
God is Lord of  the covenant, and the partnership to which, Barth says, humans are called 
recognizes that God graciously condescends to instruct human beings as to proper 
covenantal etiquette. This, as we shall see, is received as liberating command.  We see further 237
how Barth moved away from Calvin’s account of  covenant in two ways: 1) the outworking 
of  divine election; 2) the shape of  the divine command. Though these two are treated in 
turn, the distinction is logical rather than ontological.  
 The doctrine of  election is key to a Reformed account of  covenant. Since the Synod 
of  Dort (1619), in which something like an internationally agreed account of  the tenets of  
Reformed faith was endorsed, the doctrine has be understood to entail ‘an eternal, divine 
decree which...separates the human race into two portions and ordains one to everlasting life 
 CD II/1, 74 (KD II/1, 81).233
 CD II/2, 510 (KD II/2, 565).234
 On this see Mangina’s outline of  Barth’s turn from Cartesianism in Joseph L. Mangina, Karl Barth on the 235
Christian Life: The Practical Knowledge of  God (New York: Peter Lang Pub Inc, 2001) Ch. 1.
 CD II/2, 511 (KD II/2, 567).236
 ‘Command’ here should not be understood as ‘dictate’ but as permission, in accordance with the 237
graciousness of  the covenant. As William Werpehowski notes, Barth ‘uses ordinary words in a peculiar but 
coherent way by assimilating them to his conceptual scheme.’ William Werpehowski, 'Command and History 
in the Ethics of  Karl Barth’ in Journal of  Religious Ethics, 9 (1981), 302. 
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and the other to everlasting death.’  Again, Barth’s account is a particularly nuanced version 238
of  this, shifting focus away from the election of, and ultimate destination of, individual 
human persons toward the single concrete person of  the electing-God. This is followed 
secondly by the election of  the community, and only finally by the election of  the 
individual.  Again we can see why Barth chooses to treat ethics in the midst of  the doctrine 239
of  God, since it is the case that human beings elect in Christ are also agents – they act – and 
ethics is concerned with the rightness of  those actions.   240
As with covenant, Barth explained his account of  election earlier in the volume 
(§§32-35), where again his account of  Chalcedonian Christology is important in helping us 
understand its structure and function. Divine election gives shape to Christology: 
Jesus Christ is God in His movement towards man…Jesus Christ is the decision of  
God in favour of  this attitude or relation. He is Himself  the relation…He is also 
called Jesus of  Nazareth. He is also very man, and as such is the Representative of  
the people which in Him and through Him is united as He is with God, being with 
Him the object of  the divine movement.  241
It is a two-sided structure: first, Christ’s divinity is shown to encompass God’s self-election 
in eternity to be gracious toward humanity by becoming incarnate: ‘God makes this 
movement, the institution of  the covenant…in Jesus Christ…First and foremost this means 
that God makes a self-election in favour of  the other.’  Election, as a divine decision to act 242
is necessarily first a choice about the divine determination before it is a choice about which 
human beings shall be saved. Barth prioritizes God not as the elector, but as the self-elect. It 
is God who first chooses for election, for covenant relationship, as the enactment of  the 
eternal covenant before human beings were even created.  Barth once again emphasises the 243
 Loraine Boettner, The Reformed Doctrine of  Predestination (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed 238
Publishing Co., 1976), 83. 
 See §33. This is a logical rather than ontological distinction.239
 Barth treats election in relation to ethics under his account of  ‘the way of  theological ethics’ (§36.2) CD 240
II/2, 543-51 (KD II/2, 603-12).
 CD II/2, 7 (KD II/2, 5).241
 CD II/2, 9-10 (KD II/2, 8).242
Again, see in particular Bruce McCormack, ‘Grace and Being: the role of  God’s gracious election in Karl 243
Barth’s theological ontology’ in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster (Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), pp. 92-110, and the counterargument offered by Paul Molnar, 'Can the electing God be without 
us? Some implications of  Bruce McCormack's understanding of  Barth's doctrine of  election for the doctrine 
of  the Trinity' in NZST 49.2 (2007), 199-222. 
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eternality of  the covenant decision and divine self-election. This is a proper aspect of  divine 
sovereignty: that God determines himself, and as such binds himself  to the covenant, is not 
so much an account of  the limitedness of  God as the power of  God. Barth acknowledges 
this when he suggests that God’s freedom, God’s eternity, and God’s righteousness, as facets 
of  divine grace which reach out to humanity, are all constituent parts of  the doctrine of  
election .  244
Second, Christ’s humanity is understood as the centre of  covenant-election as it is 
actualised. As I have already argued it is not that Christ is a mechanism by which some are 
chosen, but rather is shown to enact God’s election of  the world, so that  
in Him and through Him God moves toward the world. It means not merely that He 
creates and sustains the world, but that He works on it and in it…That God wills 
neither to be without the world nor against it can never be stated more forcibly than 
when we speak of  His election.  245
The doctrine of  election εν χριστω (Eph. 1:4) is the election of  the world – the movement of  
God towards the world in love: ‘His election is not simply exemplary and typical…there is 
also an election of  others in Him.’  The elect in Christ are invited to be witnesses to God’s 246
glory and partners in the covenant. As we have already noted, this latter point is made 
controversial by virtue of  Christ’s universal humanity. It frequently leads to the charge of  
apokatastasis or universalism – since the distinction between the human-damned and the 
human-elect, present in traditional Reformed theology, is dissolved.  Barth argues that 247
‘God…has taken upon himself  the rejection merited by the man isolated in relation to Him; 
that on [this] basis…the only truly rejected man is His own Son…so that [rejection] can no 
longer fall on other men or be their concern.’  Double predestination is now to be found 248
wholly in Jesus Christ: the universal human being is both elect human and reprobate sinner 
 CD II/2, 24 & 27-34 (KD II/2, 24 & 28).244
 CD II/2, 26 (KD II/2, 27).245
 G.C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of  Grace in the Theology of  Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,  1956), 101.246
 On this point see Berkouwer, The Triumph of  Grace… Ch. 10; more recently Tom Greggs, “Jesus is Victor: 247
Passing the Impasse of  Barth on Universalism,” Scottish Journal of  Theology, 60 (2007), 196-212, and his Barth, 
Origen, and Universal Salvation: Restoring Particularity (Oxford: OUP, 2009) explore Barth’s apparent denial of  
apokatastasis in CD II/2, 417-19, by suggesting that it is the denial of  the act of  formulating God’s grace and 
thus of  binding God’s sovereign freedom, but not actually of  the ultimate friendliness of  Jesus Christ.
 CD II/2, 319 (KD II/2, ). Barth immediately follows this statement in a way suggestive of  universal 248
salvation, saying that ‘their concern is still to be aware of  the threat of  their rejection…but it cannot now be 
their concern to suffer the execution of  this threat, to suffer the eternal damnation which their godlessness 
deserves.’
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on the cross – God acting in humanity and for humanity.  These two parts come together 249
to form the whole doctrine of  eternal divine election as Barth conceived it:  Jesus Christ is 250
the elect human and the electing God, the elect and the Elector,  both the object and 251
subject of  divine election.  In this concrete person, God actualised the eternal decision for 252
human fellowship with himself  and called human beings into covenant partnership: “not 
only did He elect fellowship with man for himself  he also elected fellowship with Himself  
for man.”  As we have also noted elsewhere in relation to covenant, God’s judgement is 253
enacted positively in election – since it is the case that He has judged in favour of  humanity 
by becoming human for the sake of  the covenant. So it is that Barth hails the doctrine of  
election as “the sum of  the gospel.”  254
 Divine self-election for humanity still involves the election and determination of  
human beings for service, commission, and witness in the world.  Divine election implies 255
the lordship of  one over another: it is a partnership in which the creature is expected to fulfil 
the reality of  the existence for which she has been determined, as the Creator fulfils the 
reality for which he has determined himself, in the covenant. Covenant-election involves 
God’s lordship and sovereignty; God’s decision and judgement; God’s claiming and 
determining; and ultimately God’s grace. For Barth, election involves us in obedience which 
comes in the form of  the divine command. Ethics is about our human response to this: 
That God wills to rule over man clearly means that He wants his obedience, and the 
question of  obedience is therefore put to him. That God has determined him for 
service clearly means that He claims him for Himself, and he is therefore asked 
whether he will satisfy this claim.  256
That determination and claim is received by humanity as the command of  God addressed to 
His creatures. It is the way humanity hears God’s lordship, receives its election in Christ, and 
hears the determination of  its actions – what Barth understands concretely as the request for 
 CD II/2, 546 (KD II/2, 606).249
 CD II/2, 510 (KD II/2, 565).250
 CD II/2, 94-144 (KD II/2, 101-57).251
 CD II/2, 145-9 (KD II/2, 157-214).252
 CD II/2, 168 (KD II/2, 184).253
 CD II/2, 34 (KD II/2, 35).254
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obedience.  The command is addressed to humanity as a specific kind of  address of  the 257
divine Word. This is a key concept in understanding God’s self-giving: that the Word who 
was God and was with God, and became flesh and dwelt among us, is Jesus Christ (John 
1:1-14). In the address of  the divine  Word God deals with humanity. In the light of  what we 
have already seen, the Command as a form of  spoken Word addressed to humanity is the 
form of  God’s electing – that is to say that, in hearing the Command, human beings are 
conscious of  that they are elect, determined, and claimed for covenant partnership. This 
consciousness shapes and informs the human agent and gives the believer a Christian 
perspective from which to view themselves, the world around, and the various ethical 
quandaries in which they may be caught up.  It is the key to the question of  their existence, 258
and goodness of  their conduct. Human beings act well if  they act as obedient hearers of  259
the Command, as those confronted by the Word, as those who conform to God’s 
commanding-claim in fellowship with Christ, and submit to their divine determination in 
Christ.  
Barth has reversed the normal pattern of  asking ethical questions: instead of  a 
person asking the question ‘What shall I do?’ in a particular situation, she is herself  
questioned by God who claims her for his own.  She is made accountable (Verantwortlich) to 260
the electing God through his Command  and to her is put the question of  her willingness 261
to satisfy the claim. The Command of  God is therefore the basis of  Barth’s account of  
responsible human action: 
The core of  the matter is that God gives His Command, that He gives Himself  to be 
our Commander. God’s Command, God Himself, gives Himself  to be known. And 
as He does so, He is heard. Man is made responsible [Verantwortlich]. He is brought 
into that confrontation and fellowship with Jesus Christ.  262
 CD II/2, 546 (KD II/2, 607). It is significant that it is a request for obedience: God’s claiming of  humanity 257
is satisfied neither by obedience nor disobedience, it is self-satisfying in as much as the claim qualifies human 
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CD II/2, 667-69 (KD II/2, 744-45).
 ‘Goodness’ here connotes obedience to the command in as much as it connotes God-like behaviour. See 259
CD II/2, 546-7 (KD II/2, 608)
 CD II/2, 545-6 (KD II/2, 606).260
 CD II/2, 543 (KD II/2, 603).261
 CD II/2, 548 (KD II/2, 609).262
Page !81
That is not to say that the question ‘What shall I do?’ is not one that Christian ethics asks.  263
Instead it is to re-orientate human attitudes toward moral reflection by contextualising 
humanity: the Command of  God is addressed to human beings in a threefold determination 
as creatures, as reconciled sinners, and as those awaiting redemption – all of  which is known 
only after the actualization of  this determination in Jesus Christ. As such, the command of  
God is ultimately graced: it comes only by the enactment of  God’s gracious desire to live in 
covenant partnership with the humans he has created, reconciled, and will redeem. Drawing 
here on the threefold structure of  the Ethics lectures, Barth orders the rest of  the Church 
Dogmatics according to these (again logical but not ontological) distinctions, putting the 
question of  the divine command at the end of  each. What is significant for the present 
investigation is the shape and content of  human responsibility as the key aspect of  ethics in 
relation to the Doctrine of  God, as we have already outlined it.   
3.3 Responsibility and the Doctrine of  God 
Like his two-natures Christology rooted in the Chalcedonian Defintion, Barth speaks of  
responsibility in two natures: divine and human, more particularly the responsibility of  God 
and the responsibility of  human beings. This is no insignificant point: Barth’s 
Christocentrism allows him to develop a mutual responsibility that fills out his claim that the 
covenant theology has at its heart divine human partnership. His actualism is central to this 
in two ways. First, Christ is the enactment of  divine responsibility: God is as he acts, and the 
principal place where human beings see God in action is in Jesus Christ. Second Jesus is also 
the true liberated human being enacted before God. It is in the midst of  the second point 
that human responsibility as the organising principle of  human agency is to be found: Christ 
enacts true humanity, and human beings are called and permitted to live in the fullness of  
humanity as God intends. Since responsibility is a species of  action our understanding of  
divine and human responsibility begins in the place where divine action is actualised and 
human agency is permitted. This makes for a heavily Christocentric and actualised 
responsibility. 
3.3.1 Divine Responsibility 
Much of  this material is related to the way in which God acts for his creatures in Jesus 
Christ, in covenant election. As a feature of  Barth’s Christological actualism, there are two 
 Though it is worth noting here that Barth opts for a communal approach asking, ‘What ought we to do?’ 263
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notable aspects of  divine responsibility: the first concerns the human origin and the second 
the human telos.  The former is summed up in the eternal decision of  God to be for us in 264
Christ, and the reality of  our existence governed by this covenant decision. In eternity God 
makes himself  responsible for humanity, providing a context for this in creation. God is 
therefore prospectively and retrospectively responsible for creation – it exists because of  his 
prior decision, it came about at the command of  his word, and it belongs to him. The reality 
which God accords his creatures is derivative of  his absolute divine reality. Compared with 
human responsibility, the implications of  God’s responsibility are much more forensic: 
divine responsibility is the decision and enactment of  the divine will for covenant 
partnership. Barth writes, “we must insist upon the responsibility which God shouldered 
when he created man and permitted the fall of  man…for what God required of  himself  on 
man’s behalf  is infinitely greater than what he required of  man.” As experienced by human 265
beings, divine responsibility is the continuation of  true human existence: it is the gracious 
enactment of  human orientation towards God, and the overturning of  the impossible 
demand to be ‘knowers’ of  the divine person and will aside from grace, with the divine 
assumption of  responsibility for this knowledge on behalf  of  humanity in the doctrine of  
revelation.  In giving himself  to be known and loved in Jesus Christ, the human struggle to 266
find God and to seek out the divine will amidst many viable options is over, and so the 
ethical task is redirected from that of  the pursuit of  the highest good to the outworking of  
the covenant relationship.  
This helps us to understand God’s responsibility for the human telos: Barth’s 
Christology suggests that God assumes responsibility for the answer to the question of  
human obedience in the man Jesus, and in the union of  the divine and human in him 
establishes once and for all the goal of  covenant partnership. In short the effect is that 
human action in the present does not affect human destiny: ‘[God] Himself  assumes 
responsibility for man’s temporal and eternal future.’  We noted earlier that for some this 267
entails God ‘taking over’ from human beings and therefore removing all traces of  human 
agency – rendering the actions of  the present worthless by removing post-temporal 
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consequences: there is no eternal judgement, and no hell for the reprobate.  But since for 268
Barth both the elect and the reprobate are found in Christ , there is a universal human 269
vocation to conform to the divine determination, without fear. It could be viewed positively 
or negatively: those who have understood it negatively have usually done so because it makes 
the process of  ethical reflection worthless by divesting moral decisions and actions of  
eternal retrospective responsibility, or because it removes creativity from the decision 
process and renders all good human actions a question of  obedience to the prescriptive divine 
will, making human responsibility equal conformity.  Those who see it positively have 270
understood the, sometimes implicit, call that Barth issues to take theology, in particular 
Christology, seriously  and allow it to influence our thinking about ethics. Theological 271
reflection of  this kind can empower Christian ethics by introducing a framework in which to 
think Christianly and creatively about moral problems. The answers to the ethical questions 
of  the present are currently open-ended: the calling of  human beings is to ‘display the image 
of  God’ in each moment, to conform to Jesus Christ, the image of  the Father.  This means 272
that creative thinking about and continual listening for the divine command is integral to 
ethical reflection for the Christian and something that is integral to the shape of  human 
responsibility. To see God’s actions in Christ as opposition to human agency overemphasises 
the restrictive elements and subsequently misinterprets Barth’s negativity towards 
unbounded human freedom. Barth means to reject the false notion that human beings are 
self-determining, seeing, instead, a liberating element, humanly speaking, to the responsibility 
God assumes for us. It is this that is enshrined in the notion of  divine command we 
encountered earlier: the content of  the command is the call to live in the divine 
determination, to let one’s life be ordered and orientated according to the covenant.   
3.3.2 Human Responsibility 
 Here, the existence of  hell is a key aspect of  human freedom, and therefore agency. George Hunsinger 268
nods at this when he argues that, in parts of  the Christian tradition, hell is penalty for sin – a form of  
retribution, and (retrospective) responsibility. See ‘Hellfire and damnation: four ancient and modern views’ in 
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If  we treat the above in terms of  moral reality, then what we have seen in Jesus Christ is the 
establishment of  that reality in the covenant.  But precisely because it is Christologically 
grounded, we are also in the realm of  human agency, and of  responsibility by virtue of  
God’s determination of  human beings in Christ. Barth is clear that God makes humans 
responsible agents, anticipating some kind of  freely chosen action as response to his own. The 
image here could be that of  a divine-human dialogue, where human responsibility is a 
complementary component of  covenant-partnership. Barth writes, 
The matter of  theological ethics is the responsibility [Verantwortung] which God has 
assumed for us in the fact that He has made us accountable [Verantwortung] through 
His command  273
Both parties are accorded responsible agency. Though, as the English translators suggest in 
rendering creaturely agency ‘accountability’, human responsibility comes logically after divine 
responsibility. It is not the case that Barth simply says that in Jesus Christ right human action 
has been performed without also saying that this God then submits humanity to a 
requirement.  Neither obedience nor disobedience affects this: the possibility of  either 274
response only confirms that God has claimed and determined human beings. It is therefore 
through conformity to what God has determined for us in Christ that human beings are 
freed to live the reality of  human existence.  
As a divinely imparted gift, human responsibility is enacted in two different ways – 
before God, and before others. Human beings are called to responsible actions by free 
decision: ‘It is in the use of  our freedom that we give an account of  how we stand in the 
sight of  God…in the use of  our freedom we have to embody God’s righteous judgement 
upon us.’  Responsibility-to-God as the first order of  responsible human action is macro-275
responsibility, orientating the whole of  human existence toward its divine origin – giving an 
account of  our standing. In the case of  Christian ethics it negotiates two equal and opposite 
existential fallacies that are easily arguable. The first fallacy is any suggestion that human 
beings can legitimately judge for themselves what is right and wrong without consideration 
for the will of  God, as if  there were no God at all. It would be at least possible that this 
could happen if  God had not decided in eternity for election and covenant, and had God 
not issued His command in Christ. But this is not the case: God has done those things. Nor 
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does it mean that the Church is safe from this fallacy: it might include a way of  reading 
Scripture that privileges prescriptive sections of  the Bible as easily graspable accounts of  the 
divine will in such a way that does not require an encounter with the divine person. However 
conceived, Barth calls this fallacy arrogance. The second fallacy is a kind of  self-deception 
that suggests that the sovereignty of  God’s decision is such, and the overarching account of  
Christ’s humanity is such, that one need not be concerned with good conduct – with ethics – 
because the determination of  an individual life has been pre-decided. This kind of  fatalism is 
an easily warped version of  traditional double predestination. Good conduct and bad 
conduct sit equally under this determination, so knowing that they cannot change God’s 
judgement, human beings use this as an excuse not to act at all or not to be concerned for 
the rightness of  acts committed. Barth calls this false-humility, since it plays on the apparent 
weakness of  human beings in the face of  the divine decision but is really a manipulation of  
the truth that seemingly permits bad conduct, and excuses humanity from ethical reflection. 
Between these two opposite but equally false accounts of  human agency, Barth posits 
responsible human action. This is governed by covenant theology, and rests on an awareness 
of  one’s cosmic location, engendering 
the sense of  responsibility of  those who know that God alone is their Judge and not 
they themselves, and that because God is their Judge they have every reason to 
remember Him in all their willing and doing [and] to keep Him before their mind’s 
eye…  276
The concept of  responsibility encapsulates, for Barth, both the need to know that we are 
creatures, and children of  God, and also the gift of  freedom and agency in the Christian life, 
orientated toward our divine origin and goal. That is not to say, however, that only those 
who are conscious of  God are responsible agents. This could be a trap into which William 
Schweiker might fall when he argues that Barth’s understanding of  human responsibility is a 
‘dialogical theory’  in which one becomes a responsible agent only in encounter with 277
another. It is the nature of  our response to this ‘other’ that makes us responsible people, and 
so therefore only after encounter can we be truly responsible beings.  Schweiker makes 278
responsibility an a posteriori of  the divine-human encounter. Commenting on Barth’s 
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understanding of  divine command ethics, he implies that only as God is encountered are human 
beings made responsible agents: 
Karl Barth’s divine command ethics is one of  the most radical expressions of  
responsibility ethics centred on encountering the other. He insisted…that the other, 
God, reveals himself  and encounters self  as commander…[and] defines 
responsibility in terms of  an obedient answer to the Command of  God.  279
Contrary to this, I suggest that though it may be the case that human beings know themselves 
as responsible agents as they encounter God, it is not ontologically the case that human 
beings become responsible only after this encounter. For Barth, responsibility is the state of  
existence for all humanity: it is the ‘most exact definition of  the human situation in the face 
of  the absolute transcendence of  the divine judgement.’ It is our creaturely situation, such 
that our actions are “an actualization of  responsibility.”  The distinction between 280
Schweiker’s Barth and my understanding of  Barth here is that, in my reading, divine encounter 
reveals the fact of  universal human responsibility but does not establish it. It has been 
established in Jesus Christ, by virtue of  the divine responsibility already undertaken. We can 
see this point demonstrated with regard to Barth’s opposition to natural theology, where he 
argues that a person’s attempt to know God other than by revelation actually means that ‘his 
responsibility before his God remains completely hidden.’  That is not to say that it does 281
not exist, but to say that the person in question is unaware of  it: she has blinded herself  to 
the reality of  the human situation in which she has a share. Humans are responsible agents 
by virtue of  Christ’s universal humanity: this is true of  both the Christian and the non-
Christian, as the following quote illustrates: 
We live in responsibility, which means that our being and willing, what we do and 
what we do not do, is a continuous answer to the Word of  God spoken to us as 
Command…Man does not belong to himself….He is subjected to the divine will, 
Word, and Command, and called to realize the true purpose of  his existence as 
covenant-partner with God…This is the essence of  responsibility…Christian ethics 
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will see every man as responsible and caught up in the dreadful act of  
responsibility.  282
All human beings live and act in responsibility before God, knowingly or unknowingly, but 
those who are Christians are more aware of  the calling because they are sensitive to the 
subjective way in which the command is heard: conscious that Jesus Christ speaks definitely 
and concretely. The command is peculiar to everyone – ‘[God’s] command applies to us all’ 
but is received as ‘our personal question…addressed to us personally.’  So what of  those 283
who do not hear? One answer is that only those who hear are the elect, but this is not 
Barth’s answer. He nuances it slightly saying that the one who listens is the one who hears. 
That is to say that there is in the message of  Jesus Christ  an invitation to, and enabling of, 284
responsible human action addressed to each person, not ‘as the specimen of  a natural or 
historical collective…but as this particular man, i.e. this one beloved by God and therefore a 
responsible partner in the divine covenant.’  This person knows herself  as covenant 285
partner as she hears covenant-election as command, and enacts that partnership in 
obedience to the divine determination, as she is self-consciously aware of  her part in the 
covenant-partnership.  Barth goes on, ‘We are not responsible to an idea…[but to] the 286
concrete reality of  the covenant between God and man, in the person and work and lordship 
of  Jesus Christ.’  287
On the issue of  the content of  particular momentary commands, Barth is silent. He 
affirms that God speaks and argues that individuals receive the divine command as ‘concrete 
and specific orders’ , of  which stories of  divine encounter and command in the Bible are 288
indicative. But, Barth recognizes, for many people the sense of  confrontation by the divine 289
command is ‘rare and superficial’. This is because, he argues, for the most part people do not 
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live as though the Bible were ‘the normative Word of  God.’  In so doing they do not allow 290
themselves to be shaped by the covenant story. To do so would be an event of  
confrontation, and an act of  orientation. Barth argues that being reminded of  the covenant-
story reminds us of  our responsibility before God: 
If  we realise again that God’s Son is made sin for us…if  we listen anew to the 
selfsame Son of  God speaking for us…We are made responsible as we have heard 
the voice of  the risen Lord, and it is our responsibility to continue to hear this 
voice.   291
  
 Much of  what I have said above can seem quite subjective – it relies heavily on a 
personal encounter with God in order to know one’s own status before God, and it relies on 
the honing of  one’s conscience and self-consciousness for the reception of  the divine 
command. To leave it at that, however, would be a misleading representation of  Barth’s 
thought on the subject. Barth’s account is about much more than the subjective relationship 
of  the ‘I’ with God: it also impinges upon human beings as they relate to one another. Barth 
reckons with these elements of  responsibility as he tackles political responsibility [politischer 
Verantwortlichkeit] within the circumference of  the goodness of  the divine command (§38.3). 
The polites to which he refers is the interrelation of  human beings in community with each 
other, and with God. 
 The section is under-girded by a commentary on Romans 12-15, through which 
Barth argues that part of  the universal responsibility of  humanity before God is revealed in 
the political responsibility humans have to one another.  That is to say, the former so 292
conditions the latter, that the latter can become a witness to the former. It is contextually 
significant that Barth should choose to address political responsibility here, given the Nazi 
shadow hanging over the European landscape in 1942. His message was universally 
appropriate – that political responsibility means the fulfilment of  a divinely given obligation 
for human beings to love one another, a clearly implicit critique of  the German regime, and 
an appeal to let one’s life accord with the reality of  its determination. It is also an ecclesially 
specific charge, for it is the church that is most aware of  the divine-human covenant-
partnership, and most aware of  the divine determination of  humanity with regard to God 
and one another. So it is the Church that is most conscious of  its political responsibility, 
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acting ‘not out of  fear, but because it knows the will of  God.’  It is clear that for Barth, the 293
responsibility humans have before God informs and shapes the responsibility they have 
before one another. In what follows I will delineate the key points in Barth’s explanation of  
the goodness of  the command as it sheds light on his account of  political responsibility. 
The goodness of  the command is expressed in three terms: right; friendly; 
wholesome. All of  these belong together, ‘if  we subtract two, or even one, of  the three, we 
are not speaking truly or seriously of  goodness.’  This definition is founded upon divine 294
action for humanity in Jesus Christ, and so by the command of  God which is the active 
form of  election. God loves what is right, he is friendly towards us in Christ, and effects 
what is wholesome as he returns humanity to its proper created determination. Human 
responsibility, as the act of  correspondence to this determination, involves regard for the 
goodness of  God’s will, and so for the right, the friendly, and the wholesome. With regard to 
political responsibility, Barth sees in Paul a call for active political involvement that is all of  
these things, existing to promote what is right and wholesome out of  friendly regard for, and 
for the good of, the state: 
…Christians should see and fulfil their whole obligation by loving one another, that 
in reciprocal love they are to build up and maintain the Church and so fulfil the 
whole Law, thus proving themselves to the world, and accepting their basic 
responsibility to the divinely instituted order of  the state…   295
Granted, the first level of  responsibility is still to God – the state is divinely instituted – but 
the second level of  responsibility for Christians is to the order of  the state. It is because of  
the divine institution that the Christians are aware of  their responsibility for its order. The 
Church affirms the rightness of  the state’s existence, as a given by God, and it does so in 
friendly speech –in affirmation and rebuke – in order to seek the wholesomeness of  our 
common life together as co-partners with one another, and partners with God, in the 
covenant. Barth draws comparisons with Paul’s account of  the strong and the weak (Rom. 
14-15), implying that both instances have their ‘basis in the fact that Christ is the Lord of  the 
living and the dead’ and that such lordship leads to an ordering of  things in which humans 
are responsible to each other – learning the ‘law of  love’ for each other, which is grounded 
in Christ. As in Jesus Christ all are accepted by virtue of  his responsible action, so there 
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must be a reciprocal act of  responsibility in the Church for those beyond its borders. Part of  
this responsibility involves the Church in worship and witness: the refusal to conform to this 
world, asking in opposition to it, ‘what is the will of  God?’ and the pointing, by its common 
life, to the reality of  creaturely existence in covenant-partnership. 
But the Church does not do this from a distinct ontological position in relation to 
other human beings: rather Barth affirms the fellowship of  all humanity before God. Those 
who know themselves to be responsible, the Church, know themselves actually to be in 
common (universal) responsibility, and therefore mutual trust and living fellowship with each 
other before God. We have already encountered this in the Ethics lectures. It changes 
therefore the way we view the ‘other’, acknowledging in them the fellowship we have with 
Jesus, who, as the concrete and responsible human being before God, encompasses all 
human acts of  responsibility. This Barth calls an inward brotherly love: 
…the affectionateness with which we seek neither ourselves nor others but the 
common Lord in brotherhood with others, gladly seeing in our brother, although 
without surrendering our own freedom and responsibility, the representative of  our 
eldest Brother, and therefore the common Father, and thus yielding him the 
preference and honour.       296
There is a profound strength and gentleness to Barth’s account of  mutual human 
responsibility here: the strength is in the Church’s witness to the responsibility human beings 
have to God, and because of  that to one another, which can involve both challenge and 
rebuke, and a re-orientating of  our human interaction; the gentleness comes in the affection 
with which Barth calls us to relate to fellow human beings, applying the metaphor of  
brotherhood and family.  What Barth has done is to reduce political responsibility and 297
Christian responsibility to a common factor in Jesus Christ, thus “understanding Christian 
responsibility in itself  and as such as political, and political as Christian.”  The way of  the 298
Christian in the world is the way of  Christ. The effect is to emphasize the point that human 
beings exist in community and so individual responsibility before God involves an 
outworking in common-responsibility to others, with the former shaping and influencing the 
latter. Once again Christology underpins responsibility. 
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3.4 Summary and Conclusion 
By way of  a summary of  human responsibility in the context of  the doctrine of  God, I want 
to highlight several key points that will help with the interpretation of  future volumes of  the 
Dogmatics: 
First, Barth understands all human responsibility within the reality of  the covenant-
partnership established in Christ. With this in mind, much of  what we have seen in this 
chapter is orientation or conceptual location: it allows Barth to place human responsibility 
firmly within the covenant, and therefore to accord human action a reality of  its own. Barth 
believes, contrary to many of  the ways he has been interpreted, that human action is 
meaningful within the theological meta-narrative. Indeed, meaningful human action is only 
determined within that framework – it is the only place where agency is established, and the 
human being is free to live in the responsibility of  her creaturely determination. It is against 
this determination, therefore, that all human actions, whether in obedience or disobedience, 
are acts of  responsibility – they are indicative of  a person’s relation to God, but not 
determinative of  their standing within the covenant. The primary calling of  human agents, 
whether intentionally Christian or not, is to reckon with the God of  Jesus Christ as the 
origin and end of  humanity and so to conform to that existential matrix – i.e. to live within 
the boundaries of  reality. In this way, Barth makes the ethics of  responsibility a foundational 
question of  human existence. 
Secondly, Barth’s account of  covenant really is one of  divine-human partnership. We 
have seen that this is primarily enacted in Christ – thus rendering the fate of  all humanity 
secure in God – but in the subsequent bestowal of  responsibility within this Christ 
paradigm, human agents are made peculiarly responsible. This responsibility can be summed 
up broadly as the invitation to conform to the proper determination of  human existence, to 
cease warring with God and to partner God in the life of  the covenant: its more particular 
elements are part of  the command of  God as ‘I’ hear it. God makes himself  responsible to 
humanity as he binds himself  to the covenant, to being God for us. Barth’s actualism enacts 
this point, as God fulfils his covenant determination in Christ. In the humanity of  Jesus, 
God maintains his responsibility for human beings – in the story of  Jesus’ life, death, and 
resurrection the covenant-story is told, and human telos is fulfilled: God has made himself  
responsible for the whole of  human existence. The mutuality of  this account should not be 
over-emphasised since God is still the Lord of  the covenant. Nonetheless, Barth does point 
to a paradigm of  divine responsibility, in which human beings are also called to be 
responsible, and in which each requires the action of  the other.  
Page !92
Thirdly, Barth’s covenant responsibility gives Christian ethics a theological perspective 
from which to look at, and interpret, the reality of  the world around. The covenant narrative 
provides a framework that delineates the relationships between God and creation, and 
between human beings. It provides the meta-ethical context for the living of  human life. 
Again, thinking and acting in conformity to the divine determination is important but it is 
not so prescriptively given that all human agency is removed. The concept of  human 
responsibility Barth deploys involves a great deal of  human creativity to think and act in the 
midst of  the flow of  covenant narrative, hence Barth’s point about the human conscience 
being shaped and informed by our self-conscious awareness of  our part in it. From this 
vista, human beings recognize that our lives are inexorably connected to the life of  Jesus 
Christ, and this recognition allows the conscience to hear and know the Command of  God 
when it comes. 
Fourthly, human responsibility before God has a corollary form in the responsibility 
humans bear to one another under the law, the latter mirroring and testifying to the former. 
Barth’s account of  human action opposes any kind of  individualistic fideism in favour of  
the common responsibility of  the community. His account of  political responsibility, with its 
emphasis on the fellowship of  humanity before God, is grounded in the co-partnership of  
all humans in covenant-partnership with God. This brings with it a whole new way of  
relating to other people – of  being responsible to them, at a secondary level, as we would be 
responsible to God in Christ.  
Page !93
Chapter 4 
Responsibility in the Special Ethics of  Church Dogmatics III/4 
In this chapter I turn to the next sphere of  ethics in the Dogmatics, and argue that here Barth 
discusses human responsibility in terms of  particular concrete activities. These acts orientate 
the agent in relation to God, others, and self, and in so doing draw on the theological 
description of  human responsibility discussed in the previous chapter. Throughout this 
chapter I signpost the ways in which the discussion of  responsibility in the special ethics of  
CD III/4 relates directly to the discussion in the ethics of  CD II/2. 
4.1 Introduction 
The leitmotiv of  CD III/4 is freedom.  Barth’s discussion of  freedom focuses on the 299
concrete and particular moments of  human acting, informing us about the kind of  person 
the responsible agent will be. He considers what responsible human agency, sanctified and 
freed by the grace of  God, might look like in reality. Various accounts of  freedom play 
prominent roles in philosophical and theological accounts of  human responsibility, and these 
are mostly couched within a theological doctrine of  sanctification. This fact is no less true 
for Barth. What is new is the particular dynamic Barth creates between freedom and 
responsibility. To be clear about the significance of  the practice of  responsibility here I shall 
begin by outlining Barth’s conceptual understanding in § 52 “Ethics as a Task of  the 
Doctrine of  Creation”, clearing the way for a close reading of  human responsibility in §§ 
53-56. This opens up space in the following chapter for exploration of  the relationship 
between the substantive account and the practice of  responsibility in which their 
interrelation is finally clarified, and the interpretative function of  each for the other is 
explored. 
If  it is the case that, in fulfilment of  my initial projection in chapter 2, the practical 
concerns of  CD III/4 fit broadly, mutatis mutandis, the idea that the practice of  responsibility 
is the embedding in lived-life of  the substantive account of  responsibility, then it will also 
confirm one of  the suggestions with which I introduced this study: that the specifically 
ethical sections of  the Dogmatics ought to be read together within an appropriate 
hermeneutical framework because in so doing Barth’s notion of  human responsibility can be 
shown to be coherent and ethically valuable.  
 W.A. Whitehouse argues that the introduction of  a detailed discussion of  freedom is what distinguishes 299
Barth from other Protestant ethics of  the twentieth century. See his, “The Command of  God the Creator,” in 
The Authority of  Grace: Essays in Response to Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1981), 54.
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4.2 Freedom and Responsibility 
Barth introduces § 52 with the problem of  the goodness of  human conduct. He inquires 
about the goodness of  the actions of  a person who is not God, when the Christian tradition 
acknowledges that God alone is good (Mark 10:18). Barth’s short answer, “that man’s action 
is good in so far as it is sanctified by the Word of  God which as such is the command of  
God” , is unpacked throughout this part-volume. “Sanctified” human action is 300
commanded human action. This statement suggests that the onus of  sanctification rests with 
God, but it must be held in tension with Barth’s emphasis on human obedience: “the hearing 
and obeying which proceeds from and by the Word of  God is man’s sanctification. Ethics 
has to understand the Word of  God as the fullness, measure and source of  his 
sanctification.” The command does sanctify, and therefore make good, but the human agent 
must also of  herself  freely act in accordance with the commanding Word.  
 The argument of  § 36-39 is partly repeated here: the command of  God is 
liberating.  It is the means by which humans are sanctified, set free for God and 301
humanized, and so free to be the moral agents they are intended to be by divine 
determination. Barth writes,  
the command is God’s judgement upon him; the judgement of  His grace by which 
man is at once condemned and acquitted and thus becomes free for eternal life. This 
freeing of  man for eternal life by God’s judging grace is the final goal, the real work 
and therefore the original purpose of  the command of  God. It is man’s 
sanctification. Good human action is action set free by the command of  God.  302
Barth understands his conceptual consideration of  the relationship between the command, 
sanctification, and human freedom leading to concrete consideration of  the actuality of  
human activity in a natural progression from the concerns of  general ethics (as I shall argue 
the substantive account of  human responsibility) to the concrete moments of  human action 
(in the practice of  responsibility). He writes:  
 CD III/4, 4.300
 CD II/2, 634. Barth is picking up themes found in CD II/2 § 36 regarding the difficulty of  reckoning with 301
human sanctification as “effected by the action of  God in His command” seemingly without the involvement 
of  active human agents. The task of  § 36 was to explore how it is so in Barth’s mapping of  the ethical field 
and in so doing to outline the proper place of  responsible human agency in acceptance of  the command. 
 CD III/4, 5.302
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if  then the outworking and shaping of  man’s sanctification by the command of  God 
in man’s real action is a problem of  ethics, this necessarily means that ethics becomes 
concrete, particular, or special ethics…it now follows the work of  grace and the 
Word and command of  God into the distinctive lowlands of  real human action and 
therefore into the sphere of  concrete human volition, decision, action, and 
abstention.  303
An important feature of  the turn to the concrete is the refinement of  Barth’s critique 
of  “systematic casuistry” and his perception of  its claim to deliver universal ethical 
insight.  Barth distinguishes between the discourse of  systematic casuistry and the 304
deliberative mechanism of  practical casuistry. The processes of  the latter are appropriate to 
deliberation in the midst of  encounter with the divine command, and are considered good 
practice for the responsible human agent. But its systematic counterpart is considered 
prescriptive of  the content of  the Command.  
Barth’s approach addresses concreteness and particularity head-on by considering the 
imperatival value of  the context in which a person must be responsible. Though proponents 
of  casuistry are often critical of  Barth’s ethics for its lack of  concreteness, Barth’s counter-
critique is that systematic casuistry makes little of  the particularity of  ethical situations 
instead emphasising the universality of  the divine will, i.e. the texture of  the moment lends 
nothing to our understanding of  the command - though it may affect its application. 
Universal laws, by their very universality, detract from the absolute particularity of  each 
moment thus distorting our understanding of  what is required. For Barth it implies a lack of  
confidence in the Holy Spirit as moral guide.  The command and will of  God is regarded 305
as prescribed legal text: scripture, natural law, and tradition supply the elements of  our 
understanding of  the divine will’s content – though with various taxonomies operative 
amongst those elements in different shades of  the tradition. Barth’s problem is that this 
makes a distinction between the actuality of  an ethical situation and the form and content of  
the divine command. The situation itself  does not have an imperatival texture, i.e. it does not 
contain the command. Thus Barth cannot speak of  the command as being truly concrete from 
a casuistic perspective, regardless of  the particularity of  the situation to which it is applied.  
 CD III/4, 6.303
 Nigel Biggar queries any sense in which casuistic ethics claims absolute rights with regard to ethical 304
deliberation. See his “A Case for Casuistry in the Church,” Modern Theology 6, no. 1 (1989): 29-51; “Moral 
Reason in History: An Essay in Defence of  Dialectical Casuistry,” in Issues in Faith and History (Edinburgh: 
Rutherford House, 1989). 
 CD III/4, 7.305
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Practical casuistry on the other hand locates the commanded will of  God in and 
through the particulars of  the concrete situation, recognizing that the command for that 
situation is particular to it. The job of  the responsible human is to interpret and understand 
the situation as the particular and concrete command, and in so doing agree to act 
accordingly (i.e. responsibly). Only in this can the responsible human agent be engaged in 
properly concrete and particular action. 
Barth offers three theological rebuttals of  systematic casuistry. Firstly, it contradicts 
God’s grace and makes the human agent lord instead of  God - claiming to know the 
command and will of  God aside from practical interaction with God. It does so because, for 
example, practitioners of  casuistic ethics need not pray as part of  ethical deliberation: i.e. 
there is no necessity for dynamic interaction with God whose will it is that such people claim 
to know. Secondly, systematic casuistry abstracts the command and will of  God as it reifies it 
thus making it a rule or principle waiting for application rather than the living Word of  the 
living God made known in its particularity. Thirdly, and most importantly for what Barth will 
say about human agency and responsibility, systematic casuistry contributes to the 
destruction of  proper human freedom. Barth distinguishes between freedom as 
individualistic and self-concerned “choice, preference, or selection”  and what he calls the 306
human being’s “real freedom”. This is the actual voluntary freedom of  the creature to be 
governed by the divine Word – to be obedient – in the actual concrete and particular 
circumstances of  her life and as such discover her proper creatureliness. For Barth, to talk 
about freedom means to speak of  concrete acts of  obedience and responsibility.  
Freedom and obedience here mean the voluntary confession of  God and the offering 
of  oneself  to God in the particularity of  ones life situations, continually and momentarily, 
and in so doing the proper realisation of  oneself  as creature and not Creator; the fulfilment 
of  one’s created determination. We have seen something of  this in the Muenster/Bonn cycle 
already. Casuistic ethics, Barth charges, “conceals…direct responsibility” from the creature, 
which is the proper characteristic of  his free conduct before God. In saying this he repeats 
the charge levelled against natural theology in CD II/1. From this we can conclude that 
Barth regards casuistic ethics as the ethical manifestation of  the natural theology, and 
therefore it is fundamentally theologically flawed.  
Barth’s concern for concreteness and particularity in free and responsible activity is 
not to argue against the substantive account of  responsibility given in CD II/2 but to see 
particularity as corollary of  it. The human creature only knows herself  as such in the 
concrete and particular moment of  knowing it. The discourse of  special ethics does not 
 CD III/4, 13.306
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promise the content of  the divine command but instead is a “formed reference” to the 
circumstances in which the command will be heard and its content responsibly enacted.  
“Formed reference” is a frequently used term in the introductory paragraph and 
expressed in various ways throughout the part-volume. “Form” indicates concreteness of  
our creaturely reality in which the command is heard - grounded in a concrete situation and 
event. It is opposed to a “formless reference” , i.e. one abstracted from particularity and 307
concerned only with generalities. A formed reference allows the discourse of  special ethics 
to serve as “preparational instruction” for the responsible Christian, what Barth also calls 
“training in Christianity” , enabling the concrete practice of  responsibility. It is because 308
special ethics is instruction and training that the theological mapping of  the ethical field is 
essential in CD II/2. Barth can construct formed references to the divine command, and in 
so doing prepare Christians to hear the command of  God, because of  a thorough-going 
Christology. Again, we encountered this in the previous chapter. 
4.3 Responsibility in Respect of  God, § 53 
Matthew Rose comments regarding this section that “what is remarkable about Barth’s 
account of  our freedom for God…is his strong argument that the most fundamental of  
human activities are in some sense liturgical.”  In using this term Rose is arguing that the 309
first concrete activities Barth cites – observation of  the Holy Day , confession, and prayer 310
– are those worshipful acts that are “appropriate to human beings by virtue of  the fact that 
they are human” and as such those actions which consummate our humanity.  In 311
considering responsibility in respect of  God, we turn now to consider the practice of  
responsibility in those things which make us fundamentally and fully human  from which 312
all other concrete forms of  the practice of  responsibility take their cue and in which 
humanity is appropriately orientated in relation to God and therefore itself. 
 CD III/4, 18.307
 CD III/4, 3.308
 Rose, God, Metaphysics, and Morals, 149.309
 Barth does not refer to Sunday, Sonntag, or Saturday, Samstag, in this regard though certainly the Sabbath 310
idea is in his mind when he references the Decalogue. He does not use language of  Sabbath, Sabbat, much at 
all, though in several places the English translators have opted to translate the more colourful language of  
festival and celebration that Barth does use – Feiertag – as Sabbath. In modern German, Feiertag is commonly 
translated as ‘Bank Holiday’ but literally means ‘celebration day’. In parts of  the English edition, including the 
section title, it is given as ‘Holy Day’, and for ease this is how I translate it throughout, noting the places 
where I have changed the quirks of  the English edition.
 Rose, God, Metaphysics, and Morals, 149.311
 What Barth called “humanizing actions” in the Muenster/Bonn cycle: Ethics, 250 (Ethik I, 424).312
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 Barth introduces this paragraph by reminding his readers that “it is the will of  God 
the Creator that man as His creature should be responsible before Him.” He extends this 
description by saying that, 
To be a man means to be caught up in responsibility before God. This responsibility 
implies man’s acknowledgement that God his Creator is in the right in all He does – 
in His governance and judgement as well as in His gentleness and goodness, and His 
silence as well as in His speaking, in His anger as well as in His love; and it means that 
he may entrust himself  wholly to God and render obedience to Him alone.  313
But in reiterating this point about the cosmic standing of  human creatures before God, 
something already discussed in CD II/2 as I have shown in the previous chapter, Barth is 
not trying to avoid the concrete questions of  responsible human action. He continues, 
The same responsibility before God which is in fact the one and all that God claims 
from man is also one particular thing which, as such, stands alongside other divine 
claims. Hence it must not be regarded as only embracing and accompanying 
everything else as a general theme, but rather as constituting at the same time a 
particular theme.  314
The theological description of  responsibility I have been pursuing in the previous chapter is 
clearly implied in the above discussion. But the concreteness of  the commanded human life 
means that responsibility before God is also a particular theme enacted in particular 
instances and concrete moments of  action that are directed Godward.  Responsibility 315
before God means that some particular task is ours to perform in concreto. The command of  
God to which we make our response is therefore the mandatum Dei concretissimum. Barth is 
clearly aware of  the incongruity that presents in a theological ethics that emphasises both the 
sovereignty of  the content of  the command as it remains free from (Barth’s understanding 
of) casuistic considerations, and also his own theological discourse on ethics which deals 
with the concreteness of  human responsibility. What he offers are “approximations” to the 
 CD III/4, 47 (KD III/4, 51).313
 CD III/4, 47 (KD III/4, 52).314
 Barth is critical of  some parts of  the Protestant tradition that emphasise indirect worship of  God through 315
social action or serving the Church. He cites Ritschl, Soe, and Brunner in this regard, and marshals the 
double-love command (Mark 12:29ff) to show that God is a proper object of  human action distinct from 
others. See CD III/4, 48-49.
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concrete command, without pretending to absolute knowledge of  its content.  These 316
approximations give us indicative examples of  Barth’s understanding of  our responsibility 
before God as it is embedded in the actuality of  lived human lives, and contribute to the 
pedagogical formation to which he refers in § 52. 
 There are three areas in which the human agent is called to concrete and particular 
responsible action that is directed Godward: keeping the Holy Day, confession, and 
prayer.  317
4.3.1 The Holy Day 
Keeping the Holy Day is a particular act of  “regular observance of  a definite portion 
of  time…the most comprehensive form of  [the human creature’s] special responsibility 
before God.”  The particularity of  observing a whole day and acting on that day in 318
accordance with its meaning is the primary example of  the Godward practice of  
responsibility. The Holy Day is, for Barth, the first thing to be said within special ethics 
because it is “the end, the beginning, and the interruption” of  human work.  It is to be 319
understood broadly as a commandment – the “Sabbath Commandment”, das Feiertagsgebot – 
by virtue of  its relatively lengthy inclusion in the Decalogue. Barth’s is a theological reading 
of  Genesis 1 and 2, and Exodus 20: the Holy Day is the eschatological symbol of  the 
consummation of  all human work in the rest of  God at week’s end. But the Holy Day is also 
the beginning of  the week. For Barth this liminality is important: at the beginning of  the 
week the Holy Day indicates that before human beings were given work they were given rest, 
and this rest is symbolic of  the grace of  God which called them into being; at the end of  the 
week it provides an eschatological horizon for human life (Heb. 4:1-11).  
With the commencement of  human work, book-ended weekly by the Holy Day, there 
is also across the span of  our lives continual interruption of  human work by the Holy Day – 
human beings cease from human work for the purpose of  the peculiar human task of  
devotion to God. As a symbol of  the whole gospel narrative, the Holy Day stands to 
constantly remind human creatures of  the omnipotent grace of  God and in so doing to 
 CD III/4, 48 (KD III/4, 53).316
 In his account of  these, Rose refers to the observation of  the Holy Day as “worship” in contradistinction 317
from confession and prayer. Barth does not do this. Rose refers to these works collectively as “religious 
actions” or “doxological actions” presumably as opposed to non-religious actions. Again this is not Barth’s 
phraseology. I suspect it comes from Rose’s desire to read Barth from the perspective of  the Roman Catholic 
tradition’s naturalistic emphasis that particularizes the religious in amongst the sacred natural. See his Ethics 
With Barth: God, Metaphysics, and Morals, 146, 148, 151, 152.
 CD III/4, 73 (KD III/4, 79).318
 CD III/4, 50 (KD III/4, 55).319
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scupper any bent towards self-sufficiency in their work. It is a “renunciation [Entsagung] of  
man [and] a renunciation of  himself, of  all that he thinks and wills and affects and 
achieves”.  Considering the Feiertagsgebot this way is not to contradict his earlier critique of  320
casuistry – the “particularity of  the Sabbath Commandment… [cannot] be reduced to 
general rules, thus telling the individual indirectly what is his obedience to this 
commandment”.  Rather, Barth’s instructions on the Holy Day are understood to “aid the 321
proper human hearing of  God’s command” not preclude it. He takes the general command 
to observe the Holy Day for the above purposes as his starting point, and argues that its 
content, i.e. what we ought to do with it, is the content of  the particular command to each 
person. Observance of  the Holy Day in this way is “a holy exercise” of  particular and 
concrete responsibility, “of  the special responsibility towards [God] which belongs to each 
human being.”  322
4.3.2 Confession 
Though the Holy Day is the primary example of  the practice of  Godward 
responsibility, Barth cautions that “it takes other forms as well”, in particular “the invitation 
and obligation of  man to bear express witness to God…[as it] concerns a man’s mouth, 
tongue, lips, talking, and speaking.”  This is Barth’s summary of  the practice of  323
responsibility in the free act of  confession. Confession here is the execution of  a Christian’s 
willingness to bear witness to God, and as such “the execution of  special responsibility”  324
before God. Barth writes, 
It is certainly true, though almost too true, that God claims for His praise and witness 
man’s life in all the length or brevity of  its time and in all its expressions. But it is 
even more true, or at least it is to be noted more urgently in an ethical context, that 
this is also a matter of  single and concrete human actions. A man’s praise of  God, 
and therefore his confession and witness to Him, is often enough recounted in the 
Bible as the simple moment of  a particular history…and…it will be realised in 
definite moments of  our own history.    325
 CD III/4, 59 (KD III/4, 64).320
 CD III/4, 65  (KD III/4, 71).321
 CD III/4, 73 (KD III/4, 80).322
 CD III/4, 73-75 (KD III/4, 80).323
 CD III/4, 73 (KD III/4, 80).324
 CD III/4, 74-5 (KD III/4, 81)325
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In this way, the Christian witness becomes “a responsible partner” of  God. Their 
responsibility lies in the practice of  witness-bearing in real and particular moments of  
speech and action to the covenant of  God with humanity in Christ. “Man is responsible for 
this.”  This responsibility means particular activity. “A confessor…”, says Barth, “…is one 326
who is not ashamed to do something…”  Confession as a responsibility of  the human 327
creature before God takes the form of  concrete and particular “free” speech which is 
directed Godward.  It is not however, the same as prayer. 328
  
 4.3.3 Prayer 
Barth suggests that prayer is also a special and particular instance of  human 
Godward responsibility. It is not an attitude nor a kind of  spirituality, but an actual temporal, 
particular, and concrete activity that “must take concrete form in individual moments and 
specific actions.”  It is, therefore, a matter of  the practice of  responsibility. 329
[Prayer]…is not a matter of  mere existence, of  a mood, of  surrender to a feeling. In 
all circumstances prayer is also a matter of  man’s responsibility before God, a 
responsibility fulfilled in the particular that man has recourse to God in prayer and 
encounters Him as one who prays…  330
It is responsibility grounded in the freedom that comes from the command of  God: “the 
real basis of  prayer is man’s freedom before God, the God-given permission to pray which, 
because it is given by God, becomes a command and order and therefore a necessity”.  As 331
with the Holy Day and confession, prayer has a humanizing effect for the Christian: “in 
prayer, all masks and camouflages fall away” and we stand before God in our creaturely 
 CD III/4, 75.326
 CD III/4, 78.327
 CD III/4, 85.328
 CD III/4, 88-89.329
 CD III/4, 89.330
 CD III/4, 92.331
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reality as those who petition Him  and, though as creatures we pray falteringly, we are 332
guaranteed to be heard since “what we do badly is made good by His grace.”    333
  
4.3.4 Summary 
That human responsibility before God means very definitely concrete human action 
should now be obvious. Moreover, responsible actions are enacted in a Godward direction. 
Barth describes quite vividly what responsibility before God might look like: human agents, 
freed by the gracious command of  God, live lives in which God’s presence is recognized in 
the performance of  particular activities; in which they set aside time each week to encounter 
God afresh in the gospel narrative; in which they confess with their mouths their 
relationship to the God who encounters humanity in Jesus Christ; and in which they pray to 
Him in both good times and bad. This is not an abstract description of  human 
responsibility, but relates to real people walking around: Barth expects that this kind of  
responsibility in respect of  God can be seen in the lives of  worshiping, confessing, and 
praying Christians.  
That this account of  Godward responsibility presupposes the earlier theological 
description of  CD II/2 should also be obvious. There I argued that responsibility names our 
particular location in relation to God: through the covenant actualised in Christ we have 
been determined and situated as ethical agents, and as such are permitted to know and 
understand that agency only as we turn attention to the covenant, and therefore to Christ. In 
the indicative acts of  responsibility discussed above, we see how Barth maintains that Christ-
centred account of  responsibility, and makes it ontically viable by ensuring human agents 
maintain the Godward orientation through prayer, sabbath observation, and confession.   
4.4 Responsibility in Respect of  Other Human Agents, § 54 
In his short commentary on CD III/4, Otto Weber suggests that Barth’s emphasis on 
humanity, Mitmenschlichkeit, in § 54, “Freedom in Fellowship”, is a development in which “he 
had taken over…the concept of  analogia relationis” to explain “the fact that God did not 
 CD III/4, 97.332
 CD III/4, 101. Barth raises the question of  how prayerful petitions are received by God whilst maintaining 333
the integrity of  the petition and the continuity of  God’s will. He remarks that “the intervention of  Jesus 
Christ and the Holy Spirit…makes our human asking a movement in the cycle which goes out from God and 
returns to God”. Therefore, “under Christ’s leadership and responsibility…[God] can give to the requests of  
His creature a place in His will.” See CD III/4, 101, 107, 109; KD III/4. Prayer as a practice of  human 
responsibility is encompassed and enabled by Christ’s responsibility as the one who is both divine and human. 
See also John McDowell, “‘Openness to the World’: Karl Barth’s Evangelical Theology of  Christ as the Pray-
er,” Modern Theology 25 (2009): 253-283;  and John McDowell, “Prayer: Particularity, and the Subject of  Divine 
Personhood: Who are Brunner and Barth Invoking When They Pray?,” in Trinitarian Theology After Barth, ed. 
Myk Habets and Phillip Tolliday (Eugene: Pickwick, 2011), 255-283.
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intend himself  to be a lonely God and that correspondingly man’s creation in the image of  
God…consists in his ‘co-humanity’”.  This point about living socially has been repeated 334
more recently, and in different ways, by Paul Matheny , Joseph Mangina , and Matthew 335 336
Rose . It is an important observation that human solidarity and responsibility in respect of  337
one another is grounded in the divine responsibility for us; it follows from the close relation 
we observed in §§ 36-39 between divine and human responsibility. Barth considers the 
fellowship of  humanity a natural corollary of  responsibility in respect of  God. “[The human 
agent’s] ordination to be in covenant relation with God has its counterpart in the fact that 
his humanity, the special mode of  his being, is by nature and essence a being in fellow-
humanity.”  As Paul Jewett writes of  Barth’s account, “Since God is no Deus solitarius, but 338
the Deus triunus, i.e. God in relationship, there is no possibility that Man, who is in His 
likeness, should be homo solitarius.”  The human creature is not given to a solitary life, but 339
one in which her humanity is properly realized in the fellowship of  all human creatures. The 
affirmation of  humanity in fellowship is part of  the practice of  responsibility in respect of  
other human agents. Again, Jewett writes, “[God] gives him, invites him, commands him, not 
only to receive his humanity as his nature but to affirm it as humanity-in-fellowship by his 
own decision and responsibility.”  340
Unlike responsibility in respect of  God, where particular forms of  Godward 
observance were considered, the practice of  responsibility in respect of  other human agents 
falls into three particular spheres of  relationship.  The practice of  responsibility in respect 341
of  co-humanity is fulfilled in these three spheres: the relationship between men and women; 
between parents and children; and between near and distant neighbours.  
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Emphasis added.
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 Continuing the trajectory of  the Muenster/Bonn cycle, where the subject of  the practice of  responsibility 341
was human relationships with God and one another.
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 4.4.1 Men and Women 
It is key to Barth’s theological anthropology that the single co-humanity of  male and 
female reflects the imago Dei. The divine image is not found only in men to the exclusion of  
women, but in the fellowship of  the two.  Sexed human co-existence is a gift of  God in 342
creation  requiring from human beings responsible actions. Barth explores this idea in an 343
extended description of  male female relations, both platonic and amorous.   344
As he did in the Muenster/Bonn cycle, Barth instructs men and women that they are 
to live in mutual responsibility.  The terms of  this responsibility are framed slightly 345
differently from in the earlier text. In his later theological anthropology Barth recognizes 
that the differentiation of  the sexes is a form of  conflict – “each sex has to realise that it is 
questioned by the other” - but finds in this conflicting relationship something constructive. 
He writes, “the question challenges both man and woman to act in responsibility to each 
other. As they consider one another and necessarily realise that they question each other, 
they become mutually, not the law of  each other’s being…but the measure or criterion of  
their inner right to live in their sexual difference.”  The responsibility men and women have 346
in respect of  one another is the fulfilment of  their created determination as male and 
female, enabling the other to do the same. There is an implicit complementarity here: 
maleness is located in both its distinction from and inner connection to femaleness, and vice 
versa. Fulfilling their sexuality is therefore the “reciprocal responsibility” that human beings 
owe to one another, what Barth also calls their “mutual responsibility.”  Matthew Rose 347
highlights the significance of  this when he writes, 
Sexual difference is therefore charged with ethical significance; our created bodily 
forms are not morally indifferent. God created us male and female and commands us 
 This is a précis of  CD III/2, in particular § 45.3, “Humanity as Likeness and Hope.” 342
 Barth writes, “his creatureliness is to be male or female, male and female, and human in this distinction and 343
connection.” CD III/2, 286. Emphasis added.
 Barth’s account of  co-humanity is novel in that it does not focus primarily on marital relations or sexual 344
encounter. He writes, “…the sexual relationship is notoriously capable of  transformation and sublimation. It, 
too, is only a dimension and component of  the whole encounter of  man and woman, and alongside it there is 
in greater or lesser proximity to others… Coitus without commitment is demonic.” CD III/4, 133.
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to live as males or females. He commands humans in and through their sexual 
differentiation and his law presupposes and acknowledges sexual integrality.  348
The practice of  responsibility will look different for women than for men. The responsible 
female must live in the fullness of  her sexual distinction, and vice versa.  Barth fleshes this 349
out a little by discussing marriage as symbolic of  the responsibility sexed humans reciprocate 
to one another.  350
 In marriage the man and the woman bear separate and distinct responsibilities toward 
one another as they are ordered to one another in their sexual difference. The male has a 
particular “responsibility to live with woman as an heir together of  the grace of  life… and to 
treat her as the fellow creature without whom he himself  could not be a man… with whom 
he stands or falls… This is man’s special responsibility.”  The man’s role is understood as 351
one of  “service”.  The woman too “has her own responsibility” in this relationship: she 352
“will never let herself  be pushed into the role of  compliant wife…she will endorse the 
strength of  the strong man which is the strength of  his sense of  responsibility and 
service”.  It is unclear what Barth is practically advocating: he is reluctant to say much 353
about what the married man and the married woman should do in concreto in order to fulfil 
their sexuality for one another. As for responsibility in respect of  God, it is clear for Barth 
 Rose, Ethics With Barth: God, Metaphysics, and Morals, 154-155. Though I cite Rose favourably here, he goes 348
on to argue a few lines later that the moral deductions we might make from this observation are that “human 
beings should be faithful to their nature and duties indicated by it.” Whilst this is partly true for Barth, Rose 
evades talk about phenomenal human nature in contradistinction from real human nature which is the 
conceptual framework underlying Barth’s own discussion in CD III, provided in part by CD II/2. For a 
(slightly) more balanced view see, Hans Mikkelsen, Reconciled Humanity: Karl Barth in Dialogue (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2010), chap. 5. 
 It is a frustration that Barth does not give clear guidelines as to what maleness and femaleness is, beyond 349
some brief  remarks about psychology and biology. Rather sexual difference is considered worthy of  
comment because it is an observable aspect of  God’s creative work, the definition of  which exists only in the 
fact that men and women are distinct in their reciprocal responsibility for one another. Even Rose recognizes 
the “perplexity” of  this: “Barth is convinced that this cannot require upholding any particular masculine or 
feminine standards, and his sexual ethics does not prescribe what it means to be individually male or female.” 
God, Metaphysics, and Morals, 159.
 Jewett expresses frustration with Barth’s handling of  marriage as an incidence in the male-female 350
relationship. He suggests that the argument “suffers…not only from the occasional overstatement, but also 
from complexity – even confusion – as the argument unfolds since he constantly shifts the subject of  the 
discourse from Man’s creation as male and female to the institution of  marriage with its roles of  husband and 
wife.” Man as Male and Female, 46. 
 CD III/4, 175. In this particular section Barth appears to advocating sexist views about subordination of  351
the woman to the man, and male headship, in the context of  Christ’s giving himself  for the Church. This is 
not, however, a patriarchal treatise: its Christological centre means that Barth’s argument culminates in 
“exhortation to mutual subordination.” 
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 CD III/4, 178-180.353
Page !106
that the responsibility in which humans are placed requires particular actions in keeping with 
the concrete circumstances of  sexual difference. It is also clear that to live in this 
responsibility is liberating – both for oneself  and for the sexual ‘other’. He comments, “the 
life-partnership of  genuine marriage emancipates man as man and woman as woman and 
both in their particularity… the fullness of  this life-partnership consists in the fact that man 
and woman keep in step in this gladly demonstrated and experienced freedom. It is a 
question of  freedom in fellowship, of  the genuine freedom which here as elsewhere is 
identical with responsibility.”  Human responsibility in respect of  one another is first and 354
foremost about acting in ways appropriate to the liberation of  the other, so that woman may 
realize in her life acts the proper determination which is hers by God’s creative act. In so 
doing she is also made free for God and free for the other, and therefore free to be 
responsibly herself. Rose comments that this has a “peculiarly modern shape” that can be 
summarized as “emphasising an ethic of  mutual responsibility and trust.”  355
  
 4.4.2 Parents and Children 
The theme of  responsibility continues in Barth’s discussion of  parents and 
children.  Here we are commonly on more familiar territory with the language of  356
responsibility, since many contemporary manuals talk about “responsible parenting.” Indeed 
Barth, for the most part here, addresses the practice of  responsibility from the perspective 
of  the parents. “The [child] owes its existence to an encounter of  man and woman 
consummated in sexual inter-course”, the corollary of  which is that the parents “are now 
responsible for its existence.”  Responsibility indicates both the historical priority of  the 357
parents in relation to the child, as those whose union has brought the child into being, but is 
also a description of  the ongoing relationship of  the parents and child “as an integral part 
of  their existence”. What governs the parents’ responsibility is not some vague notion of  
family , but the command of  God which leads human agents into the particular 358
 CD III/4, 190-191. Barth goes on to say that “it is primarily the responsibility of  the man that their 354
fellowship should always be and become a fellowship in freedom…” CD III/4, 193. Here the mutuality of  
the subordination breaks down a little in practice, as the male is required to be responsible to woman as the 
one who maintains the proper order of  their relationship. It is perhaps language like this that accounts for the 
manifold critique Barth has received for his views on women. See Alexander McKelway, “Perichoretic 
Possibilities in Barth’s Doctrine of  Male and Female,” Princeton Seminary Bulletin 7, no. 3 (1986), 231-243.
 Rose, God, Metaphysics, and Morals, 158.355
 Though, as Rose notes, “at a high degree of  generality” - Rose, God, Metaphysics and Morals, 162.356
 CD III/4, 240-241.357
 For Barth’s critique of  the concept of  family, and orbiting of  Christian ethics around such a concept, see 358
CD III/4, 242.
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responsibility that belongs to parents. In this instance the command is not concerned with 
the physical generation of  the child from the parents as much as it is “with the certain 
oversight and responsibility with regard to children which this physical relationship implies 
for the parents.”  At its most basic, this oversight and responsibility means that parents are 359
“required to provide for children indispensable guidance in the conduct of  life. Its most 
fundamental responsibility is that of  instruction and the raising up of  children in the training 
and instruction of  the Lord.”  360
 Theologically, the rationale for this responsibility is grounded not in creation per se, 
but in the covenant responsibility that God the Father assumes for his creatures: “the 
superiority which demands this respect [of  parents by their children] consists rather in the 
correspondence of  their parenthood with the being and action of  God.”  Here again, he 361
builds upon the covenant theology and divine responsibility established in CD II/2. Barth 
can therefore suggest that for children their “parents have a Godward aspect.” As such, 362
“parents…are ambassadors of  God and charged with imitating him by loving 
unconditionally”.  The responsibility parents enact for their children is defined by the 363
actions of  God whom the responsible parent will model. “The decisive action for which the 
parents are responsible in relation to their children and which the latter must be content to 
accept is primarily and properly God’s action, which their human action can only attest.”   364
 The aim of  such responsible parenting is to enable the child to stand before God “in 
responsibility to Him as the true and proper Father” and to realize that they are creatures 
and God, “before whom the child is responsible”, is the Creator.  Good parenting 365
therefore seeks “to appeal to the child itself  in its…dawning freedom and responsibility” , 366
to,  
give the child the opportunity to encounter the God who is present, operative, and 
revealed in Jesus Christ, to know Him and to learn to love and fear Him. The greatest 
 CD III/4, 243.359
 Rose, Ethics With Barth: God, Metaphysics, and Morals, 162.360
 CD III/4, 245.361
 Barth is quick to prevent the collapse of  the divine subject into the parents, and maintains a keen 362
distinction between the two as the spiritual life of  the child develops. See CD III/4, 252; KD III/4.
 Rose, God, Metaphysics, and Morals, 162.363
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and the smallest things, the most serious and most trivial, which can happen between 
parents and their children can become for parents an occasion to present to their 
children this opportunity.  367
Parenting contributes to the humanization of  the child as she is given the opportunity to 
encounter her Heavenly Father whose love is symbolized in her parents’ responsible 
action.  “While doing everything which they can and must do within the compass of  their 368
responsibility they can only commit [the child] to the hand of  God from whom they have 
received her [and] to the Holy Spirit of  God who alone is able to make their weak testimony 
efficacious to her…”  369
  
 4.4.3 Neighbours 
The final relational sphere to which Barth attends concerns our neighbours. This 
narrows the focus to geography and to those who are like us and those who are not. Barth is 
concerned with the concrete context in which the commanded creature hears God’s Word: 
as she is found amongst “some form of  race or people group” and is confronted by her own 
people and others who are not her own.  “The command of  the Creator presupposes this 370
social ontology, addressing and claiming human beings as participants in a common life. 
God’s command is directed to us as members of  a particular people group and also as a 
member of  humanity generally.”   371
The history of  a particular human being’s particular people group or race is the 
object of  her responsible activity. “The command of  God sees and affects man as one who 
even in this historical respect belongs to his people.” Barth suggests that this belonging is 
what first demands responsible action from us: the divine determination that we should be 
of  a certain race, time, and geography matters. Here Barth is acutely contextual in his 
account of  the practice of  responsible agency. He makes the point in relation to the 
absoluteness of  God’s sanctifying command: 
The past and present of  his people is no more holy than its language and territory, or 
he himself, God alone is holy. But if  the sanctification of  man by the divine 
 CD III/4, 283.367
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 CD III/4, 284.369
 CD III/4, 287.370
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command is not also the sanctification of  his historical existence, if  his obedience 
does not include his historical responsibility as a member of  this people, it is not 
sanctification.  372
The command sanctifies not only the agent, but the means by which the agent hears the 
command – i.e. her historical location. This is acutely contextual. The responsibility of  the 
commanded human is exercised publicly: “he cannot try to live an aesthetic or a Christian 
life which is private and neutral…” By living, as it were, publicly the human being must 
affirm what is good in the history of  her people, and understand the presuppositions of  her 
people, whilst also at her “own place and time take up and genuinely share the problems of  
the future.” Accepting the constraints of  race, time, and geography, the responsible human is 
able to hear the divine command, to “exercise her own freedom in the constraint thereby 
imposed [by them].”  The exercise of  this freedom will have meaning only in this context 373
as it takes note of  the particularities of  the times and seasons. 
 Barth’s emphasis on the command of  God in this regard is not to the detriment of  
responsibility in respect of  other human beings, but rather is the key to understanding the 
propriety of  responsible practices. Though the practice of  responsibility is directed toward 
other humans, the responsible agent “even in this respect must obey God rather than man 
and his own habits of  thought and ideas and fancies.” Barth continues: “in the share of  
responsibility accepted by [the responsible agent] only that will be right and good which the 
command of  God in all its majesty requires of  him day by day.”  As with responsibility in 374
respect of  sexual difference and parents and children, the overarching schema which makes 
Barth’s understanding of  responsible agency, and the particularity of  the practice of  
responsibility in the sphere of  neighbourliness intelligible, is the divine command and its 
liberating effects: “Barth’s ethics envisages the life of  created beings under the direction of  a 
God who wills their lasting good and happiness.”   375
 4.4.4 Summary 
 Barth’s account of  the practice of  responsibility in respect of  others is more 
circumspect than it is in respect of  God. He does not offer a description of  the concrete 
practices that we undertake regarding other people. The practice of  responsibility here is 
 CD III/4, 295.372
 CD III/4, 295.373
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about the way in which human agents must negotiate the complex relationships that are 
theirs by virtue of  God’s creative activity, and which must be negotiated by virtue of  God’s 
commanding Word. This means that the practice of  responsibility in respect of  others is 
quite open-ended: providing key relationships are regarded and pursued appropriately, the 
particulars of  the responsible agent’s activity are at her discretion. But this discretion is 
informed, as with the rest of  Barth’s ethics, by the vision of  the ethical agent he offers in 
Jesus Christ. Christ as the one in whom the covenant between God and humanity is 
actualised is also the one who shows us what genuine responsibility for the other looks like. 
Once again, we here return to Barth’s earlier discussion of  responsibility in CD II/2, and in 
particular think of  the responsibility which God takes in respect of  humanity. In doing so, 
God becomes responsible to Godself, as Jesus Christ is the genuine responsible agent. Christ 
demonstrates as fully as possible what responsible humanity looks like in respect of  the 
other: attending to their best interest, and enabling them to fulfil their own responsibility 
before God as divinely determined creatures. Such responsibility is self-effacing, and seeks 
the flourishing of  another. 
4.5 Responsibility in Respect of  Self, §§ 55-56 
The final relationship in which a human being engages in the practice of  responsibility is in 
respect of  herself. §§ 53 and 54 explored the vertical and horizontal relationships with God 
and fellow-humanity respectively, but in § 55 Barth turns to discuss the command of  God 
regarding the fact of  life – i.e. that humans are alive and as such must act responsibly. In § 56 
Barth extends this treatment by considering the limitation of  human life, the delimitation of  
responsibility, and the appropriateness of  this limitation for human flourishing.  
  
 4.5.1 § 55 
Barth’s summary of  life under the divine command is a person’s “freedom to treat as 
a loan both the life of  all men with his own and his own with that of  all men.”  Freedom 376
entails accepting that God has determined creatures for life in particular forms and 
inhabiting those forms accordingly. In other words, human freedom is not absolute self-
determination, but the fulfilment of  humanity. That human life is loaned by God means that 
humans should assume that the content and meaning of  their lives are under the direction 
of  the Creator, before whom they are responsible: “each [person] should exist – always in 
orientation to God and solidarity with others – as… a rational creature, attentively, 
unreservedly and loyally confessing his human existence in willing responsibility to the One 
 CD III/4, 335.376
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to whom he owes it.”  The link between active confession and acceptance of  our human 377
existence and our responsibility is important: human responsibility is elicited by God who 
commands and to whom it is owed, it is practiced in the acceptance of  human life in 
adoption of  certain practices that show “loyalty” to that humanity. I understand loyalty here 
both to mean practices that are in keeping with my humanity, and also practices that cause 
my humanity to flourish. 
 A significant and unusual way in which Barth addresses this topic is under the banner 
of  “Respect for Life”.  Respect involves recognition that creaturely life belongs to God 378
from whom it originates, thus imposing on human creatures a need to honour and respect 
non-human creation. This also means responsibility in respect of  my own life: “the world of  
animals and plants forms the indispensible living background to the living space divinely 
allotted to man and placed under his control. As they live, so can he.” There is an intrinsic 
link between human flourishing and responsibility and the proper treatment of  non-human 
creation. Barth argues: “as a living being in co-existence with non-human life, man has to 
think and act responsibly.”   379
As with responsibility in respect of  others, Barth is less prescriptive about what a 
responsible human must do to and for the non-human. Rather he discusses what a 
responsible human must be in that relationship: viz. lord. Lordship is responsibility exercised 
by the human creature in relation to the non-human animals, and plants , and 380
differentiated in respect of  each. Human creatures are lords by divine will and command, 
and as such are made responsible for the non-human by divine command.  
 In respect of  non-human animals, the practice of  responsible lordship has particular 
meaning. It must prevent “human stupidity, severity, caprice, and irrationality” by 
emphasising “gratitude to God…translated into careful, considerate, friendly and above all 
understanding treatment of  [non-human animals] in which sympathetic account is taken of  
its needs and limits…”  This is not however an argument for vegetarianism. It is the basic 381
responsibility that the human has for the non-human animal as part of  the divine command 
to respect life. This may also involve “a qualified and also enhanced responsibility”  to take 382
 CD III/4, 341.377
 CD III/4, 324-397.378
 CD III/4, 350.379
 CD III/4, 351. Barth’s discussion of  plants is very brief. He argues unequivocally that human beings “may 380
and should” use plants for food. “Man’s vegetable nourishment…is not the destruction of  vegetation but a 
sensible use of  its superfluity.” He makes this point following a short exposition of  Genesis 1:28.
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the life of  an animal, “knowing that it does not belong to him but to God, and that in killing 
it he surrenders it to God in order to receive back from Him as something he needs and 
desires…”  The permission is granted only in as far as humans taking non-human lives do 383
so in gratitude to God who gives the non-human for human sustenance. Non-human 
animals remain a commodity in Barth’s thought, to be used by responsible humans for food 
and clothing – hence the proper treatment of  creation is a concern for responsibility in 
respect of  self  both as the use of  creation causes human beings to flourish, but also as 
creation is properly regarded by human agents with gratitude and joy we are orientated 
appropriately to the God who is Creator. 
 Another theme is responsibility as human social activity. This impinges directly on 
responsibility in respect of  self  as one’s agency contributes to the force of  social activity. In 
terms of  the practice of  responsibility it means active concern for several social factors: 
health ; happiness ; and promotion of  life - including consideration of  abortion , self  384 385 386
defence , capital punishment, and warfare.  These concerns are pursued in concrete 387 388
activities that enable human flourishing in each of  the named areas. Rose, in his brief  
commentary on this section, argues that regard for these factors – or as he calls them 
“goods” – is basic to human flourishing because the “basic human goods of  life serve 
human existence in the form of  a loaned capacity or vitality necessary to exercise integral 
human flourishing.”  Beyond this, Barth is concerned for the Christian social context – i.e. 389
the Church – within wider society and the responsibility in respect of  self  that participation 
in that particular community involves.  This particular social distinction is worth noting in 390
respect of  responsibility to self. 
 Participation in the Christian community is “at the head of  the concretion of  the 
active life demanded by the command of  God” . In the phrase “active life” Barth intends 391
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the creaturely freedom and responsibility that the command of  God elicits: that life is both 
given and imposed on humans, and as such must be accepted, means it must, as we have 
seen already, be treated with respect. By prefacing the term with the qualifier “concretion” 
Barth intends that free, respectful, responsibility consists in particular acts of  service that 
contribute to the life of  the Christian community. He writes, “Each is responsible for what 
the community either is or is not in itself…for its health or sickness.”  Using the language 392
is this way does not mean that the Church is a human construct with no spiritual meaning or 
power, but that we participate in its life in very concrete and mundane ways. Human 
responsibility pertains to these things: “It should be pondered that the responsibility of  each 
for his own particular action is of  such tremendous weight and importance because it 
derives from his faith, and his faith from his perception of  the Kingdom of  God.”  My 393
responsibility to participate appropriately in the life of  the Christian community is grounded 
in the faith which I own by God’s grace and which is sustained by the ongoing participation 
in the life of  the Church, whose life is also a gift of  grace: “The Christian is not free to 
adopt any current religious idea…and then to urge this upon the community. On the other 
hand he is both free and yet also summoned and obliged to reflect on the Word which 
underlies the community and is to be declared by it, giving responsible expression to his 
reflections.”  The sort of  responsibility in respect of  self  that participation in the Church 394
entails involves critical ownership of  the Church’s faith and confession; of  internalization 
and personal reflection. In so doing the individual member is properly responsible in respect 
of  the life of  the whole community and so of  her own life. 
 4.5.2 §56 
 The second aspect of  responsibility in respect of  self  concerns the limitation God 
places on human beings. “This limit is both individual in a specific form for each man, and 
universal as the one great limit of  His will as Creator and Lord which He has set for all.”  395
In both cases it concerns the will and determination of  God for the individual as it is 
revealed in the divine command for that time and place, and also the willingness and actual 
activity of  the individual as she acts in accordance with that will thus making it her own will 
and freedom. Hence it is responsibility in respect of  self  as it pertains to the fulfilment of  
one’s created determination in the free decision and choice to so act. 
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 Not least amongst Barth’s considerations in this regard is death: “to consider that we 
shall die means, in contrast to all attempts at evasion, to accept oneself.”  This final 396
limitation means that the responsibility with which my life is currently endowed is serious 
and unique. The fact that in death we move to a final and fulfilled encounter with God is 
important for Barth: the knowledge that “the Lord is the frontier to which we move…gives 
my transience its seriousness and responsibility.”  It is because we shall meet God that we 397
are responsible: not through a sense of  needing to impress or for fear of  judgement (Barth’s 
notion of  divine judgement stands at the beginning and not the end of  ethical deliberation, 
liberating us for the course ahead) but because life is a movement with its terminus in God. 
That things will one day not be in their present form is part of  the eschatological horizon of  
Christian discipleship. It also contributes to the sense of  uncertainty that has followed 
Barth’s notion of  responsibility through these §§ 53-55. The pedagogical structure of  CD 
III/4 means that Barth never provides a final certain answer to the question what should we 
do? The responsible agent lives under the conviction of  her encounter with God in and 
through the command, and in the midst of  Christian and non-Christian community. The 
final answer is always with God alone: the frontier toward which we move. 
 It is in this context that Barth discusses the notion of  vocation.  This is a theme I 398
have already discussed in Chapter 2 as it appears in the Muenster/Bonn cycle. Much of  the 
discussion in CD III/4 can be seen to be prefigured by the discussion in the early text. 
Nonetheless, it is still worthy of  note as it relates to the practice of  responsibility here. 
Vocation is not the same as “divine summons” in Barth’s mind. The latter is the work of  the 
divine command, the former is “the old thing which the man already is, which he has behind 
him, or rather which he brings with him, as the new comes to him.” In this case, citing 
Bonhoeffer, Barth argues that a person’s vocation is their particularity now claimed for the 
new particularity issued in the command and as such, “vocation is the place of  
responsibility.”  By this Barth means vocation is a place of  extreme particularity both 399
because the content of  the command which encounters an individual at any time and place is 
particular, but also because the history of  life and encounters which an individual brings 
with her to that moment is also particular and peculiarly hers. Her responsibility in the face 
of  the divine command is thus also entirely particular, and must take all aspects of  vocation 
into account as well as the content of  the divine summons.  
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The vocation of  man is always the terminus ad quo of  his obedience. He cannot begin 
elsewhere than here. But he can only begin here. His vocation is the limited place of  
responsibility at which he must always be found. Yet it can be only the place of  his 
responsibility. Man is in no sense responsible to his vocation; he is wholly responsible 
to God alone.  400
It is the terminus of  her obedience because vocation is the sum of  her history in the midst of  
divine encounter. The responsible agent cannot be concerned with the past in that moment, 
“it is for God to decide how well or how badly she has discharged responsibility of  her 
previous way” , but must be concerned for how she will act in the present: “we can only be 401
those who are affected by the claim and responsibility of  this hour as though it were first 
and last.”  Barth makes this point particularly clear when he considers the significance of  402
age. The young man must not think that his present decisions can be made in the absence of  
responsibility because of  his youthfulness – i.e. because “they are followed by many other 
situations with new chances and possibilities” . Nor must the old man fall into the trap of  403
repeating previous answers to the divine command, acting in accordance with earlier 
responsibilities “as if  it were possible to freeze or solidify at the point where the river of  
responsibility should flow more torrentially than ever…”   404
 Barth continues his warning by re-emphasising the Godward orientation of  
responsibility, even in respect of  self. Personal vocation and the particularity of  the divine 
summons means that the free actions of  any given individual are enacted “in primary 
responsibility to God, and only secondary responsibility to the situation.” This means that 
even in the peculiarity of  her vocation and life history, at the moment of  encounter a person 
“is not handed over to the historical situation…but in occupying it bears responsibility for 
what will be made of  it and what it will or will not mean in relation to that of  others.”  405
Responsibility in respect of  self, still orientated towards God, permits agency to the 
individual that is potent and meaningful as it shapes her own history and therefore informs 
her future: “the vocation of  a man as such, as it is to be understood as a decree of  God, 
 CD III/4, 607.400
 CD III/4, 608.401
 CD III/4, 609.402
 CD III/4, 611.403
 CD III/4, 615.404
 CD III/4, 623.405
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must also be understood as man’s answer to the divine calling, as a result of  his attitude to 
the command of  God.”  Barth’s contention is that actions in accordance with the divine 406
will have a more positive effect on the future history than those in opposition to it.      407
  
 4.5.3 Conclusion 
 Responsibility in respect of  self  does not mean self-care in the way that modern 
pastoral care programs might suggest. Its two pronged focus involves the place of  the 
responsible agent in social matrix as well as the peculiarities of  the special intention that 
God wills for each person. This means that responsibility in respect of  self  is not about self-
concern, but about living life well – and for Barth this means being concerned for the divine 
will and my own vocation in that as it impacts my choices and actions - enabling and eliciting 
my own flourishing. Human sociality is a created given: to be involved in that is a necessity 
for Barth. To do so well is the stuff  of  responsibility. The same is true of  fulfilment of  
vocation in the time that God gives me to live. Responsibility in respect of  self  therefore 
means acting in correspondence with the divine will for my life as it is given to me and 
forced upon me in the context in which I find myself: “God does His work as Creator with 
the intention that man should respond by doing his work as creature.”  This is intensely 408
practical, but is informed at all points by the theological description of  human responsibility 
I have so far been discussing. 
  
4.6 Conclusion 
The practice of  responsibility for the agent has three clear directions: Godward; other-ward; 
and self-ward. These three are co-temporal, and constant. Though context may delineate 
times when one is clearly more pressing than another, the responsible human agent practices 
responsibility always in these three directions. That is not to say that there is no order of  
priority, however. Godward responsibility – observing the Holy Day, confession, and prayer 
– orientates and enables responsibility in the other two respects. It reminds and establishes 
us in our relationships with others – the opposite sex, parents, neighbours – as responsible 
fellow creatures, and to ourselves – through the practice of  self-care portrayed externally – 
as those whose life is not our own (1 Cor. 6:19-20). It is also much more clearly expressed 
 CD III/4, 634.406
 This sentiment is echoed several times by Barth CD III/4, 636-641. Gerald McKenny gives a thorough-407
going overview of  this aspect of  Barth’s thought in his recent, The Analogy of  Grace…
 CD III/4, 474.408
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than responsibility in respect of  others and self: Godward responsibility consists of  
particular concrete activities in which our agency is enacted and the theological description 
of  the responsible agent in CD II/2 §§ 36-39 is embedded and revealed.  
 The practical considerations that Barth here names “responsibility” are all focused on 
the relationships the agent has with those around her and with herself. Right relating is 
central to good human agency. It is both incumbent upon her as one who is commanded by 
the Word of  God and therefore encounters God, and as one who encounters other creatures 
– human and non-human – to engage and respond well. But, to argue that encounter is 
everything would be to misunderstand Barth and to read him as if  he were H. Richard 
Niebuhr. For Barth, human beings are responsible prospectively as well as retrospectively. 
The difference here is whether or not the responsible agent must, as it were, “wait” for some 
encounter with another before she may act responsibly. On the basis of  the pedagogical 
nature of  Barth’s theological ethics I suggest not: his reflections are not, as John Howard 
Yoder noted, descriptive of  the actual content of  the commanding Word to which human 
agents ultimately make response, but are indicative of  where Christians might situate 
themselves in order to hear that Word better. That the responsible agent may act in order to 
hear the command suggests that the momentary practice of  responsibility is about the 
actions humans undertake in their journey toward encounter with God/others/self  as well as 
the actions they perform in the midst of  and as a result of  those encounters. This double 
responsibility suggests that human agents can and do have their own agency and that their 
actions are potent and meaningful.   
 Having now seen what the practice of  responsibility involves for Barth, it is 
becoming clear how his thought in this area relates to the substantive description of  
responsibility given in the previous chapter. The divine command establishes human 
creatures in a particular relationship vis a vis God. Responsibility in this respect initially 
involves recognition both of  God’s sovereignty and also of  human creatureliness: as such 
the divine will is privileged over all human desires which are contrary to it. As I argued in the 
previous chapter, the substantive description is orientational: Barth directs human agents to 
God and the gospel. In this chapter, I have aimed to show how, having been placed 
theologically and conceptually in the position of  responsibility, human agents enact that in 
reality – i.e. in particular concrete forms of  life. Barth is clear about this: human 
responsibility does involve human as well as divine activity. This activity represents the 
embedding of  the substantive description in tangible reality – responsible agents act in this 
way because of  God’s sovereign activity in Christ. This involves the freely chosen path of  
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obedience to the divine command, and in so doing the ongoing discovery and reception of  
one’s own true humanity.   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Chapter 5 
Thinking with Barth about Human Responsibility 
5.1 Thinking about responsibility 
In the opening chapter I borrowed Edward Farley’s distinction between thinking theology and 
theological method  in order to suggest one way of  dealing with the critical problem of  409
understanding what Barth means by human responsibility. I suggested that part of  the 
problem for Christian ethicists has been Barth’s reluctance to treat human responsibility as a 
particular and substantive topic within his moral theology and therefore to be methodical 
and scientific in his approach to responsibility ethics. Clarification and elucidation of  moral 
concepts as well as a clear indication of  their practicability is a key practice of  any ethics, so 
the charge that Barth does not offer this when discussing human responsibility seriously 
undermines his assertion that he is concerned with Christian ethics in the action-guiding 
sense. Further, this perceived reluctance in Barth to be clear about his moral concepts has 
led to a skewed projection of  his position by scholars concerned to develop a Christian 
understanding of  human responsibility that is practically workable and ethically appropriate. 
I suggested in chapter 1 that ethicists have had wrong expectations of  Barth, whose 
methodological decision to treat ethics as an auxiliary of  dogmatics resists the kind of  
anthropocentric discourse with which much contemporary responsibility ethics proceeds. 
Another way must therefore be found, which does not try to fit Barth into the mould of  
contemporary Christian ethics, but which attends instead to his particular mode of  moral 
reflection and in so doing sheds light on his understanding of  human responsibility. This is 
what I have sought to do. 
 In Farley’s description, methodology means a structured and systematic approach to a 
given topic - a “science”  - leading to an obviously coherent and formalised account of  it. 410
To proceed methodologically is to be deliberate, intentional, and focused and to explore the 
contours and depths of  a particular moral topic thoroughly. There is also an agreed mode of  
investigation. Such formal and structured thinking is open to public scrutiny because it 
follows clear lines of  thought and argument, and these may be articulated to other interested 
parties. By contradistinction thinking, as Farley describes it, is more intuitive, often organic, 
and lacks the formal structure of  a systematic approach to a topic. It is about discerning the 
relationships between instances of  thought and reflection, and unearthing some of  the 
 Farley, ‘Ecclesial Contextual Thinking’.409
 Farley, “Ecclesial Contextual Thinking”, 16.410
Page !120
underlying theological influences that give rise to particular thought patterns. It is 
nonetheless powerful for that since it reflects some of  the deepest held convictions and 
reflections of  the thinker, and this tells us something important about the way we think. The 
potency of  this approach to theology comes from its rootedness in both life lived and 
experienced and also within a wider discourse about that life - culture, expectations, desires, 
beliefs etc. - and therefore requires us to recognise that the way we think about a topic is 
invariably influenced by context. Farley identifies two types of  context: our personal lived-
context as thinkers and also the intellectual context of  our thinking. This latter point has 
been especially important throughout this thesis, because my aim has been to understand a 
particular moral theme in Barth’s theology by attending to key passages in his ethics in which 
it is employed as a significant idea. Barth employs the language of  human responsibility at 
various stages of  his theological development, so I have been careful to pay especial 
attention to his theological ethics in particular in order to discern the meaning of  human 
responsibility. Engaging with somebody’s particular thinking theology on a topic is not as 
straight forward as critical reflection on theological method because it is by definition not as 
publicly accessible, and therefore needs careful attention, elucidation, and explanation of  the 
context of  thinking about a topic and the application of  language within it in order to make 
sense of  the theme itself. 
 I turned to Farley’s observation to help in two ways. The first was to suggest that 
Barth is best understood as a theologian who thinks about human responsibility as an 
important part of  Christian ethics, but who does not pause to offer a “science” of  human 
responsibility, a theological methodology that tells us how we ought to think about human 
responsibility. That is not to say that he is purely intuitive in his moral theology: on the 
contrary he does his Christian ethics intrinsic to a highly structured and ordered dogmatic 
theology. But, it is to say that he employs his own idea of  human responsibility without 
pausing to explain what he means by it, i.e. there is no science of  responsibility here. This is 
important to note when one considers the discussion in chapter 1 of  the development of  
various notions of  human responsibility in Christian ethics across the twentieth century.  It 411
has been necessary for all Christian ethicists to comment, however briefly, on their own 
approach to the idea and how it fits within the wider theological framework with which they 
are working. This was true of  Barth’s contemporaries, for example, Dietrich Bonhoeffer in 
 Recall Albert Jonsen’s contention that “in much of  the Christian moral literature the meaning of  the term 411
“responsibility” is vague and its use unstable,” in his Responsibility and Modern Religious Ethics, 6.
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his Ethics manuscript.  This observation explains why a study such as this is important, viz. 412
in order to make conceptual and methodological sense of  Barth’s thinking about human 
responsibility. As I demonstrated in chapter 2, the language of  responsibility was initially 
marshalled by Barth to resist the bourgeois Christian ethics that he thought was prevalent in 
the early twentieth century, and which was too indebted to Kant’s self-affirmation of  human 
agents. Later, as Barth gave it some more theological weight in the Ethics lectures, it was 
deployed to make clear particularly difficult or dense theological statements about human 
agency. Nonetheless, it is never the focus of  extended discussion for its own sake or for the 
sake of  clarification, so even when delivering the Ethics lectures Barth was conscious that 
responsibility was a muddled concept in need of  some clarification in order to become 
meaningful and helpful for Christian ethics. I drew attention to this in chapter 2. The fact 
that he was himself  unclear about human responsibility for so long seems contrary to the 
basic requirement of  clarification and application that the discipline of  ethics involves. 
 The second help I solicited from Farley was the acknowledgement that we may still 
discern and offer coherent explanation and critical reflection on Barth’s theological thinking 
about human responsibility by attending carefully to the intellectual and theological context 
in which it happens and learning to appreciate its contours. This means developing our 
understanding of  human responsibility ‘from within’ the framework he offers us in his 
dogmatic theology - i.e. by attending to the way theological language is used, and the way 
ideas are formed in dialogue with other theological concepts, we are able to say something 
about meaning. Taking the impetus from Farley I have sought thus far to think with Barth 
about human responsibility, and to do so across a wider range of  texts than has been done 
before, taking into account the earlier ethical works and the later, post-Christological-turn, 
material of  the Church Dogmatics. I have been concerned to understand what Barth thinks 
human responsibility is, observing the way he deploys responsibility-language, providing 
exegesis and interpretation of  key passages.  
 In this chapter I step back from the particular instances of  responsibility-language in 
Barth’s ethics, and attend to the bigger picture - offering an overall account of  Barth’s 
thinking about human responsibility. To do this I will draw several parallels between the 
instances of  responsibility language I have discussed earlier, most especially in the special 
ethics of  the Church Dogmatics. This will be the basis for my description of  Barth’s mature 
account of  human responsibility. Most important here will be the way in which the more 
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ‘The Structure of  a Responsible Life’ in his Ethics…, 257-289. This section features 412
an extended discussion of  Bonhoeffer’s understanding of  the human life as essentially about responsibility, 
and the co-responsibility to one another. He uses several extended examples to explore this point, and to give 
the reader as full an understanding as possible of  the theme he wants to develop.
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practical instances of  responsibility language described in CD III/4 and discussed in chapter 
4 of  this thesis, relate to the earlier, theological discussion of  divine and human 
responsibility in CD II/2, discussed in chapter 3. There are important themes, such as 
covenant and divine command, which must be accounted for in this as well as the 
relationship between the ontological description of  human responsibility and the ontic 
enactment of  human responsibility - both of  which I have suggested are present in the 
ethics of  the Dogmatics. 
 To this end, in section 5.2 I give a synopsis of  the development of  Barth’s thinking 
about human responsibility and outline the key observations made earlier.  This provides a 
platform for my constructive work in section 5.3, where I seek to give an overall account of  
human responsibility in Barth’s moral theology. I suggest that there is in Barth’s thinking a 
theology of  human responsibility which locates human beings in relation to God and one 
another, and a subsequent practice of  responsibility which is grounded in the prior theology. 
As I see it, these two ought to be regarded as complementary aspects of  a single account of  
human responsibility and the relationships that give rise to it. I offer a framework for reading 
Barth that grows out of  his Christology and which treats human responsibility by analogy, 
taking divine and human ontology seriously.  
 In order to establish this reading further, in section 5.4 I revisit the critical scholarship 
discussed in chapter 1 and assess the veracity of  my account of  responsibility in Barth 
against Jonsen and Schweiker’s own approaches to human responsibility in the light of  their 
rejection of  very particular readings of  Barth on the topic. I shall argue that Barth’s 
approach allows us a Christian responsibility ethic that is practicable and communicable 
without abandoning the core dogmatic theology which is proper to a Christian ethic. Rather 
than something to be abandoned, Barth’s theological content then acts as a challenge to 
Jonsen and Schweiker, whose own approaches to responsibility lose Christian integrity by 
their reluctance to maintain theological distinctiveness.  
 Finally in section 5.5 I offer a discursive note on Barth’s account of  human 
responsibility and its indicative usefulness for the co-inherence of  Christian faith and 
practice — holding theological considerations about the nature of  the human agent 
alongside the basic human requirement to act well, and in so doing to live responsibly before 
God. This, to me, seems fundamental to any understanding of  Christian discipleship, and 
gives us a helpful model for thinking not only about the ethics of  responsibility, but also the 
general shape and contours of  a Christian life. Barth’s responsibility ethics helps us to 
navigate the relationship between the active human agent and the will of  God, rooted in 
prayer and the divine command, but notwithstanding the practical requirement of  any ethics. 
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5.2 Synopsis 
Barth’s particular understanding of  human responsibility matured and developed as his 
theology developed. Over the thirty year period which underlies the texts considered in this 
thesis, there are several points of  continuity as well as change. I note these now in order to 
see the developmental aspect of  Barth’s work before offering a constructive account of  his 
mature understanding of  human responsibility.  
 The Münster/Bönn Ethics cycle is Barth’s first attempt to ground ethics in dogmatic 
theology in a comprehensive way, since the other texts discussed in chapter 2 - The Problem of  
Ethics Today and The Holy Spirit and The Christian Life  - demonstrate that his use of  
responsibility-language was theologically underdeveloped for much of  the 1920s. The Ethics 
lectures are therefore a critical point in his understanding of  human responsibility as a 
meaningful concept in moral theology, precisely because its deployment here in the first (and 
only) complete ethics gives us insights into how Barth understood the whole at this stage in 
his development. Some important points can be noted from my earlier exegesis. First, the 
human agent is not overlooked in Barth’s ethics. In fact, responsibility characterises the 
human agent’s place within the large dogmatic structure. It is a definite place to be occupied 
vis a vis God, and something to which human beings are led by God,  becoming the modus 413
which they inhabit in daily decisions and actions signifying their commitment to God. God’s 
action - in this case his command - is prior to human action, and as such the agent’s 
responsibility (Verantwortung)  is understood as responsiveness (Verantwortlichkeit) to God. As 
an ethic, this means for Barth that the primary work of  God is to address human beings in 
his Word - which Barth characterises as command - in order that they may act in response. As 
such, responsibility is a form of  obedience to the divine command, and therefore has an 
orientation and focus which is beyond the human agent themselves. In Barth’s thinking, 
human agency is constituted in this relationship: the Commander and the commanded.  
 Second, Barth invites his readers to comprehend human responsibility as something 
which must be enacted, but without indicating what that action must be or might look like. It 
is not simply his denotation of  a dogmatic “position” in relation to God, but something 
which gets really and truly experienced and lived. Responsibility is not the same as action, 
precisely because at this point it also names our metaphysical relationship with God, but 
when we act we assume a kind of  responsiveness to the divine command and so human 
activity has a new level of  meaning.  This is so in all circumstances and all situations, not 414
 Ethics, 49 (Ethik I, 82).413
 Ethics, 82 (Ethik I, 133).414
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just particular moments of  ethical dilemma: it is characteristic of  the whole of  human life. 
Though this is not very well developed in Barth’s thinking at the point of  delivering these 
lectures, I argued in chapter 2 that it was indeed a concern for Barth that Christian 
theological ethics involves human action - and so responsibility, naming as it does human 
relationship to God, must also name human action in some form or other. This idea is 
implicit, but as I argued earlier, Barth at least suggests it is important. 
 But Barth was clearly unhappy with significant aspects of  his approach at this stage 
because he refused to allow the publication of  the lectures in his lifetime. Nonetheless there 
are points of  continuity from here to the special ethics of  CD II/2 some ten years later. The 
most obvious is the place of  ethics within the wider discourse on dogmatic theology. But so 
too is the abiding presence of  responsibility language, as I noted in chapter 3. The basic 
content of  human responsibility is maintained from the Ethics lectures onwards: human 
action rooted in theological description. The major development is a theological and 
methodological shift placing greater emphasis on Christology, which has a radical affect on 
his approach to human responsibility. In the first instance, responsibility is applied not to 
human agents responding to what God has done - i.e. responsiveness - but to God himself  
assuming responsibility for human beings in Jesus Christ. I characterised this as God 
responding to Godself  in the eternal decision to be God pro nobis. This seems to be a much 
more theologically satisfactory approach to human agency than the earlier attempt in the 
Ethics lectures, where responsibility is solely the act of  the human agent who responds to 
God by living a life worthy of  God. The new emphasis extends the theological foundation 
of  human responsibility by arguing that it is not only constituted in God’s prior activity it is 
also actualised by God in Christ.  
 If  we were to stop here, we would make perfect sense of  the critical school of  
thought which rejects Barth’s method as not leading to meaningful human action. If  God 
has enacted our responsibilities in Christ, then what’s the point of  anything we do? The trick, 
however, is to follow through with Barth, who argues that only when the theological 
orientation is correct can we speak of  the human agent as being responsible. The point is 
that we can and may speak of  responsible humanity, but we must do so analogously. Human 
action has genuine meaning when understood from this perspective. Here, Barth’s particular 
emphasis on the Chalcedonian Definition is important: the full humanity of  Christ, caught 
up as it is in God’s own response to Godself  in the eternal covenant, means that all human 
beings are caught up in responsibility to God. And precisely because our response to God is 
rooted in Christ, it is good news. Barth is here much more consistent with his dogmatic 
insights, and in particular the notion of  covenant and election he develops in the earlier 
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section of  CD II. There is then a very definite and concrete enactment of  responsibility 
given in Jesus which is definitive for human responsibility in every sense, ontologically and 
practically, and to which human agents conform in their thinking and doing. The divine 
command is now not a distinctive event in the interaction of  God and the human creature, it 
is the event of  the human agent being confronted by the person of  Jesus Christ - and as 
such confronted with a vision of  their own true self  - and understanding that that 
confrontation has an imperatival invitation. 
 It is important to be careful here, as Barth is, not merely to make Jesus Christ a good 
example to follow for the would-be responsible person: the idea of  analogy is theologically 
richer than that. Human beings partake in the life of  Jesus Christ through faith,  and in so 415
doing are commissioned and enabled to be responsible creatures through faith. As such, the 
responsible agent is invited to enact the divine determination for them in Christ by living a 
life “in keeping with this disposing” , i.e. by analogy - believing that which God has 416
accomplished in Christ, allowing that belief  to permeate your thinking and doing, and to 
allow this Christ-ward orientation to inform our decisions. In so doing the human agent 
becomes a responsible human being as one renewed by the gospel in thought and action.  417
She also becomes more genuinely human, as Gerald McKenny observes, 
 …[Barth] seeks a more genuinely human ethic, one that reverses what he sees as the 
 modern human attempt to be like God and thus be inhuman. And it is in the  
 humanity of  Jesus Christ that this genuine human ethic is found, so that Christ is  
 both the one in whom the divine being is disclosed as being for humanity, and the  
 one in whom human correspondence to this divine goodness is fulfilled.   418
Hence Barth’s argument that “it is as He makes Himself  responsible for [humanity] that 
God makes [humanity] too responsible.”  As I argued in chapter 3, his particular 419
understanding of  the Chalcedonian Definition radically implicates all human beings in 
 See Adam Neder, Participation in Christ: An Entry into Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics (Louisville:   415
Westminster John Knox, 2009).
 CD II/2, 512 (KD II/2, 567).416
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Christ, and invites this analogous fideistic conformity to Christ: the exercise of  which is the 
proper grounds for talking about human responsibility.  420
 Certainly critics such as Jonsen and Schweiker have pinpointed this kind of  
theological approach to human responsibility as one of  the key problems with Barth’s idea. 
It is perceived that it is simply not action guiding. In chapter 4 I suggested that it is unfair to 
argue that Barth is disinterested in action-guiding ethics because he discusses human 
responsibility in quite practical, concrete, ways in the special ethics of  CD III/4. I pointed to 
Barth’s concern for genuine enacted human freedom as the leitmotiv which undergirds 
responsibility as a series of  concrete and particular activities each in relation to God, others, 
and self. These actual practices are themselves examples of  responsible action as well as 
being indicative of  what free, responsible, agency looks like. They include: prayer; sabbath 
observance; confession; relationships between sexes; parental relationships; relationship with 
neighbours; and self-care. This is certainly a step beyond the theological description of  CD 
II/2, and work needs to be done to see how Barth’s concerns for the divine command and 
Christ-centred human ontology relate to this (the task of  the following section), but it is 
nonetheless grounded in theological terms, most obviously divine and human freedom to be 
and to enact one’s being - though these two are established differently: human freedom is a 
derivative of  divine freedom.  
 The emphasis on responsibility and particular practices in CD III/4 represents a 
significant development beyond the suggestion that practice is an important aspect of  
responsibility, as in the Ethics lectures. Here, human responsibility is directly connected to a 
threefold relationship with God, others, and self, and these relationships are, by definition, 
enacted. The responsible human being is required to relate. It is not merely a theological 
description of  divine and human relationships, but an indicative theology of  rightly ordered 
human activity in and around these relationships. In this, our relationship with God takes 
priority because it is the relationship in which we are consisted as human beings, and out of  
which flows a right relationship with others and with self. These are maintained and 
supported by particular responsible actions in the sphere of  each relationship. This is also a 
new development. Whereas before some tentative sense of  orders of  creation was operative 
for Barth - “as a creaturely standard and basis for the knowledge of  the will of  the 
Creator”  - now Barth prefers to speak of  “formed references” to the will of  God, which 421
turn us and orientate us appropriately, but which are not themselves the command which we 
 Barth makes it clear that as we are bound to Christ so too are we genuinely free. See CD II/2, 609 (KD II/420
2, 677).
 Ethics, 215 (Ethik I, 366 ).421
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must hear and to which we must respond. This is to overcome any sense that what we do as 
creatures, or that creation itself, might be “misunderstood as laws, precepts, or 
commands” , as the orders of  creation were. The command is always direct address from 422
God to human beings. Following the Christological emphasis in Barth’s theology, only God 
can occupy the centre of  Christian ethical reasoning. Therefore, the practices Barth 
describes as supportive of  these spheres of  relationship are indicative: formed references to 
the will and command of  God encountered in Christ, but not themselves the substance of  
that encounter. They are, therefore, properly speaking response to the divine command. 
Human beings pray, therefore, precisely because in Christ we are commanded to 
acknowledge God in praise and thanksgiving, and invited by God to make our supplications. 
5.3 Human responsibility in Barth’s moral theology 
The question I have been concerned to answer in this thesis is what does Barth understood 
by human responsibility? I now wish to answer it by turning to the relationship between the 
two aspects of  his thought on this topic just outlined: the theological description of  human 
responsibility offered in the context of  CD II/2, and the indicative practices Barth describes 
in the context of  CD III/4. The connection of  these two is fundamental to an account of  
Barth’s responsibility-ethics in his mature theology. Since the whole approach of  this thesis 
has been exegetical, and focused thus far on particular points in the Barth-corpus, my task 
now is to offer something bigger drawn from these particular instances. From my reading of  
the special ethics, there are two aspects to Barth’s understanding of  human responsibility 
that come together to make a whole. 
5.3.1 The First Aspect: A Theology of  Human Responsibility 
I contend that the material in Church Dogmatics II/2 is best understood as a theological 
description of  human responsibility, rooted in the inner life of  the Trinity and the divine 
covenant. As we have seen, Barth argues that God becomes responsible to Godself  for both 
the existence and the well being of  all creation. This divine responsibility is actualised in 
Jesus Christ. Any understanding of  Barth’s account of  human responsibility must therefore 
be rooted in divine responsibility. But contrary to critiques made by, for example, Robert 
Willis on human agency in general and William Schweiker on human responsibility in 
particular, in making this point so clearly Barth does not neglect the proper role and place of  
the human being as active agent. Rather, it is necessary for him to argue in this way to 
establish the proper place and agency of  human beings by relativizing human responsibility 
 CD III/4, 29.422
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in relation to divine responsibility. The latter is the condition and context for the former. It 
is therefore meaningful to speak of  the responsible human, as I have suggested above, only 
in terms of  her becoming responsible in analogy to Christ. Barth remains on the attack against 
Kantian notions of  responsibility that are about promoting the self  as agent in isolation 
from God and others. 
 This means that Barth’s basic orientation for human responsibility is Christ-ward, 
since his Chalcedonianism means that all of  humanity is caught up in Christ’s humanity. All 
human life and activity therefore takes on the characteristic of  response to the divine will, as 
Christ is in some sense the enacted response of  God to God’s own willing and desiring of  
creation. God orders his being and action pro nobis in the eternal covenant, and this in turn 
constitutes human creatures as responsible before him. In responding to God positively, i.e. 
living in the light of  Christ’s redeeming work and embracing our creatureliness rather than 
trying to live as if  God did not exist, human agents live in line with God’s determination of  
them, and therefore in right relationship with him. This is to be regarded as the positive 
fulfilment of  human responsibility.    
 Relationship is key to this theological description because it is governed by the inner 
life that God has within Godself  in the eternal covenant decision. God’s relationship with 
Godself  is an ontological description rather than a sociological one, i.e. God relates as God 
is, as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Jesus Christ relates to the Father as obedient Son, but also 
reprobate and righteous human being. Christ stands as responsible before the Father, and in 
Christ our humanity is perfected and welcomed to share in the life of  God, not as God but 
as those caught up in the humanity of, and therefore responsibility of, Christ. Relationship 
and responsibility belong together, therefore, as two sides of  the same ontological coin. 
There is no way for humanity to be aside from its being in and with God. And God wills not 
to be without humanity. This desire for relationship with humanity on the part of  God is the 
condition for human existence. We therefore have our being in relationship to God. More 
specifically, we exist in and through Christ,  and stand with Christ, our fellow human being, 423
in responsibility to the Father. On our human-side of  this, we then are invited to a 
responsible life that images Christ’s responsibility. We are enabled by the Holy Spirit to enact 
this responsibility as we maintain right relationship with Christ Jesus.  
 The theological description of  human responsibility therefore has ontological 
significance: it is not simply about ethical behaviour, but acting in accordance with the reality 
of  God’s determination of  us; about occupying the “space” that is properly assigned to 
human agents as creatures willed and ordered by God, and learning to live and move within 
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it. Part of  the task of  a theological description of  human responsibility is therefore about 
orientating human beings within that relationship, turning our attention away from ourselves 
and towards God in order to discern that for which we were created and the appropriate 
ways to inhabit that determination. By contradistinction, an ethics of  irresponsibility would 
be to ignore or overrule the Christian claim that we are creatures, and as such to make 
ourselves masters of  our own destiny. This was the bourgeois Christianity of  early twentieth 
century Europe against which Barth determined to think with a greater level of  theological 
robustness. Hence the divine command motif  remains important throughout Barth’s career: 
moral information comes to us externally; it is not the product of  our own willing and 
doing. Humanity, rightly ordered, is determined not self-determining. As such, the divine 
command will not support the status quo. It is summons and vocation: we are not permitted 
to weigh the merits of  God’s will, but only to fall into line with it, since to decide upon its 
veracity and significance is to open ourselves up to destruction. Human beings are not 
permitted to be self-centred but God-centred in Christ; this is the essence of  human 
responsibility as Barth sees it. In so doing we discover and fulfil our real humanity. Following 
Barth’s Christological emphasis, we live analogously by saying yes to the divine will - the 
divine determination of  us - and no to our own self-willing.  
 This is Barth’s theological rationale for human responsibility. It is not the whole 
picture, but it locates the issue theologically and gives appropriate space in which the 
commanded and responsible human agent may act. It is not the whole picture for exactly the 
reasons that critics such as Schweiker and Jonsen articulate: it is heavily theoretical, and 
needs some indication of  its practicality. This is the concern of  the second aspect. 
5.3.2 The Second Aspect: Embedding the Theological Description 
The second aspect of  Barth’s ethics of  responsibility, I contend, is best understood not as a 
separate strand of  Barth’s thought, but as the embedding of  the theological description in 
the lives of  Christian people.  To “embed” in this sense is to show forth the truthfulness 424
of  the theology in the patterns of  life and behaviour we adopt for ourselves: to inhabit the 
moral space that is informed by the theological description of  responsible humanity and 
 The idea of  “embedded” theology has been around for quite a while now, usually connected to theological 424
reflection and frequently found in introductory guides to theological study. For example, see the distinction 
between embedded theology and deliberative theology in Howard Stone and James Duke, How to Think 
Theologically (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006). More recently there has been a recognition that every human 
agent is embedded in a particular context, and that this exercises significant influence over the way we make 
moral decisions. My line of  argument here is that it is the external, theological description, that ought to be 
our primary orientational influence; I’m therefore theoretically in keeping with studies that have recognised 
the interrelation between the metaphysical and the concrete, and the way embedding may be conceived as a 
movement from the former to the latter. See for example, Christopher Steck, ‘Re-embedding Moral Agency’ 
in Journal of  Religious Ethics 41, no. 2 (2013), 332-353.
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translate it into particular practices in the concrete reality of  our existence. But to embed in 
this sense is not to be given a series of  prescribed activities one must follow. Barth instead 
offers a series of  indicative practices that help us embed the theological description of  
responsibility ontically, to maintain the Christ-ward orientation, and to be open to the 
ongoing reception of  the command of  God. Such indicative practices are to be understood 
from the human-side of  the equation as helping us to maintain and inhabit our 
responsibility, and thus to navigate the “responsible space” in which we are situated on the 
human side of  the covenant. We do not cease to be responsible before God if  we neglect 
our Christ-ward orientation or our openness to the divine command. Instead, we fail to 
inhabit our humanity as it has been determined by God. Indicative practices rooted in the 
theological description of  the responsible agent, enable us to participate in the fulness of  
human being. 
 There are some points of  contact between the two aspects of  responsibility I am 
describing in Barth’s thought that help me to substantiate the overall point. 
 1) Orientation. As I argued in chapter 3, a key element of  Barth’s understanding of  
human responsibility in CD II/2 is its Christ-ward orientation. His constant assertion that 
human responsibility is analogous to divine responsibility enacted in Christ, means that the 
proper focus of  human responsibility is the relationship between the individual human agent 
and Christ, in whom their responsibility is constituted. This seems, to me, to be what is 
underlying the kind of  freedom and responsibility discussed in §53, Freedom Before God. 
Here Barth focuses on the practices of  sabbath observance, confession, and prayer as 
indicators of  “the responsibility that… God claims from [human beings].”  In these, more 425
than in other practices, we are re-orientated, that it is we are turned towards God; we make 
ourselves open to God’s will for us; we lay aside our own willing and desiring; we “address 
Him personally.”  These are very deliberate acts, though Barth is not - as I suggested in 426
chapter 4 - prescriptive about how to pray, or in which church one ought to observe the 
sabbath, or how confession should be made. But he is aware of  the involvement of  our 
inclination and will in these acts, and the discipline of  obedience that is of  central 
importance. To pray requires time, space, and thought. To confess requires reflection, 
honesty, and speech. To observe the sabbath means making plans with our time and money, 
the will to be alongside others in faith and fellowship, and to be open to them, and God in 
them, in community. In this sphere of  the God-ward relationship, our responsibility is 
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embedded in these activities. We respond to the good news of  Jesus Christ by turning our 
lives, time and attention, to him.  
 But this is not supposed to be binding or restrictive. Barth labels these activities under 
the banner of  freedom. Human agents are properly free only in this primary Christ-ward 
responsibility; we live out our freedom only as we pursue this relationship and these 
indicative practices help us to do so. Barth writes, “He does not will to be God without us, 
or to exist as such…He wills and demands of  us that which is proper to us in relation to 
Him…”  As such, these activities are in themselves our responses to God, and also enable 427
our future fulfilment of  our responsibility. In turning ourselves to God today, we also 
prepare ourselves to do it tomorrow, and thereafter. Responsibility enacted in this way, 
maintained in these particular acts, affects the whole of  life as it is lived. This is why it is 
important to regard these activities as indicative: they are not the sum of  responsibility in the 
Christ-ward direction. Daily prayer, weekly Communion, and monthly confession do not 
fulfil the requirement for a whole life orientated toward God - a whole life lived in 
responsibility, for which I have shown Barth to consistently argue from 1928 onwards. They 
are indicative because they interrupt our patterns of  self-willing and doing, and are 
themselves moments of  responsible activity which undergird and influence the rest of  life 
lived in responsible freedom.  
 We get a sense of  this when we consider that the Christ-ward orientation is not a 
blinker to the rest of  creation, and in particular to fellow humanity. Barth emphasises this 
primary, Christ-ward, responsibility in order to properly locate responsibility to other human 
creatures. This is a secondary responsibility, which is constituted in the primary Christ-ward 
orientation and influenced by the indicative practices of  that sphere. Barth writes, “As God 
the Creator calls man to Himself, He also directs him to his fellow-man.”  Our 428
relationships with fellow humans are rooted in our upward relationship. In this sphere, the 
indicative practices that Barth offers are about maintaing particular strands of  human 
relationship in the light of  the Christ-ward orientation. Barth discusses three concrete 
examples of  human relationships: male-female relationships; the relationships between 
parents and children; and the relationships between neighbours. He addresses each out of  
the primary concern that human beings are responsible before God and this will impact their 
actions towards others. A good example of  this is his discussion of  sexual intercourse, 
where Barth makes the point several times that what matters is not self-gratification or 
sexual exploration, but remembering that human beings “live in the presence of  and in 
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responsibility to God.”  To remember this responsibility affects our practices in the present 429
activity of  sexual intercourse - our purpose and performance changes. A little later, in the 
context of  marriage, he argues that the “usual inequality of  man and woman in marriage” is 
a failure on the part of  the man, normally, to remember his “responsibility …that their 
fellowship should always become a fellowship in freedom…”  It is usually the failure of  430
the man to seek the freedom and flourishing of  the woman that leads to inequality, and 
Barth can make this claim because of  the prior Christ-ward responsibility he sees as 
incumbent upon all people in their relationships, and the failure of  the man to live in 
accordance with it.  
 The primary sphere of  responsibility is relationship to God, and so Barth’s concern 
when describing indicative practices is to make sure that the theological description of  this 
Christ-ward responsibility can be embedded in real lived-life. But it implicates human 
creatures in other forms of  relationship too, extending Christ-ward responsibility in second 
and third spheres of  relationship to others, and to oneself. As such, rightly ordered 
relationship with our neighbours and ourselves is the pursuit of  those who know their life to 
be the enactment of  response to this divine determination, and recognise themselves as 
responsible agents before God in Christ. 
 2) Command. In Barth’s theological description of  human responsibility, the divine 
command plays the same role as it did in the earlier Ethics lectures, viz. the controlling centre 
of  Christian ethics. For Barth the impetus for Christian morality lies in the fact that God 
addresses us, and our lives take on the character of  response to that address. In the Ethics 
lectures the commanding-address is the work of  the divine Word spoken in particular 
moments directly to individuals. It is powerful, arresting the attention of  those to whom it is 
spoken and from which there is no escape: the hearer makes a response either positively or 
negatively, but there is no neutral position. In CD II/2 the Christological emphasis adapts 
this earlier theology of  address, such that Jesus Christ embodies the divine command. He is 
God’s Word.  As such, the commanded human being knows herself  to be so because she 431
encounters Christ: just as she knows herself  to be responsible as she encounters Christ. In 
terms of  theology, this locates the divine command with greater dogmatic precision and also 
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 CD III/4, 193. This is a particular instance of  softening of  cultural norms in mid-twentieth century 430
Europe, but does not detract much from the sexism of  the rest of  Barth’s account. The point here is not to 
examine whether the way Barth employs his theological description of  responsibility is accurate, but to note 
simply that he does so and marriage is an instance of  that.
 The influence of  John’s gospel on Barth’s theology is significant, and well documented. Barth lectured on 431
the text of  the gospel . See also John Webster, ‘Witness to the Word: Karl Barth’s Lectures of  the Gospel of  
John’ in his The Domain of  the Word: Scripture and Theological Reason (London: T&T Clark, 2012), 65-85.
Page !133
opens up a doorway for Barth to make clear the role of  the hearing human being as one who 
is responsible - since both the divine address and human answer are enacted in Christ Jesus. 
Conformity to Christ is therefore the key activity of  the human being who knows 
themselves to be addressed and commanded.  
 As I indicated in chapter 3, Barth does not treat encounter with Jesus Christ as an 
historical event or a theological principle on which to build ongoing moral reflection. This is 
not akin to a past testimony or “conversion experience.” Encounter with the divine Word is 
an ongoing event, a particular happening at moments in life that comes to characterise the 
whole of  life. We encounter Christ afresh, and are reminded of  our status and position as 
responsible creatures before him. Our responsibility is the response we make in the moment 
of  divine encounter, and the ongoing responses we make to him in the daily run of  human 
existence. Barth writes, “we are made responsible as we have heard his voice, and it is our 
responsibility to continue to hear this voice.”  We have been addressed and commanded 432
once, we are addressed and commanded now, and will be addressed and commanded again. 
This constitutes us as responsible before God, and ensures our ongoing responsibility to 
God. 
 This ongoing hearing and responding to Christ as the commanding address of  God 
relates directly in two ways to the embedded responsibility which is in view in this 
discussion. First, our response to God will always be embedded in as much as his command 
to us will always be in the concrete reality of  our human existence. There is no distinction to 
be made between the sacred and the secular in this case, at least, because God addresses and 
commands us entirely and so the entirety of  our existence is in view. Since to exist is to act, 
we will always be engaged in some kind of  responsive action. We embed the theological 
description of  human responsibility in this way, by living before God in the concrete reality 
of  our creaturely existence. Second, and more importantly for this discussion, the indicative 
practices Barth presents serve in some way to make us open to hear and receive the 
commanding address. In the sphere of  Christ-ward relationship, for example, the indicative 
practices of  sabbath observance, confession, and prayer help us to turn our attention to 
Christ and to seek to encounter him. Since to encounter Christ is to know oneself  addressed 
and commanded by God, then orientating ourselves by way of  these indicative practices aids 
us in our responsibility to continue to hear his commanding address. Moreover, these 
practices are themselves response to the divine command. In his discussion of  the Lord’s 
prayer, for example, Barth argues that we pray “with and after Christ”  and that this is 433
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“what God wills…”  Christ then is for us an imperative to pray, precisely because we are 434
caught up with him in his prayers to the Father. Again, his responsibility elicits our 
responsibility before God.  
 The idea of  responsibility never becomes a substantive principle in itself, but rather a 
way of  conceiving human existence in relation to the divine will. Because the flip-side of  
responsibility is relationship, the idea of  the divine address to human beings holds within it 
the notion of  relationality: speech, reception, and response. It also means that no time of  
prayer, sabbath observance, or confession will be the same. Nor will any relational encounter 
between human beings, or with oneself. This is true because each concrete moment in which 
a human agent embeds these relationships in particular practices is a fresh moment of  re-
orientation to Christ, and a new openness to his commanding address.  
5.3.3 Summary 
Barth’s account of  human responsibility may be thought of  as a two sided coin: on the one 
side a theological description of  Christologically conditioned relational ontology, i.e. that 
humans are beings-in-relationship to God in Christ, and this establishes and affects 
relationships with one another and self. The relationship between humanity and God in 
Christ is ontologically basic because it constitutes, enacts, and enables true human being in 
every sense; and on the other side is the embedding of  theological description in concrete 
human lives through the enactment of  indicative practices which orientate us towards Christ, 
and one another and self, and which make us open to receiving God’s commanding-address. 
Barth’s understanding of  human responsibility is therefore both an ontological category - 
the proper determination of  human beings in relation to God - and also a modus of  human 
life, a way of  conducting oneself  and enacting one’s agency that is fitting to the reality of  its 
divine determination in Christ. 
5.4 Revisiting Barth’s critics 
In chapter 1, I outlined Albert Jonsen and William Schwiker’s critiques of  Barth’s 
understanding of  human responsibility. These two represent the most comprehensive 
scholarship on Christian ethics of  responsibility in general, and engage with Barth as part of  
that - each is critical of  his theological ethics, and each rejects his understanding of  human 
responsibility. In the same chapter I note that both scholars make a similar methodological 
mistake when reading Barth’s responsibility-ethics, which is to focus too narrowly in their 
exegesis and to give account of  only one aspect of  Barth’s approach, in this case the special 
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ethics of  CD II/2 only. This narrowing of  vision encouraged me to expand my investigation 
into Barth’s understanding of  human responsibility, and to examine a much wider range of  
texts than has been done before. 
 In order to test the depth of  my account of  Barth’s understanding of  human 
responsibility, and to allow for a bit of  “push-back” against the existing critiques of  his work 
in this area, I shall in this section revisit Jonsen and Schweiker’s scholarly critiques, and 
explore the ways in which my reading of  Barth’s understanding of  human responsibility 
might be brought into dialogue with them critically and constructively.  
5.4.1 Revisiting Jonsen 
Jonsen’s critique of  Barth was to suggest that his overly theological approach to human 
responsibility was ultimately a problem for Christian ethics, because it could not be 
translated into action guiding principles. Jonsen categorised Barth’s work as “theological 
affirmation” of  human responsibility, and his challenge was to “translate the propositions of  
faith into philosophical propositions”  in order that they might become useful for Christian 435
ethics in practice. Jonsen’s objection is that Barth’s discussion has “nothing to do with 
practical questions…”  So far I have suggested that Jonsen’s judgement is hindered by his 436
reliance on his reading of  what I have called the theological description of  human 
responsibility, rooted and grounded in Barth’s Christology, and his failure to think with Barth 
about the ways this description can be enacted. Here I want to develop that criticism further 
by making three points. 
 First, Jonsen rejects theology as a legitimate source of  Christian moral reasoning. His 
criticism of  Barth’s “propositions of  faith” exposes his prejudice that faith-based ethics is 
required to translate itself  into more generally acceptable forms of  reasoning in order to be 
taken seriously, even by Christian ethicists. This seems like a strange request. If, as Barth 
seems to think, part of  the task of  Christian ethics, and in this case an account of  human 
responsibility within it, is to describe the reality of  human existence and human agency, then 
the Christian must acknowledge that the Church has always spoken about true humanity by 
speaking about Jesus Christ. This is part of  the credal nature of  the Church. And since, as 
Barth notes, Christ is not a principle - nor can a principle be made from Christ, that we 
might move beyond encounter with Christ - it seems that the only way for Christian ethics to 
proceed is theologically, i.e. from within the integrity of  its confession. The difficulty this 
poses for Jonsen is as much about the application of  ethics as it is about the method: if  we 
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go forward theologically, not philosophically, then the “reach” of  Christian moral reflection 
is much less. This is surely true. But Christian ethics must proceed with integrity. Theology is 
the language we use to speak about God in Christ. 
 My second point relates to this. Part of  the underlying argument here is about the 
“vision” of  humanity we wish to paint. All ethics proceeds with some kind of  account of  
true human being and doing in mind, but this is a major variable. Each ethicist will have his 
or her vision of  true humanity, or at least touch points that indicate what this might be like. 
For Barth, this account is God-given and can only be rooted in revelation, more specifically 
in the person of  Jesus Christ. When Jonsen turns to the material in CD II/2, I suggest he 
turns to the theological description of  the responsible human - the vision of  what it is to be 
a human being - so what he rejects is not Barth’s practical ethics of  responsibility, but the 
bigger description that informs practice. This is, for Barth, a true description - i.e. he thinks 
that in turning to Christ we see something of  ourselves and understand more of  what it is to 
be a human being, elect in Christ and determined by God. What matters in every ethic is that 
the vision gets translated into practice. Jonsen is concerned for this, and so is Barth. 
 My third point then, is that Barth does indeed translate the vision into something 
more concrete, as I have suggested in section 5.3. He points to a series of  embedded 
practices that grow out of  the theological description and which revolve around three 
relationships: Godward, other-ward, and self-ward. The Godward relationship determines 
the other two, and the indicative practices that underpin it serving to inform the character of  
the whole of  human life. These are grounded in the dense theology of  CD II/2, without the 
need to translate that into philosophical principles. What Barth advocates, and where Jonsen 
loses his nerve, is confidence in the ability of  theology not only to speak about God in 
Christ, but as it does so to speak about real human life also.  
 This last observation is quite ironic when one considers the conclusion of  Jonsen’s 
work. His own articulation of  human responsibility is the prospect of  “the human person, 
essentially a decision maker and creative moralist, working in community to find those forms 
of  rules and principles which will best promote and protect the growth of  human life in 
depth and breadth…”  For Barth, the promotion and protection of  human life can only be 437
sought of  God, and in particular God’s constitution of  true humanity in Jesus Christ. The 
debate between Jonsen and Barth is therefore instructive for all considerations of  how best 
to do Christian ethics: where do we locate the content of  our moral concepts, and in 
particular our anthropology? 
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5.4.2 Revisiting Schweiker   
Schweiker’s critique of  Barth rotates around his discomfort with Barth’s concern for the 
divine command, and its apparent undermining of  human agency. He suggests that Barth’s 
focus on divine-human encounter is to prioritise the “Other” to the detriment of  the 
responsible self.  This means that the role of  the human agent is never morally basic; 438
instead revelation is. This fundamentally undoes the order in which Schweiker thinks the 
moral problem should be considered, viz. “how a self  is to be responsible, that is, how a self  
is to respond to others.”  In a telling section of  his book, he explores how in the 439
contemporary Western world we are to seek out the sources of  responsibility - i.e. that 
which informs our sense of  being responsible agents - “after theism and 
metaphysics.” This is not Schweiker’s proposal, but rather his recognition that the context 440
in which we think about human responsibility is that of  post-Christendom, post-modern, 
culture. His rejection of  Barth’s approach is therefore a rejection of  the denial of  the human 
subject. In response, Schweiker develops his account of  integrated responsibility, in which 
responsibility is defined as the concern for the integrity of  value and practices - i.e. the 
enquiry into the relationship of  belief  and practice.  
 There are two points to be made in response to this, highlighting the way a more 
developed understanding of  Barth’s theology denies Schweiker’s criticisms. 
 First, it should be clear from my argument in section 5.3 that Barth has a very definite 
space for the human agent, but that this space is defined in relation to God and in particular 
in relation to the covenant. This is not the same as Schweiker arguing that encounter is 
morally basic, since the encounter is not ontologically constitutive of  human being, but 
rather of  the human being’s perception of  their position in relation to God and therefore of  
their appropriation of  responsibility. This is a direct challenge to Schweiker’s underlying 
assertion that human beings own and enact their responsibility in and of  themselves; that 
agency is not constituted but a given. Only if  Schweiker assumes this, can his critique that 
encounter undermines self-responsibility be legitimate for him. The real debate between 
Barth and Schweiker therefore concerns what human agency is and how it is constituted 
before God and fellow humans. Barth locates this in Christology, first, and embeds it in 
indicative practices - as I have already indicated.  
 This relates to my second point, which is that Schweiker thinks that responsibility is 
essentially subjective: it is about the co-inherence and integrity of  one’s beliefs and practices, 
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and that Barth attacks the subjective self. But against Schweiker, my reading of  Barth offers 
us a theologically robust understanding of  human agency orientated not towards the 
integrity of  one’s own beliefs, but the reality that human beings are subjects of  divine 
affection and as such are ordered and determined. This determination is, for Barth, the 
fulfilment of  our true humanity, rather than a threat to it. So, human responsibility is 
genuinely before God, and genuinely for the sake of  inhabiting and enacting real humanity. 
It is about flourishing as a human person. 
5.5 Barth, Responsibility, and Christian Discipleship 
I have argued in this thesis that Barth offers us an account of  human responsibility involving 
a dogmatic description of  the responsible human creature as one located vis-a-vis God, by 
God, through the enactment of  the covenant between God and humanity in Jesus Christ. 
The covenant is the context for human action, and Barth’s dogmatic description of  it is a 
moral ontology - delineating the space that is proper to the human agent. The ethical nature 
of  this space according to Barth, I have argued, is best described with recourse to the 
language of  responsibility. In Christ human agents are positioned as creatures responsible 
before God. If  this dogmatic description were all that Barth had to say on the matter of  
human responsibility, then the criticisms of  responsibility-ethicists such as Jonsen and 
Schweiker - that Barth’s account of  human responsibility is of  no practical value - would be 
justified. But I have sought to highlight the ways in which Barth suggests the theological 
description of  responsibility might impact human agents in the concrete circumstances of  
their existence. In particular, I argued that Barth maintains the Godward orientation that is 
proper to human responsibility by advocating prayer, sabbath observance, and confession. 
From these practices flow practices relating to the care of  others and the self. 
 The dual aspect of  Barth’s account of  human responsibility is instructive in a number 
of  ways.  
 First, “without vision, the people perish.”  That is to say Barth demonstrates the 441
importance of  moral vision in the construction of  an account of  responsible action that is 
also ontically viable. His outworking of  the possibility of  human responsibility is guided and 
shaped by his understanding of  what it really means to be human. His vision of  human 
agency is established in the two-natures Christology of  Chalcedon, applied in the particular 
context of  the covenant between God and humanity actualised in Jesus Christ, and the 
recognition that in Christ humanity is caught up in permanent relationship with God. This 
relationship is the proper determination of  the human creature - her moral ontology - and is 
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the telos of  her existence. In doing so, Barth opposes any ethics that seeks to bypass the 
theological vision by becoming overly pragmatic and action based, especially and in 
particular any Christian account of  ethics that avoids theological reflection. He is here 
recognising that a vision of  what human life is and ought to be is necessary for the task of  
ethics because without it no clear sense of  how the agent ought to proceed in life can be 
articulated. This point is made more interesting after my comparison of  Barth with Jonsen 
and Schweiker. What stands out here is the fact that the fundamental disagreement between 
the sides concerns the kind of  vision of  humanity they employ. 
 Second, Barth’s double-aspect approach to human responsibility allays fears that 
dogmatic ethics can only ever be descriptive in nature, and thus never provide any indication 
of  what human beings actually ought to do. This is the question of  viability. Of  great 
importance in any ethics is its ability to so inform reflection and deliberation that it will in 
the end result in some kind of  action (or inaction, as the active form of  abstinence). Human 
creatures are active in a world in which our choices and decisions make a difference to the 
course of  our lives and the lives of  those around us: therefore it matters that the dogmatic 
content of  our faith is not disengaged from the requirement placed upon us to act, and to 
act well. I am arguing that Barth’s approach to human responsibility gives us a particular 
model for deriving ontic agency from dogmatic (ontological) description. It works because 
Barth believes the dogmatic material describes all of  reality, caught up in God through Christ 
and given its own particular determination through Christ. In so thinking, Barth provides us 
with sufficient material to indicate the practices that will help shape our lives in relation to 
our true ontology. Of  course, Barth is unwilling to be exhaustive in his account of  ontic 
agency - the divine command mitigates against this, and requires him to acknowledge that 
God is God. But the core practices derived from the ontological description give life a 
practical threefold structure - Godward, other-ward, and self-ward - and recognise the 
complexity of  human relationships. Barth is confident in the ability of  dogmatic theology to 
speak to concrete human beings about how they may live. 
 Third, Barth’s account of  what I have termed “indicative practices” suggests strongly 
that fundamental religious practices are ethically valuable. Sabbath observance, prayer, and 
confession interrupt the course of  our natural self-obsession and remind us of  our true 
standing before God and in relation to one another. They re-establish us as responsible 
creatures. There is, therefore, no distinction between the secular and the sacred: our whole 
lives must turn to God in prayer as we turn in prayer at particular instances; our whole life is 
interrupted as we observe the sabbath day; our whole life is in view when we confess Christ’s 
lordship in the recognition of  our sinfulness. These practices keep us plugged into the vision 
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of  how things are in Christ, and help us anticipate its eschatological fulfilment. They form us 
as responsible creatures in recognition of  the fact that this is the situation in which we have 
been placed by God’s determination of  us in Christ. 
 The three taken together - the vision of  human life offered by dogmatic theology; the 
recognition that this must make a difference to what we do; and the part ‘religious practices’ 
play in moral formation - suggest to me some kind of  manifesto for discipleship. They are 
suggestive of  what is necessary to live as a Christian, and to do ethics as a faithful Christian: 
to be instructed by the dogmatic proclamation of  the good news of  the covenant in Jesus 
Christ, and to embrace God’s gracious determination of  human beings in him by acting in 
ways that correlate with that as hearers of  the commanding-Word.  Or in short, to respond 
to the grace of  God by living responsibly.  
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